



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A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Compiled by
EDITH M. PHELPS



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EXPLANATORY NOTE

This volume, true to the purpose of the Series, is not intended as propaganda in favor of a league of nations, nor to oppose it; but to reflect as impartially as may be, the development and present status of the idea, and the arguments against it as well as those in favor. The articles reprinted are arranged to set forth first of all, President Wilson's conception of a league of nations as outlined in his recent papers and addresses, the historical background, the development of the idea to date and the movements to advance it, with endorsements of the idea from leading men and organizations. This is followed by a general discussion where appear the arguments in favor of a league of nations, the objections to it and the difficulties that lie in the way of its realization. A selected bibliography is included for the convenience of any who may wish to pursue the subject beyond the limits of this volume.

December 6, 1918.

E. M. PHELPS.

NOTE—After the main part of this volume was printed, information was received of the union of the two English societies for a league of nations described on pages 50-52 of this Handbook. The new union is included in the list of organizations on page xxix.

The French plan for bringing about a society of nations was reported to Premier Clemenceau a few days ago by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and Senator Léon Bourgeois. A report of this plan will be found on the front page of the New York Times for December 20, and doubtless will also be found in other daily papers of the same date.

E. M. P.

December 21, 1918.

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
CONTENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliographies	xi
Books, Pamphlets and Documents	xii
Periodical References	xvi
ORGANIZATIONS	xxix
INTRODUCTION	I
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS ADVOCATED BY WOODROW WILSON	5
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	
Phillips, Walter Alison. Historical Survey of Projects of Universal Peace	15
Snead-Cox, J. G. The Holy AllianceLiving Age	23
Dennis, William C. William Penn's Plan for World Peace	25
..Proceedings, American Society of International Law	25
Stowell, Ellery C. A League of Nations	Nation
Mead, Lucia Ames. The Hague and Peace Conferences..	29
Our Arbitration Treaties	A League of Nations
32	
ORGANIZED EFFORT TO PROMOTE A LEAGUE OF NATIONS	
Levermore, Charles H. American Constructive Proposals for International Justice	World Court
41	
Keeping the World Safe: The Preamble and Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace	43
Victory Program of the League to Enforce Peace	45
League of Free Nations Association: Statement of Principles	Survey
47	
The League of Nations Society	50
British League of Free Nations Association	World Court
51	
French League of Nations Society	League Bulletin
53	

Buisson, Ferdinand. Appeal to Form a French Society of Nations	World Court	53
A League of Nations	New Statesman	56
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS ENDORSED		
Governments Pledge Support to a League of Nations		61
Men and Organizations Endorse a League of Nations		65
DISCUSSION		
Goldsmith, Robert. The Foundations of a Lasting Peace	Bookman	79
Grey, Viscount, of Falloden. The League of Nations		86
Brailsford, H. N. The League of Nations	English Review	93
Wells, H. G. The League of Free Nations	Saturday Evening Post	101
A League of Nations	New Statesman	109
Overstreet, Harry Allen. What a League of Nations Shall Be		124
Van Hise, Charles R. A League of Nations		134
Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference. Memorandum on War Aims	London Times	140
Tead, Ordway. Labor and the League of Nations	International Conciliation	149
Kallen, Horace Meyer. The Structure of Lasting Peace	Dial	155
Thomas, Albert. The League of Nations	Atlantic Monthly	162
The Defeatists	New Republic	169
Firth, J. B. The Government and the League of Nations	Fortnightly Review	173
A League of Nations	Living Age	181
The League to Enforce Peace	Spectator	185
Poindexter, Miles, Senator. A League of Nations	Congressional Record	188
Reed, James A., Senator. A League of Nations	Congressional Record	191

The Cornerstone of Peace	American Economist	198
Macdonell, John. The League of Nations in Jeopardy.....		
.....	Contemporary Review	201
Lord Cecil in Favor of a World League..New York Times		204
Angell, Norman. The Background of Aggression		
.....	New Republic	207
Butler, Nicholas Murray. A League of Nations		212
Holt, Hamilton. Why Peace Must Be Enforced		
.....	Independent	213
Taft, William Howard. International Police to Enforce World Peace	Nation's Business	217
Lodge, Henry Cabot. Opposition to Force for an Interna- tional Peace League		221
Marburg, Theodore. Germany and a League of Nations		
.....	New York Times	224
Freedom of the Seas	New York Times	227
Freedom of the Seas	Independent	229
Wilson, George Grafton. The Monroe Doctrine and the Program of the League to Enforce Peace		
.....	World Peace Foundation	230
Bryce, Viscount. The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations	Nation	235
Parmoor, Lord. Lord Lansdowne and the League of Nations	Contemporary Review	237
Bennett, Arnold. A Peace League Based on Population		
.....	New York Times Current History	241
Blakeslee, George H. Will Democracy Make the World Safe.....Proceedings. American Antiquarian Society		245
Pinkham, Henry W. A League of Nations	Public	251
Begbie, Harold. Can Man Abolish War?.....		
.....	North American Review	252
Rockefeller, John D., Jr. Man Cannot Live to Himself Alone nor Can a Nation		255



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ORGANIZATIONS

American Association for International Conciliation, Sub-station 84 (407 W. 117th St.), New York, N. Y.

Publishes "International Conciliation," monthly. Subscription price 25c a year; \$1 for 5 years. Special bulletins are issued also from time to time. Back numbers of "International Conciliation" and the special bulletins will be sent to any address post paid at five cents each. A list of those available is published in the October issue for 1918.

American Peace Society, Colorado Building, Washington, D. C.

Publishes the "Advocate of Peace" monthly except September. Subscription price, \$1 a year. Also handles the publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A complete list of these will be furnished upon request.

American School Peace League, 405 Marlborough St., Boston, Mass. Mrs. Fanny Fern Andrews, Sec.

Association to Abolish War, 17 Hazlewood St., Roxbury, Boston, Mass.

Publishes literature which is sent on request.

California Society for the Promotion of the Federation of Nations [Inc.], Nellie Wheelwright, 901 3d Av., Los Angeles, Calif.

Publishes the "Federator." Subscription price, 50c a year.

Central Organization for a Durable Peace, Theresiastraat 51, The Hague.

Church Peace Union, 70 Fifth Av., New York, N.Y.

Fellowship of Reconciliation, East 28th St., New York, N. Y.
Publishes the "World Tomorrow," monthly. Subscription price, \$1 a year.

French Association of the Society of Nations. Temporary office, 74 Rue de l'Université, Paris. M. Leon Bourgeois, Honorary President.

Irish League of Nations Society, 65 Middle Abbey St., Dublin, E. A. Aston and W. G. Fallon, B. A., Honorary Secretaries.

League for Democratic Control, Room 428, Walker Building, 120 Boylston St., Boston, Mass.

Publishes "Forward," monthly. Subscription price, \$1 a year.

League for Permanent Peace, 421 Boylston St., Boston, Mass.

League of Free Nations Association, 130 W. 42d St., New York, N. Y. Lincoln Colcord, Publicity Director.

Membership \$5 a year. Funds for publicity work derived from membership fees and voluntary subscriptions. Circulars and publicity material distributed free on request.

League of Nations Union, 22 Buckingham Gate, London, S. W. I. Viscount Grey of Falloden, Pres.

This new society was formed recently by the union of the League of Free Nations Association of which Viscount Bryce was Vice-President, and the League of Nations Society of which the Rt. Hon. W. H. Dickinson, M. P., was Chairman.

League of Nations for a Society of Nations Based on an International Constitution, 5 Cité Cardinal-Lemoine, Paris. Henri Lepert, Sec.

Publishes "La Société des Nations," monthly. Subscription price, 5 fr. a year, including foreign postage. First issue November, 1917.

League to Enforce Peace, 130 W. 42d St., New York, N. Y. William H. Taft, Pres.

Issues a small weekly publication under the title "The League Bulletin." Subscription price, \$1 a year. Also publishes many leaflets and circulars on the subject of "A League of Nations," including occasional digests of current literature on the subject, all of which are distributed free of charge. The library at Headquarters is also open for study to anyone interested. Active membership, \$5 a year.

Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, Prinsessegracht 19, 'S-Gravenhage, The Hague. Dr. B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, Dir.

Publishes a number of pamphlets and an official organ "De Toekomstige Vrede."

New York Peace Society, 70 Fifth Av., New York, N.Y. Charles A. Levermore, Sec.

Publishes the "Messenger." Subscription price \$1 a year.

Woman's International League, 70 Fifth Av., New York, N. Y. Nell Vincent, Sec.

Issues occasional leaflets and pamphlets which are distributed free or for a few cents.

World Court League, Inc., 2 West 13th St., New York City., Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Pres.

Publishes "The World Court," monthly. Subscription price, \$2 a year.

World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass.

Issues "A League of Nations," bi-monthly. Subscription price, 25c a year; \$1 for 5 years. This publication is the successor of the World Peace Foundation pamphlet series. The Foundation also issues other publications and pamphlets, a list of which will be sent on request.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps every war has created in men's hearts the feeling that there must be no more war, and that ways must be found whereby nations may live in peace with one another and yet secure adequate expression for the national spirit and the self-development necessary for full and free existence. Early in the Seventeenth Century Sully set forth the "Grand Design" of Henry the Fourth whereby a "General Council of Europe" "would examine into and determine all civil, political and religious suits either in Europe itself or arising out of the relations of Europe with the world outside." St. Pierre, William Penn, Alexander I, all conceived similar plans which they believed would put an end to war, and the Holy Alliance was originally an actual attempt to carry out the principle advocated today in the idea of a league of nations. The fact that all of these projects embodied the very idea which is urged today as the fundamental basis of a permanent peace, might discourage us from believing that a league of nations could be accomplished more successfully than were they, were it not perhaps that today we shall be able to see more clearly the fundamental defects in our political, economic and social systems that drive men to war; that perhaps by a study of the history of all the attempts that have been made to establish peace between nations we can see what has heretofore prevented us from attaining the real spirit of brotherhood which must be the basis of any lasting peace.

The impression derived from a study of the rather extensive literature that has appeared during the last few years is well expressed by Mr. H. G. Wells. Of the phrase "A League of Nations" he says "It must be confessed that to begin with it conveyed to most minds rather an aspiration than any detailed content. It was little more than the expression of a desire for

SELECTED ARTICLES

some organized attempt to end war in the world; in some manner the states of the world were to come together in a more or less binding pledge to substitute law for force in their interaction. . . . Within the frame supplied by this phrase however, an enormous amount of mental activity has gone on, and much that was entirely vague has now been thought out." One is struck too by the absence, until recently, of any real opposition to the idea, perhaps because in the minds of many it was comfortably destined to remain forever an ideal, and partly too because the active struggle to secure peace was not conducive, except on the part of the far-seeing few, of any consideration of methods where by peace was to be perpetuated after it had once been secured. With the signing of the armistice however the league of nations ceases to be merely a lofty ideal. To the more or less definite suggestions that had already been made by the Inter-Allied Socialist and Labour Conference, by President Wilson, and others, and by the League to Enforce Peace and other organizations, new proposals for a league of nations are formulating rapidly and new organizations are forming to promote definite plans for putting it into effect. The difficulties involved in its practical application are also beginning to appear, and, within the last few weeks, active opposition is evident.

In view of the rapidity with which the movement is now progressing, this volume will be somewhat out of date, even on its issue from the press, but it provides a history of the movement to date and represents in the reprints all phases of the discussion that have appeared thus far, and therefore will furnish a basis for study which can and should be supplemented by recourse to the discussions that will appear from now on in the press and on the platform in ever-increasing quantity.

In this volume has been set down, first of all, President Wilson's idea of a league of nations as developed thru his speeches and state papers of the last two years—ending with the Metropolitan speech of September 27. This has not been chosen as a definite proposal to which discussion should be limited but to give body to the proposition at the outset and to provide a starting-point for the discussion. In fact, it cannot be said, as yet, that there is a definite program on which discussion can center. Men are finding it necessary to reconstruct their ideas constantly in order to keep pace with the constant change of events. We

have an example of this in the new "Victory Program" which the League to Enforce Peace has just substituted for its earlier platform.

This first division of the volume is followed by a series of reprints selected to furnish the necessary historical background and to show how public opinion is reacting to the idea of a league of nations at the present moment. A special effort has been made to include the latest material available to date describing the various organizations that have been formed to promote a league of nations as a part of the peace settlement. Although no organization has yet appeared for the single purpose of combatting the idea, the discussion which occupies the most of this volume sets forth the arguments of the opposition as well as those in favor.

This has been followed by brief statements of endorsements from prominent men, governments, various organizations and peace societies. Many of these endorse the general idea only and do not support a particular plan. They serve to show the amount of attention that has been given to the question and from what varied sources the suggestion has come.

In the discussion following two aims have been kept in view; to give expression to the various conceptions of a league of nations as put forth by its advocates, and to voice the difficulties and objections as they have been given. The plans that have been presented vary all the way from timid schemes for a mere rehabilitation of the Hague, to the broad and comprehensive scope conceived of by Mr. H. G. Wells, or the British Labour Party. The opposition is divided also between those who, like Senator Reed; oppose the entire scheme of a league of nations, and those who approve the idea but are troubled as to its bearing on such problems as the freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, the self-determination of peoples, disarmament, and the degree of sovereignty that must be relinquished by the various entering nations if the league is to be a real success. The compiler has striven to select impartially and as judiciously as possible from the material available, all that would give light on the various ideas that have been presented, especially in regard to the questions that will be matters of controversy in connection with the peace settlement.

While it is hoped that the articles collected in this volume

SELECTED ARTICLES

will enable the reader to gain an intelligent understanding of this question, doubtless many persons will wish to make a more extensive study. For their convenience a bibliography has been included of the more important books and periodical articles on this subject. With a few exceptions, these have been published during the past two years, but the various bibliographies that have been listed will give access to earlier articles. Of later material the reader will probably find no dearth in the periodicals and newspapers he is accustomed to consult. For his assistance however it might be acceptable to name a few of the periodicals that are devoting or can be expected to devote much space to the subject, as the Advocate of Peace, the World Court, the New Republic; also the propagandist material of the various peace societies and league of nations associations which have been listed on another page of this volume. For the opposition, doubtless more material will be forthcoming in the Congressional Record, like the speeches in the Senate of November 15 and 21, published in the Record of the same dates, and many of the daily papers can be relied upon to represent this side.

It is hoped that every citizen will give earnest and reflective thought to this great question and thus take his part in the great settlement

EDITH M. PHELPS.

December 6, 1918.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS ADVOCATED BY WOODROW WILSON¹

I pray God that if this contest have no other result it will at least have the result of creating an international tribunal and producing some sort of joint guarantee of peace on the part of the great nations of the world.—*Address at Des Moines, Iowa, February 1, 1916.*

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their government to move along the line . . . second, an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. . . . I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace.”—*Address to the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, D. C., May 27, 1916.*

I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance, an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests, and unite the peoples of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There

¹ Excerpts from the addresses and state papers of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States.

is the achievement of the highest thing for which the United States has declared its principles.—*Address at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1916.*

We believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively secure those principles to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the complete and unhindered use of all nations.—*Public Address, June 17, 1916.*

When we look forward to the years to come—I wish I could say the months to come—to the end of this war, we want all the world to know that we are ready to lend our force without stint to the preservation of peace in the interest of mankind. The world is no longer divided into little circles of interest. The world no longer consists of neighborhoods. The world is linked together in a common life and interest such as humanity never saw before, and the starting of wars can never again be a private and individual matter for the nations. What disturbs the life of the whole world is the concern of the whole world, and it is our duty to lend the full force of this nation, moral and physical, to a league of nations which shall see to it that nobody disturbs the peace of the world without submitting his case first to the opinion of mankind.—*Semi-Centennial Address at Omaha, Nebraska, October 6, 1916.*

The nations of the world must get together and say that nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion cannot sanction. The world's peace ought to be disturbed if the fundamental rights of humanity are invaded, but it ought not to be disturbed for any other thing that I can think of, and America was established in order to indicate, at any rate in one government, the fundamental rights of man. America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to exert her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights throughout the round globe.—*Address before the Woman's City Club of Cincinnati, October 25, 1916.*

No covenant of coöperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war, and yet there is only one sort of peace that the

people of America can join in guaranteeing. . . . Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of Liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.—*Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.*

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

* * * * *

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them. . . .

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything

that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.—*War Message to Congress, April 2, 1917.*

The free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical coöperation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.—*Message to the Russian Government, published June 10, 1917.*

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.—*Message to Congress, December 14, 1917.*

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence.

What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one

another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe-guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardenelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the im-

SELECTED ARTICLES

perialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove.—*Address to Congress, January 8, 1918.*

It will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table, but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace, and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well-known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared

SELECTED ARTICLES

to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.—*Address at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, September 27, 1918.*

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PROJECTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE¹

The first of the long series of "projects of perpetual peace"—the Grand Design, which Sully ascribes to Henry IV. of France—was directed quite frankly, so far as it had any substance at all, *against* the [Holy Empire]; was, in fact, in its idea at least, little more than a strategical move in the secular conflict between France and Austria. Yet, though Sully says that its realization would have dealt a mortal blow at the imperial authority, the emperor was to be the chief or first magistrate of this new "Christian Republic"; but, in order to put an end to Hapsburg dominance, he was not to be chosen from the same house twice in succession. For the rest, the "Grand Design," which Sully says was first suggested by Queen Elizabeth, was a singular anticipation of certain modern developments. Italy, for instance, was to be unified as a "Republic of the Church" under the Pope (one remembers Gioberti's dream), and the dukes of Savoy were to become kings of Lombardy; while the independence of Belgium under a foreign dynasty is foreshadowed by the singular idea that the Low Countries should be carved into a series of fiefs for English princes or "milords."

As for the General Council of Europe, over which the emperor was to preside, this was to be modeled, with certain necessary modifications, on the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, and to consist of a perpetual senate of sixty-four commissioners or plenipotentiaries, four from each great power, two from each lesser power, renewable every three years. The function of this senate was to be to deliberate on affairs as they arose; to discuss matters of common interest; to settle disputes; to examine into and determine all civil, political, and religious suits either in

¹ By Walter Alison Phillips. Reprinted from Books and Reading, 1:88-95. October, 1918. Mr. Phillips is author of "The Confederation of Europe" from which this excerpt was taken originally.

Europe itself or arising out of the relations of Europe with the world outside.

Such was the Grand Design, which Sully recommended in language which anticipates that of the rescript of the Emperor Nicholas II. "He found the secret of persuading all his neighbors that his only object was to spare himself and them these immense sums which it costs them to maintain so many thousands of fighting men, so many fortified places, and other military expenses; to deliver them forever from the fear of bloody catastrophes, so common in Europe; to secure for them an unalterable repose, so that all the princes might henceforth live together as brothers."

It is on this Grand Design that all other projects of peace, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, are based—from that which Eméric Crucé gave to the world under the title of "*Le Nouveau Cynée*," two years before Grotius published his "*Le Jure Belli et Pacis*," to the latest program of the modern peace societies. It inspired the "*Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*" of the Abbé de St. Pierre, and through him the Emperor Alexander I.'s idea of a universal Holy Alliance. It may have played its part in forming the schemes of one whose name is not usually associated with projects of peace—Napoleon. Among the conversations of the great emperor recorded by the Comte de Las Cases, in his "*Mémorial de Sainte Hélène*," is one in which Napoleon explains the grand design which had underlain all his policy. He had aimed, he said, at concentrating the great European peoples, divided hitherto by a multiplicity of artificial boundaries, into homogeneous nations, which he would have formed into a confederation bound together "by unity of codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests." At the head of the league, under the ægis of his empire, was to have been a central assembly, modeled on the American Congress or the Amphictyonic Assembly of Greece, to watch over the common weal of "the great European family." Whether this plan had ever been seriously contemplated or not, it is easy to recognize in it the source of its inspiration.

The "*Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix Perpétuelle*" of the Abbé de St. Pierre was published in 1713, immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Utrecht. Its immediate effect was, of course, insignificant. The abbé, Rousseau scornfully

said, was trying to do by publishing a book what Henry IV. had failed to do with the power of France behind him, and with the aid of the universal dread of Austrian ambitions, which supplied a stronger motive than any care for common interests. But the abbé's project was destined to exert considerable practical influence later, and this gives to his proposals and to the comments of his critics a permanent interest.

The social order of Europe, he urges, is still largely determined by the passions rather than by reason. We are in civil relations with our fellow citizens, but with the rest of the world we are in the state of nature. Thus we have abolished private wars, only in order to set afame general wars, which are a thousand times more terrible; and in forming partial alliances we make ourselves, in effect, enemies of the human race. Now, Christianity, he argues has given to the nations of Europe, in religion, morals, and customs, and even in laws, the impress of a single society—to such a point that those peoples which, like the Turks, have become European in a geographical sense without becoming Christians have been regarded as strangers; and between the members of this commonwealth "the ancient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a sort of bond."

But the public law of Europe, not being established or authorized in concert, having no foundation of general principle, and varying incessantly in different times and places, is full of contradictory rules, which can only be reconciled by the right of the stronger. Now, every society is based on a consciousness of common interests, while all divisions are caused by interests that are opposed, and both common and private interests may vary with a thousand changes of circumstance. In every society, then, it is necessary that there should be a coercive power to command and concert the movements of its members, and, to form a solid and durable European confederation, it would be necessary to place all its constituent states in such a condition of mutual dependence that no one of them should be in a position to resist the rest. If, under the system of the balance of power, states are limited in their opportunities for aggression, what would their position be when there is a great armed league, ever ready to prevent those who might wish to destroy or resist it? Such a league would not waste its time in idle deliberations,

but would form an effective power, able to force the ambitious to keep within the terms of the general treaty.

The nucleus or model of such a league was already in existence in the "Germanic Body," as constituted by the Treaty of Westphalia—the "conservative force of Europe," since it was strong for defense but powerless for attack. Now, since the Treaty of Westphalia was the basis of the European system—the abbé argues—German public law was in a sense that of all Europe. His project was then, in effect, to remodel Europe somewhat on the lines of the empire as it was after 1648. Its provisions are as follows:

1. The sovereigns are to contract a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and to name plenipotentiaries to hold, in a determined spot, a permanent diet or congress, in which all differences between the contracting parties are to be settled by arbitration or judicial decision.

2. The number of the sovereigns sending plenipotentiaries to the congress is to be specified, together with those who are to be invited to accede to the treaty. The presidency of the congress is to be exercised by the sovereigns in turn at stated intervals, the order of rotation and term of office being carefully defined. In like manner the quota to be contributed by each to the common fund, and its method of collection, are to be carefully defined.

3. The confederation thus formed is to guarantee to each of its members the sovereignty of the territories it actually possesses, as well as the succession, whether hereditary or elective, according to the fundamental laws of each country. To avoid disputes, actual possession and the latest treaties are to be taken as the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting powers, while all future disputes are to be settled by arbitration of the diet.

4. The congress is to define the cases which would involve offending states being put under the ban of Europe.

5. The powers are to agree to arm and take the offensive, in common and at the common expense, against any state thus banned, until it shall have submitted to the common will.

6. The plenipotentiaries in congress, on instructions from their sovereigns, shall have power to make such rules as they shall judge important with a view to securing for the European Republic and each of its members all possible advantages.

It is impossible to examine this project without being struck by the fact that there is scarcely one of its provisions which does not emerge, at least as a subject of debate among the powers, during the years of European reconstruction after 1814. This fact is, perhaps, not the least striking on what may be called its negative side. In the Abbé de St. Pierre's project there is no provision made for even an honorary preëminence of the emperor; there is also no provision made for any representation other than that of the sovereigns. From this vision of perpetual peace the venerable phantom of the Holy Empire has vanished all but completely; this churchman and apostle of international union has as little use as the powers of the Grand Alliance for

"the center of political unity," against the abolition of which at the Congress of Vienna Cardinal Consalvi was to protest in the name of the Roman Church. He knows nothing too of nationality as the term came to be understood in the nineteenth century; for him, as later for Metternich, a "nation" is but the aggregate of people bound together by allegiance to a common sovereign—a conception which, I may add, would greatly facilitate the establishment of an international system, did it but answer to the facts. Of popular rights, as developed by the Revolution, he of course knew nothing.

Apart from the generally contemptuous reception which the abbé's project met with in that age of Machiavellian statecraft, the omissions above noted met with particular criticism during the eighteenth century. Leibnitz, to whom the abbé submitted his scheme, held that in its general idea it was both feasible and desirable. He had, he said, seen similar proposals made in the "Nouveau Cynée" and in a book by the Landgrave Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels entitled "Le Catholique Discret," and Henry IV., though his scheme was aimed at Austria, had clearly believed it to be practicable. For Liebnitz, however, the subordination of the empire was a serious blot. It had been a maxim of international law for centuries that the emperor was the temporal head of Christendom, and jurisconsults had reasoned on this basis. The empire had become weak, partly owing to the Reformation, partly owing to the alienation of its revenues and its consequent incapacity to enforce the decisions of the courts. But the dignity and precedence of the emperor survived, and he still possessed some rights of direction in Christendom. "I do not think it would be just," he says, "to destroy all at once the authority of the Roman Empire, which has lasted so many centuries. . . . Jurisconsults know that one does not lose one's rights, nor even their possession, because there has been no occasion to exercise them; and that it is not necessary even to insist on them, save where those who owe these rights declare that they wish to repudiate their obligation."

He goes on to point out certain respects in which the system of the empire is superior to that suggested by St. Pierre. The Tribunal of the Imperial Chamber (*Reichskammergericht*), for instance, consists of judges and assessors who are free to follow their consciences, not being bound by the instructions of the

princes and states that nominated them. Moreover, in the abbé's project there is no provision for the hearing of the complaints of subjects against their sovereigns, while in the empire subjects can plead against their princes or their magistrates.

The comment of Leibnitz is interesting because it anticipates the objection which, a hundred years later, Castlereagh considered fatal to the system of guarantees, precisely similar to that suggested in the third article of St. Pierre's project, which the reactionary powers sought to formulate at Aix-la-Chapelle and did formulate in the Troppau Protocol. The Abbé de St. Pierre pointed out how the proposals in this article would not weaken but strengthen the princes, by guaranteeing to each of them "not only their states against all foreign invasion, but also their authority against all rebellions of their subjects." In a memorandum on the treaties presented to the powers at Aix-la-Chapelle Castlereagh wrote:

The idea of an *Alliance Solidaire* by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government, and possession within all other states from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised, the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing could be more immoral, or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused.

In writing this, Castlereagh was unconsciously repeating and expanding a comment on the abbé's third article made long before by Rousseau, who in his "*Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle*" had written:

One cannot guarantee princes against the revolt of their subjects without at the same time guaranteeing subjects against the tyranny of princes. Otherwise the institution could not possibly survive.

With Rousseau we come to the eve of the revolutionary age; universal peace is to be the outcome, not of a fraternal union of princes, but of the brotherhood of an enlightened humanity. "The *projet de paix perpétuelle*," Voltaire wrote, "is absurd, not in itself, but in the manner of its proposal." "The peace imagined by the Abbé de St. Pierre is a chimera, which will not subsist between princes any more than between elephants and rhinoceroses, between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals will always tear each other to pieces at the first opportunity."

Wars of ambition will cease when the mass of people realize that it is only a few generals and ministers who have anything to gain by them; wars of commerce will cease with the universal establishment of free trade; wars of religion with the spread of the spirit of tolerance. As for questions of succession, these are for the people to decide. "The establishment of a European Diet," he continues, "might be very useful for deciding controversies about the extradition of criminals or the laws of commerce, or for settling the principles on which cases in which the laws of different nations are invoked should be decided. The sovereigns should concert a code according to which such disputes would be settled, and should engage to submit to its decisions or to the final arbitrament of their sword—the necessary condition for the establishment, durability, and usefulness of such a tribunal. It is possible to persuade a prince, who commands two hundred thousand men, that it is not to his interest to defend his rights or his pretensions by force; but it is absurd to propose to him to renounce them." Elsewhere Voltaire asks: "What is necessary in order to govern men, one's brothers (and what brothers!), by right?" And he answers: "The free consent of the peoples."

The outbreak of the French revolution, then—as the triumph of popular forces over those of the divine right of kings—was hailed by many as heralding the dawn of an era of universal peace. A single quotation may serve to illustrate a widespread hope which was destined to be so utterly belied. At a meeting of the Revolution Society to celebrate the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, Dr. Price—the first object of Burke's attack in the "Reflections"—thus apostrophized the leaders of the French Revolution: "O heavenly philanthropists, well do you deserve the admiration, not only of your own country, but of all countries! You have already determined to renounce forever all views of conquest and all offensive wars. This is an instance of wisdom and attention to human rights which has no example. But you will do more; you will invite Great Britain to join you in this determination and to enter into a compact with you for promoting peace on earth, good will among men. . . . Thus united the two kingdoms will be omnipotent. They will soon draw into their confederation Holland and other countries

on this side of the globe, the United States of America on the other," and so on.

Five years later, in 1795, Immanuel Kant published his treatise "On Perpetual Peace" (*Zum ewigen Frieden*), an essay on the construction of an international system on a philosophical basis. This basis he finds in the development of enlightened self-interest among the peoples and the growth of the moral idea, which has already made men open to the influence of the mere conception of law, as though this in itself possessed physical power. Perpetual peace will thus, he argues, ultimately be guaranteed by nature itself, through the mechanism inherent in human inclinations. "Seek first," he says, "the kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, and your goal (the benefit of perpetual peace) will be added unto you of itself."

But this moral idea and this pure practical reason can, in Kant's opinion, only be developed fully under republican institutions, because the people will never vote for war! His practical suggestions for an international organization, therefore, include these articles:

1. The civil constitution in every state is to be republican. But this republicanism is not to be democracy, which is opposed to liberty. The true republican government is representative.

2. The law of nations is to be established on a federation of free states. Such a great federal republic, if once established, would gradually attract other states and so ultimately include all.

It is perhaps not wholly without significance that a French translation of Kant's treatise was published at Paris in 1814 during the first occupation by the Allies. It is also interesting to note that in this same year was published the "*Réorganisation de la Société Européene*" of the Comte de Saint-Simon, who later on was to proclaim his appreciation of the benefit conferred upon Europe by the Holy Alliance. The language in which he does so is, I think, worth quoting here. In the third of his "*Opinions philosophiques à l'usage du XIXme siècle*," he writes:

The interests and the most widespread opinion of Europe called upon the kings to unite, in order to exercise the supreme direction over the social interests of Europe. In order that the transition from the feudal régime to the industrial system might take place in a peaceful manner, it was necessary that a supreme power should be established. The Holy Alliance fulfills this condition to perfection; it dominates all spiritual and temporal powers. . . . Finally, thanks to the formation of the Holy Alliance, European society is in a position to reorganize itself very securely, from the moment that a clear public opinion shall have been formed as to the institutions which correspond to the present state of its civilization.

THE HOLY ALLIANCE¹

Before "the sun of Austerlitz" had risen, the Tsar Alexander had approached Great Britain with proposals which, after Waterloo, ripened into the Holy Alliance. That strange concert of the Great Powers at the outset was quite free from reactionary tendencies. Directed primarily against France, as the powder-magazine of Europe, it was avowedly a league of sovereigns pledged to govern in accordance with the principles of the Gospel of Christ—the kings were to regard each other as brothers, and their peoples as their children. In a letter to Count Lieven, his ambassador in London, the Tsar declared that "the sole and exclusive object of the alliance can only be the maintenance of peace and the union of all the moral interests of the peoples which Divine Providence has been pleased to unite under the banner of the Cross." And the Alliance proposed to secure the peace of the world by jointly guaranteeing to each Power the territories assigned to it by the Congress of Vienna. In other words, the object of the Alliance was to perpetuate peace on the basis of the *status quo*.

With all their thoughts colored by recollections of the French Revolution, it is not surprising that some of the assembled sovereigns thought that the danger to France was quite as likely to come from internal commotions as from national greed, or dynastic quarrels. Then came the idea of what we should now call "a preventive war." To the league of the kings it seemed clearly their duty to nip any revolutionary movement in the bud as quickly as possible. As early as 1818 we find Castlereagh warning the British Cabinet as to this danger to the liberties of nations. He reports that the Tsar and his Minister, Capo d'Istria, "were, in conversation, disposed to push their ideas very far indeed, in the sense of all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a common league, guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things, in thrones as well as in territories, all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first Power that offended,

¹ From "A Future Machinery of Peace," by J. G. Snead-Cox. Living Age. 292:771-9. March 31, 1917.

either by her ambition or her revolutionary transgression." Two years later when Great Britain was getting restive and, indeed, thoroughly alarmed at the Absolutist tendencies of the Alliance, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed the famous Protocol of Troppau, which laid down the principle of intervention in the case of revolutionary movements, in these words:

States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto*, cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance.

It is unnecessary to trace in detail how the rift within the alliance gradually widened. For England, the breaking point was reached when, in 1822, France, under the guidance of Chateaubriand and as the instrument of the Alliance, invaded Spain to crush the Liberal movement, and restore the power of the Bourbons. Canning ended the negotiations with the words: "England is under no obligation to interfere, or to assist in interfering, in the internal concerns of independent nations." He went on to say that, as he understood them, England's engagements "had reference wholly to the state of territorial possession settled at the peace." The Alliance might have survived the defection of Great Britain, and it seemed strengthened by the easy success of the campaign in behalf of Ferdinand VII., but it was terribly shaken by the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which twice emptied the throne of France. The marching of the Russian armies into Hungary in 1849, in the interests of the House of Hapsburg, may be regarded as the last fruits of the Alliance. Its final collapse was due to what the Tsar Nicholas regarded as his betrayal by Austria at the time of the Crimean War.

WILLIAM PENN'S PLAN FOR WORLD PEACE¹

The problem of world organization has for centuries attracted the attention of many of the world's greatest constructive thinkers. In 1693 William Penn found time in the midst of his great struggle for religious liberty and in the midst of a world war to write his *Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe*. The literature on peace and world organization was then very meager, and there appears to be no evidence that Penn was acquainted with such as there was, beyond the Great Design of Henry IV. and his Minister Sully, which was after all so largely devoted to redrawing the map of Europe as to afford comparatively little guidance beyond suggesting the idea of world organization. And yet Penn's essay, it is believed contains every substantive idea which has ever found expression as regards international organization, arbitration and peace.

Since then, the world has merely been endeavoring to catch up with Penn, to fill in the details of the outline sketch which he drew, to furnish the evidence needed in support of the general propositions which he advanced, and to translate his dream into reality. In this work a host of wise and open-minded men of every nation have contributed, among whom might be mentioned Saint Pierre in France, Kant in Germany, Bentham in England and Ladd in the United States, coming down through more than 200 years to President Wilson's memorable address to the Senate of January 22d last, in which he bravely took his reputation as a practical statesman into his hands and, speaking both as an individual and also "as the responsible head of a great government," dared to make the adoption of the dream of the great philosophers and philanthropists of the past a question of the practical politics of to-day.

Penn was a Quaker. It would be scarcely denied that he was a good Quaker. He not only believed in the inherent wickedness of war but in its futility. He understood with

¹ From "International Organization: Executive and Administrative," by William C. Dennis, member of the District of Columbia Bar. In the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1917:91-100.

John Bright, that other great English Quaker statesman, that "force is never a remedy" and that men can no more be made righteous by treaties enforced by armies than they can by laws enforced by the policemen. He understood that true peace, the peace of the soul, comes from within because a spirit has entered the soul of man "which taketh away the occasion for war." At the same time he was the founder of Pennsylvania and he knew, as he quaintly says, referring of course to ordinary civil peace, not the peace of the spirit, that "peace is maintained by justice which is the fruit of government as government is from society and society from consent," and he believed a hundred and fifty years before Darwin that the life history of the individual is the miniature of the life history of the race, or, as he puts it, "that by the same rules of justice and prudence by which parents and masters govern their families, and magistrates their cities, and estates their republics and princes and kings their principalities and kingdoms, Europe may obtain and preserve peace among her sovereignties."

So believing and knowing that civil peace among individuals is maintained by force, actual or potential, he had no hesitation in proposing to maintain peace among nations in the same manner. Further than that he had no hesitation about compelling a recalcitrant nation by force to become a member of the league which he proposed and which he styled "the sovereign or imperial diet, parliament or state of Europe" and to submit to a proper reduction of armaments. Answering the objection which might be raised "that the strongest and richest sovereignty will never agree to it," he replies, "I answer to the first part he is not stronger than all the rest and for that reason you should promote this and compel him into it, especially before he be so, for then it will be too late to deal with such a one."

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

At the present moment the whole world is interested in the establishment of a League of Nations. Although there is nothing novel in this perennial topic of discussion, illustrious support for the project has now been obtained. A further interest attaches to the present propaganda, since it is generally acknowledged that the approaching conclusion of the great war in Europe will be an opportune moment for improving the constitution of our international relations. The magnitude of the present conflict and the advance in civilization will make it possible to effect reforms much more radical and far-reaching than at any previous period. In the midst of the tragic events of the war many philosophers and philanthropists are looking forward to the realization of this League of Nations, as in the nature of an atonement for the degradation of carnage into which we have been plunged. It is interesting to compare their hopes and prophecies with an important proposal made by a philosopher of Massachusetts in the year 1840.²

William Ladd's own words were: "It is proposed to organize a Court of Nations, composed of as many members as the Congress of Nations shall previously agree upon, say, two from each of the Powers represented at the Congress" (p. 34). The members of this court were to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as Ambassadors and to give their verdicts by a majority. In regard to their jurisdiction, Mr. Ladd proposed: "All cases submitted to the court should be judged by the true interpretation of existing treaties, and by the laws enacted by the Congress and ratified by the nations represented; and where these treaties and laws fail of establishing the point at issue, they should judge the cause by the principles of equity and justice" (p. 35).

The author, in an illuminating discussion of the objections which might be raised against such a court, enumerates them

¹ By Ellery C. Stowell, Associate Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Nation. 103:536-8. December 7, 1916.

² "An Essay on the Congress of Nations," by William Ladd. Reprinted from the original edition for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916.

substantially as follows: that it was an innovation; that it gave too much power to a few men; that there was no machinery for the enforcing of the decrees of the court; that it would be dangerous to the maintenance of existing forms of government; that republics, being in a minority among the nations, would not have so good a chance of obtaining justice; that there existed already a satisfactory system based upon many precedents of submitting international disputes to arbitration. Ladd gives a convincing refutation to many of the arguments against this latter system, and obtained a practical vindication when the calling of the first Hague Conference brought to pass the great Congress of Nations which he foretold. This Legislature of the World, as he described it, became, as he also proposed, the Constituent Assembly of an Arbitral Tribunal. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague differed, however, in one important particular. Instead of Ladd's plan of two representatives appointed by each nation, holding office during good behavior, and rendering their decisions by a majority vote, the Permanent Court, as at present organized, consists of a list of arbitrators—not more than four representatives from each country—who are appointed for terms of six years, which may be renewed. They serve without compensation except as they may be especially designated to act as arbitrators in some case which is submitted to the court.

The Hague Court is evidently a compromise between the plan proposed by Ladd and the older system of unlimited choice for the selection of the arbitrators. Nevertheless, it seems to be a happy mean, such as Ladd himself commends as a cautious step along the road of progress.

THE HAGUE AND PEACE CONFERENCES¹*The First Hague Conference*

On May 18, 1899, one hundred delegates of the twenty-six nations that had representatives at St. Petersburg met in the Queen's House in the Wood at The Hague to consider the Czar's rescript issued in August, 1898. The mightiest monarch in Christendom, appalled that the increased cost of armaments was bringing about the very results armies were formed to avert, had urged the nations to discuss the question of limitation and reduction of armaments. For nearly three months the Conference in three committees worked steadily on its problems. The service rendered by the English, French, and other commissioners was very great. Vast numbers of letters and telegrams were sent from America to Andrew D. White and the other American delegates at The Hague, and at a critical moment this strong expression of American opinion had great weight. Though disarmament was not definitely arranged for, a Permanent International Tribunal, as the necessary first step towards it, was agreed upon by the delegates. They also arranged for commissions of inquiry and methods of mediation and conciliation between the signatory powers.

Their achievement was the greatest of the kind in human history. The delegates, who had assembled with misgivings, like those at our Constitutional Convention in 1787, parted in confidence and hope.

The Hague Court was opened in April, 1901. A fine mansion was purchased for it—to be used until the Peace Palace provided by Mr. Carnegie is opened—and a permanent secretary installed. It has now a board of one hundred and thirty judges from the countries that ratified the Conventions. These judges remain at home until selected to try a case. Recourse to the Hague Court is optional until nations pledge themselves by arbitration treaties to use it. Several

¹ From "A Primer of the Peace Movement," by Lucia Ames Mead, National Secretary of the Woman's Peace Party. 8th Ed. Rev. American Peace Society.

jurists have repeatedly been asked to serve at The Hague, and thus have in a peculiar sense become international judges.

The Hague provision for Commissions of Inquiry prevented strife between England and Russia when the Russian admiral in the North Sea fired on an English fishing fleet as he was on his way to meet Admiral Togo. An international commission of admirals which met in Paris allayed English fury, and Russia paid the widows and orphans more than \$300,000 for her blunder. The Hague provision for mediation was used by President Roosevelt when he invited Russia and Japan to send commissioners to settle their war at Portsmouth, N. H.—one of the most romantic achievements of modern history.

The Second Hague Conference

In June, 1907, the Second Hague Conference, the call for which had been delayed by the Russo-Japanese war and the Pan-American Conference, convened with 256 delegates from forty-four nations, representing practically the power and wealth of the world. Hon. Joseph H. Choate headed the American delegation and presented a plea for a Court of Arbitral Justice at The Hague, to supplement (and not abolish) the present Arbitration Tribunal. This was agreed upon. . . . The Porter-Drago doctrine arranged for the peaceful settlement of difficulties arising from non-payment of contractual debts. Germany, which had been an obstacle to progress in 1899, led to the establishment of a Prize Court, to adjust ownership of captures in war. This marks the first real concession of the absolute right of sovereignty, and is a very important precedent. The Conference was practically unanimous in endorsing the principle of obligatory arbitration. Among provisions agreed to for lessening the injustice of war was that forbidding bombardment of unfortified places.

Peace Congresses

The first International Peace Congress was planned in Boston and held in London in 1843. Of its three hundred delegates, thirty were from the United States. The second

received its impulse from Elihu Burritt, and was held in Brussels in 1848. The third, in Paris, in 1849, had an attendance of two thousand, and was presided over by Victor Hugo. The fourth was in Frankfort in 1850, and the fifth in London in 1851. Burritt was an active promoter of all of these last.

The Peace Congresses were revived in 1889, and have been held in London, Rome, Berne, Chicago, Antwerp, Budapest, Hamburg, Paris, Glasgow, Monaco, Rouen, Boston, Lucerne, Milan, Munich, London, Stockholm, and Geneva. Since the meeting in 1903, most European nations have signed arbitration treaties pledging reference to The Hague Court, and France and England, unfriendly to each other for centuries, have quietly settled by diplomacy a half-dozen matters any one of which in former days might have led to war. The mere fact of a World Court being ready to hear disputes causes many a case to be peaceably settled out of court.

The International Peace Congress of 1904 met in Boston in October, and was opened by Secretary Hay. It was by far the largest International Peace Congress ever held, and was followed by great meetings in many American cities.

National Peace Congresses in addition to the international have been held in England, Germany, France, and the United States. The first National American Peace Congress was held in New York City from April 14-17, 1907, to arouse public sentiment regarding the points to be considered at the second Hague Conference. Secretary Root addressed it, and many thousands of persons attended it. The Second Congress was in Chicago in 1909. The Third National Peace Congress in 1911, at Baltimore, was opened by President Taft. For the first time since Peace Congresses began, the head of a great nation honored it by his presence.

Two National Arbitration Conferences have been held in this country, in Washington, in 1896 and 1904.

The Annual Mohonk Arbitration Conferences since 1895, to which Mr. Albert K. Smiley annually invited hundreds of judges, college presidents, captains of industry, etc., have had great influence.

OUR ARBITRATION TREATIES¹

The Hague Court began operation in 1901, and since that time has had on its docket 17 cases, of which 15 have been decided. Its operation previous to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 demonstrated that while it was sound in principle and timely in appearance, it was inadequate because it was not what it purported to be, a "permanent court of arbitration." For the court established at The Hague was merely a panel of judges from which arbitrators might conveniently be chosen by litigant nations. The next logical step in advance was taken by the United States. Secretary of State Root saw the cogency of the arguments for a court consisting of permanent judges, and in his instructions to the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference he discussed the problem involved and gave this positive direction:

It should be your effort to bring about in the Second Conference a development of The Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility.

The American delegates loyally carried out the desire of their Government. Before the conference was over, they had enlisted the co-operation of Great Britain and Germany for their plan, which was complete, except for a method of successfully apportioning 15 judges among 44 states. But the American delegates succeeded in having the principle indorsed in the Final Act of the conference, to which was appended the entire project, minus details respecting the composition of the court. Though the conventions signed by the conference required ratification by the powers to become binding, the Final Act did not; so that while the project failed of immediate realization, the wish expressed in the Final Act committed 44 states of the civilized world to the advisability of such a court in these words:

The conference calls the attention of the signatory powers to the advisability of adopting the annexed draft convention for the creation of a Court

¹ From "A League of Nations." Vol. I. p. 30-8. October, 1917.

of Arbitral Justice, and of bringing it into force as soon as an agreement has been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the court.¹

With the idea of a league of peace backed by regulated force already prominently launched by a former President of the United States, there was formed in New York at almost the time when Mr. Roosevelt was speaking at Kristiania an organization called the World Federation League. This organization proved to be short-lived; but it was instrumental in having Congress consider and pass a joint resolution providing for a commission to study the preservation of peace and the establishment of a combined force for its maintenance. This resolution, which was approved by President Taft on June 25, 1910, is of peculiar significance because it is believed to be the first attempt on the part of any legislature to initiate an organization of the nations of the world, with or without the element of force. The joint resolution as passed reads:

[No. 43.] JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION IN RELATION TO UNIVERSAL PEACE.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States to consider the expediency of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement, and of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of government for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war: Provided, That the total expense authorized by this Joint Resolution shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars and that the said commission shall be required to make final report within two years from the date of the passage of this resolution.

Approved June 25, 1910²

The idea was in advance of its time, even though it correctly expressed the aspirations of the American Congress and the American people. When the Government inquired of other states as to their attitude on the matter and the Department of State examined the world situation with a view to realizing the purpose intended, it was found that action was not possible. There is only one official statement respecting the matter in American public records, but that is clear and

¹ Scott, *Texts of the Peace Conference at The Hague 1899 and 1907*, 138-139.

² *Statutes at Large*, 36, Part I, 885.

accurately reflects the situation at the time. President Taft in his annual message of December 6, 1910, wrote:

I have not as yet made appointments to this commission because I have invited and am awaiting the expression of foreign governments as to their willingness to co-operate with us in the appointment of similar commissions or representatives who would meet with our commissioners and by joint action seek to make their work effective.¹

Foreign governments evidently discouraged the American initiative.

Two weeks lacking a day after the publication of this message, President Taft proved how thoroughly he had the cause of pacific settlement at heart by consenting to address the annual meeting of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes at its annual banquet. Not only did he lend to the ideal for which the society stood the prestige of his position, but he thrilled his hearers, and the world next day through the newspapers, by suggesting, responsibly, for the first time on behalf of a great power, that the arbitral settlement of every issue between states, whether or not involving honor or vital interest, might be attempted. In his address, he made an assertion which was immediately taken up as indicating a new American policy. His words were:

If now we can negotiate and put through a positive agreement with some great nation to abide the adjudication of an international arbitral court in every issue which can not be settled by negotiation, no matter what it involves, whether honor, territory, or money, we shall have made a long step forward by demonstrating that it is possible for two nations at least to establish as between them the same system of due process of law that exists between individuals under a government.

It seems to be the view of many that it is inconsistent for those of us who advocate any kind of preparation for war or any maintenance of armed force or fortification to raise our voices for peaceful means of settling international controversies. But I think this view is quite unjust and is not practical. We only recognize existing conditions and know that we have not reached a point where war is impossible or out of the question, and do not believe that the point has been reached in which all nations are so constituted that they may not at times violate their national obligations.²

President Taft showed without delay that he was in earnest. The administration announced the intention of negotiating treaties involving the solution of every issue by peace-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910*, ix.

² *Proceedings of International Conference under the auspices of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Washington, D. C., December 15-17, 1910*, 353.

ful methods with two of the great powers. American relations with France had proceeded without a ripple of distrust or serious difference for a century, and there was a mutual admiration between the two republics that made France a natural party to such an agreement. America's relations with the other great English-speaking state, Great Britain, had varied; but the year in which the President spoke had seen the settlement of the last continued and serious difference between the two countries, when the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration had rendered its decision in the North Atlantic Fisheries controversy. Cordial relations, similarity in institutions, a common language, and like ideals all pointed to Great Britain as another participant in the projected step forward. Great Britain and France were approached and were found to be responsive.

The problem remained to find a formula capable at the same time of realizing what the President had in mind, and of safeguarding the rights of the contracting states. In addressing the Third National Peace Congress at its opening session in Baltimore on May 3, 1911, he hinted at the difficulties confronting the administration:

Your chairman has been good enough to refer to something that I had said with reference to a hope for general arbitration, and the expression of opinion that an arbitration treaty of the widest scope between two great nations would be a very important step in securing the peace of the world. I do not claim any patent on that statement, and I have no doubt that it is shared by all who understand the situation at all. I have no doubt that an important step—if such an arbitration treaty can be concluded—will have been taken, but it will not bring an end of war at once. It is a step, and we must not defeat our purposes by enlarging the expectation of the world as to what is to happen and then disappointing them. In other words, we must look forward with reasonable judgment, and look to such an arbitration treaty as one step, to be followed by other steps as rapidly as possible; but we must realize that we are dealing with a world that is fallible and full of weakness—with some wickedness in it—and that reforms that are worth having are brought about little by little and not by one blow. I do not mean to say by this I am not greatly interested in bringing about the arbitration treaty or treaties that are mentioned, but I do think that we are likely to make more progress if we look forward with reasonable foresight and realize the difficulties that are to be overcome, than if we think we have opened the gate to eternal peace with one key and within one year.¹

The actual work of negotiation was intrusted to Chandler P. Anderson, counselor of the Department of State. His work was much facilitated by the sympathy for the project

¹ *Proceedings of Third National Peace Conference, Baltimore, May 3, 1911, 14-15.*

evinced by Ambassador James Bryce of Great Britain and Jules Jusserand of France. Treaties were signed on August 3, 1911, embodying an idea which had first been developed by William Jennings Bryan at the London Conference of the Interparliamentary Union on July 24, 1906. The formula adopted distinguished for the first time in a formal manner between justiciable disputes, to be settled by legal methods, and nonjusticiable disputes, to be resolved by a process of extra-legal and extra-diplomatic investigation. For six months following publication of these treaties, they were one of the principal subjects of public comment. With tenacious insistence upon its alleged prerogatives, the Senate failed to advise and consent to the ratification of these treaties, taking the attitude it had previously assumed in the case of the Anglo-American treaty of 1897 and the 1904 series of treaties. After some amendments, based on provincial prejudices which legal experts from that time forward have pronounced to be invalid, the Senate gave the requisite consent.¹. The President did not proceed to the ratification of the treaties, because the extraneous amendments destroyed their full usefulness as world-models. As negotiated the treaties provided:

ART. I. All differences hereafter arising between the High Contracting Parties, which has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, relating to international matters in which the High Contracting Parties are concerned by virtue of a claim of right made by one against the other under treaty or otherwise, and which are justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law and

¹ President Taft strongly opposed the Senate's attitude at the time, and as an ex-President has many times rebutted its arguments. In his book, *The United States and Peace*, published in 1914, he wrote (pages 112, 115-116):

"As in the consideration of the Hay treaties, so here it was argued that the President and the Senate would unlawfully delegate their treaty-making power if they agreed that a tribunal should finally adjudge that a specific difference, subsequently arising, was in the class of differences covered by the treaty. It is very difficult to argue this question because the answer to it is so plain and obvious. . . .

"Nevertheless, the Senate struck out the provisions for a decision by the Joint High Commission. I considered this proposition the most important feature of the treaty, and I did so because I felt that we had reached a time in the making of promissory treaties of arbitration when they should mean something. The Senate halted just at the point where a possible and real obligation might be created. I do not wish to minimize the importance of general expressions of good will and general declarations of willingness to settle everything without war, but the long list of treaties that mean but little can now hardly be made longer, for they include substantially all the countries of the world. The next step is to include something that really binds somebody in a treaty for future arbitration."

equity, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the Convention of October 18, 1907, or to some other arbitral tribunal, as shall be decided in each case by special agreement. . . .

ART. II. The High Contracting Parties further agree to institute as occasion arises, and as hereinafter provided, a Joint High Commission of Inquiry to which, upon the request of either Party, shall be referred for impartial and conscientious investigation any controversy between the Parties within the scope of Art. I, before such controversy has been submitted to arbitration, and also by any other controversy hereafter arising between them even if they are not agreed that it falls within the scope of Art. I; provided, however, that such reference may be postponed until the expiration of one year after the date of the formal request therefor, in order to afford an opportunity for diplomatic discussion and adjustment of the questions in controversy, if either Party desires such postponement. . . .

ART. III. . . . It is further agreed, however, that in cases in which the Parties disagree as to whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under Art I of this Treaty, that question shall be submitted to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry; and if all or all but one of the members of the Commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Art. I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.¹

The incident in American national history, however, is not to be counted a failure. It broadened interest in the cause of world organization, and it convinced many in and out of public life that sound advances toward a practical plan for insuring peace were possible. Moreover, it had the effect of bringing the once remote problems of international peace into the sphere of practical politics.

President Taft, however, was looking beyond the treaties he attempted to establish as a world model. He made this clear in his public speeches. One of the notable occasions on which he expressed his views was the Citizens' Peace Banquet at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on December 30, 1911. At that time, he definitely foreshadowed the idea of a league of nations, and particularly emphasized the fact that his own treaties and even a full-fledged international arbitral court were to be considered only as steps toward a larger goal.

The idea continued to be dominant in the President's mind during the remainder of his administration. At a luncheon given by the International Peace Forum to him at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on January 4, 1913, he again stated his belief in a way which completely foreshadowed the program of the League to Enforce Peace, of which he has been president since its organization on June

¹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1776-1909, Supplement, 1913, 380-382.*

17, 1915. The following statement by the President was more than a declaration of personal views, it was an assertion of state policy:

My own idea was that if we could make those treaties, they would form a basis for a treaty with every other nation by the United States, and then between other nations than the United States, and finally, by interlocking and intertwining all the treaties, we might easily then come to the settlement of all international questions by a court of arbitration, a permanent, well-established court of arbitration, whose powers are to be enforced by the agreement of all nations, and into which any nation may come as a complainant and bring any other nation as a defendant, and compel that defendant nation to answer to the complaint under the rules of law established for international purposes, and under the rules of law which would necessarily, with such a court, grow into a code that would embrace all the higher moral rules of Christian civilization.¹

President Wilson succeeded President Taft on March 4, 1913. The effort of his administration to make progress was destined to be successful. The previous administration had failed in an effort to combine the principles of arbitration and the commission of inquiry in a single system of pacific settlement. The new administration decided to leave the 25 existent treaties of arbitration then in force undisturbed, and to negotiate independent treaties establishing permanent commissions of investigation for all questions not properly falling under the arbitration treaties. These "treaties for the advancement of peace," as they are officially called, are at present in force with 20 countries, while 10 more have been signed and five others accept the principle. Their effect has been to add to the practical machinery of pacific settlement a method for resolving all non-justiciable disputes. The treaties already in force contain the following essential provisions:

ART. I. The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding Article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report.

ART. II. The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from each country, by the Government thereof; one mem-


¹ *The Peace Forum*, February, 1913, 12.

ber shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments. . . .

ART. III. In case the high contracting parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the International Commission for investigation and report. The International Commission may, however, act upon its own initiative, and in such case it shall notify both Governments and request their co-operation in the investigation.

The report of the International Commission shall be completed within one year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend the time by mutual agreement. . . .

The high contracting parties reserve the right to act independently on the subject-matter of the dispute after the report of the Commission shall have been submitted.



ORGANIZED EFFORT TO PROMOTE A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

AMERICAN CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE¹

The first society, organized in the United States after the adjournment of the second Hague Conference to apply itself to the discussion and defense of plans for a world court, is the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, founded in 1910 by a company of lawyers, publicists and other eminent citizens.

Next came the American Institute of International Law, founded at Washington in 1912, with the object of propagating in America the principles of justice and law which ought to prevail in the relations between States. Its membership is composed of not more than five publicists from each American country, making in all a body of possibly one hundred and five members. At the second meeting of this Institute which took place in Havana, January 22 and 27, 1917, ten recommendations on international organization were unanimously approved. These recommendations include every item of the program of the World's Court League, and are all in entire harmony with that program.

The third society with similar purposes is the World's Court League, organized at a conference held in Cleveland, Ohio, May 13th, 14th and 15th, 1915. It was incorporated on December 28th of the same year. The league was formed in the hope of concentrating popular attention in the United States upon the necessity of establishing and maintaining an international court of justice. It began the publication of a magazine called *The World Court*, and devoted itself to the work of educating public opinion.

¹ By Charles H. Levermore, Secretary of the New York Peace Society.
In *World Court*. 3:72-9. March, 1917.

SELECTED ARTICLES

June 17th, one month after the formation of the World's Court League, the League to Enforce Peace was born at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. A comprehensive program of world reorganization after this war was adopted, including a court, council and congress of nations belonging to the league, and an agreement to compel investigation before fighting.

In the fall of 1916, the World's Court League was reorganized with a view to enlarging and perfecting its work. In November the Board of Governors adopted a revised and expanded platform which is as follows:

We believe it to be desirable that a League among Nations should be organized for the following purposes:

1. A World Court, in general similar to the Court of Arbitral Justice already agreed upon at the Second Hague Conference, should be, as soon as possible, established as an International Court of Justice, representing the nations of the world and, subject to the limitations of treaties, empowered to assume jurisdiction over international questions in dispute that are justiciable in character and that are not settled by negotiation.

2. All other international controversies not settled by negotiation should be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, or submitted to an International Council of Conciliation, or Commissions of Inquiry, for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

3. Soon after peace is declared, there should be held either "a conference of all great Governments," as described in the United States Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, or a similar assembly, formally designated at the Third Hague Conference, and the sessions of such international conferences should become permanently periodic, at shorter intervals than formerly.

Such conference or conferences should (a) formulate and adopt plans for the establishment of a World Court and an International Council of Conciliation, and (b) from time to time formulate and codify rules of international law to govern in the decisions of the World Court in all cases, except those involving any constituent State which has within the fixed period signified its dissent.

4. In connection with the establishment of automatically periodic sessions of an International Conference, the constituent Governments should establish a permanent Continuation Committee of the conference, with such administrative powers as may be delegated to it by the conference.

At the same time the magazine, bearing the new title of "The World Court, a Magazine of International Progress," was considerably enlarged under a new board of editors; and the organization of an International Council and a National Advisory Board began.

The new platform of The World's Court League is practically identical with the platform which has been favored by the American Peace Society since the days of President William Ladd in 1840. All the local State Peace Societies are affiliated with the American Peace Society so that the whole force of that organization is committed to this plat-

form. The American Peace Society receives a considerable portion of its support from the Carnegie Endowment, which is the largest endowment for international peace in the world.

The World's Court League has combined in its platform the essential doctrines of all these other peace societies and organizations for the improvement of international relations. It has omitted all contentious matter, unless the initial proposal, that the league among nations be formed, be still regarded as open to question. It offers what may be called "the irreducible minimum" of all plans for reorganizing the world so as to ensure peace with justice.

KEEPING THE WORLD SAFE: THE PRE- AMBLE AND PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE¹

*Adopted at the Organization Meeting in Independence Hall,
Philadelphia, June 17, 1915*

Throughout five thousand years of recorded history, peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have coöperated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its borders. States have formed league or confederations or have otherwise coöperated to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept at all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good.

Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilization may be conserved, and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment and happiness may continue.

¹ From "A Reference Book for Speakers," p. 31-4. Published by the League to Enforce Peace, William H. Taft, President.

SELECTED ARTICLES

We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorised by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal mentioned in Article One.

VICTORY PROGRAM¹

The war now happily brought to a close has been above all a war to end war, but in order to ensure the fruits of victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe there should be formed a League of Free Nations, as universal as possible, based upon treaty and pledged that the security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the whole. *The initiating nucleus* of the membership of the League should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the war.

The League should aim at promoting the *liberty, progress, and fair economic opportunity* of all nations, and the orderly development of the world.

It should ensure peace by eliminating causes of dissension, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by uniting the potential force of all the members as a standing menace against any nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world.

The advantages of membership in the League, both economically and from the point of view of security, should be so clear that all nations will desire to be members of it.

For this purpose it is necessary to create—

1. *For the decision of justiciable questions*, an impartial tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the assent of the parties to the controversy; provision to be made for enforcing its decisions.

2. For questions that are not justiciable in their character, a *Council of Conciliation*, as mediator, which shall hear, consider, and make recommendations; and failing acquiescence by the parties concerned, the League shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken.

3. *An administrative organization* for the conduct of affairs of common interest, the protection and care of backward regions and internationalized places, and such matters as have been jointly administered before and during the war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods and through machinery that will ensure both stability and progress; preventing, on the

¹ Adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee, held in New York, November 23, 1918, as the official platform of the League to Enforce Peace, superseding the proposals adopted at the organization of the League in Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. Reprinted from a recent circular.

one hand, any crystallization of the *status quo* that will defeat the forces of healthy growth and changes, and providing, on the other hand, a way by which progress can be secured and necessary change effected without recourse to war.

4. *A representative Congress* to formulate and codify rules of international law, to inspect the work of the administrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the tranquility of the world or the progress or betterment of human relations. Its deliberations should be public.

5. *An Executive Body*, able to speak with authority in the name of the nations represented, and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered.

The representation of the different nations in the organs of the League should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they assume. The rules of international law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity.

A resort to force by any nation should be prevented by a solemn agreement that any aggression will be met immediately by such an overwhelming *economic and military force* that it will not be attempted.

No member of the League should make any other offensive or defensive treaty or alliance, and *all treaties* of whatever nature made by any member of the League *should at once be made public*.

Such a League must be formed at the time of the definitive peace, or the opportunity may be lost forever.

This VICTORY PROGRAM is offered for the consideration and endorsement of all organizations and individuals interested in the problems of international reconstruction.

LEAGUE OF FREE NATIONS ASSOCIATION¹

The object of this society is to promote a more general realization and support by the public of the conditions indispensable to the success, at the Peace Conference and thereafter, of American aims and policy as outlined by President Wilson.

The particular aims, such as the liberation of Belgium, Serbia, Poland and Bohemia, and their future protection from aggression, and America's own future security on land and sea, are dependent upon the realization of the more general aim of a sounder future international order, the corner-stone of which must be a League of Nations.

The purposes of such a league are to achieve for all peoples, great and small:

- (1) Security: the due protection of national existence.
- (2) Equality of economic opportunity.

* * * * *

The fundamental principle underlying the League of Nations is that the security and rights of each member shall rest upon the strength of the whole league, pledged to uphold by their combined power international arrangements ensuring fair treatment for all.

The first concern of a League of Nations is to find out what those arrangements should be, what rules of international life will ensure justice to all, how far the old international law or practice must be modified to secure that end. It is to the interest of the entire world that every nation should attain its maximum economic development, provided it does not prevent a similar development of other nations. The realization of this aim depends upon gradually increasing freedom of mutual exchange with its resulting economic interdependence. It is certain, for instance, that if anything approaching equality of eco-

¹ The League of Free Nations Association has just been launched under the presidency of Norman Hapgood, with Richard S. Childs as chairman of the executive committee; Prof. Stephen P. Duggan, secretary, and Prof. Wendell Bush, treasurer. Lincoln Colcord is publicity director in a campaign to arouse American interest in the social issues at stake in the settlement, in the creation of a League of Nations and in its democratic constitution. This declaration of principles is reprinted from the Survey of November 30. p. 250.

nomic opportunity as between great and small, powerful and weak, is to be obtained, the following must be guaranteed for all on equal terms:

(a) No state shall accord to one neighbor privileges not accorded to others—this principle to apply to the purchase of raw material as well as to access to markets. Equality of economic opportunity does not mean the abolition of all tariffs or the abolition of the right of self-governing states to determine whether free trade or protection is to their best interests.

(b) States exercising authority in non-self-governing territories shall not exercise that power as a means of securing a privileged economic position for their own nationals; economic opportunity in such territories shall be open to all peoples on equal terms, the peoples of nations possessing no such territories being in the same position economically as those that possess great subject empires. Investments and concessions in backward countries should be placed under international control.

(c) Goods and persons of the citizens of all states should be transported on equal terms on international rivers, canals, straits, or railroads.

(d) Landlocked states must be guaranteed access to the sea on equal terms both by equality of treatment on communications running through other states, and by the use of seaports.

* * * * *

The administrative machinery of a workable internationalism already exists in rudimentary form. The international bodies that have already been established by the Allied belligerents—who now number over a score—to deal with their combined military resources, shipping and transport, food, raw materials, and finance, have been accorded immense powers. Many of these activities—particularly those relating to the international control of raw material shipping—will have to be continued during the very considerable period of demobilization and reconstruction which will follow the war. Problems of demobilization and civil reemployment particularly will demand the efficient representation of labor and liberal elements of the various states. With international commissions, and exercising the same control over the economic resources of the world, an international government with powerful sanction will in fact exist.

The international machinery will need democratization as well as progressive differentiation of function. If the League of Nations is not to develop into an immense bureaucratic union of governments instead of a democratic union of peoples, the elements of (a) complete publicity and (b) effective popular representation must be insisted upon. The first of these is implicit in the principle, so emphasized by President Wilson, that in the future there must be an end to secret diplomacy. The second can only be met by some representation of the peoples in a body with legislative powers over international affairs—which must include minority elements—as distinct from the governments of the constituent states of the league. It is the principle which has found expression in the American Union as contrasted with the federated states of the German empire. If the government of the United States consisted merely of the representatives of forty-eight states, the Union could never have been maintained on a democratic basis. Happily it consists also of the representatives of a hundred million people. The new international government must make the same provision and deliberately aim to see that all the great parties and groups in the various states obtain representation.

The assurance of the political, civil, religious, and cultural rights of minorities within states is an even more difficult problem. But genuinely democratic parliamentary institutions in the league, ensuring some expression of minority opinion as well as complete publicity, will be a strong deterrent if not a complete assurance against tyrannical treatment of minorities within its constituent states.

Indispensable to the success of American policy are at least the following:

A universal association of nations based upon the principle that the security of each shall rest upon the strength of the whole, pledged to uphold international arrangements giving equality of political right and economic opportunity, the association to be based upon a constitution democratic in character, possessing a central council or parliament as truly representative as possible of all the political parties in the constituent nations, open to any nation, and only such nation, whose government is responsible to the people. The formation of such an association should be an integral part of the settlement itself and its terri-

torial problems, and not distinct therefrom. It should prohibit the formation of minor leagues or special covenants, or special economic combinations, boycotts, or exclusions. Differences between members should be submitted to its judicial bodies. Its administrative machinery should be built up from the inter-allied bodies differentiated in function and democratized in constitution. The effective sanction of the association should not be alone the combined military power of the whole used as an instrument of repression, but such use of the world-wide control of economic resources as would make it more advantageous for a state to become and remain a member of the association and to cooperate with it, than to challenge it.

All the principles above outlined are merely an extension of the principles that have been woven into the fabric of our own national life.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETY¹

The League of Nations Society (1 Central Buildings, Westminster), was founded March 10, 1915. The chairman is the Rt. Hon. W. H. Dickinson, M. P.

Program

1. That a treaty shall be made as soon as possible whereby as many states as are willing shall form a league binding themselves to use peaceful methods for dealing with all disputes arising among them.

2. That such methods shall be as follows:

- (a) All disputes arising out of questions of international law or the interpretation of treaties shall be referred to The Hague Court of Arbitration, or some other judicial tribunal, whose decisions shall be final and shall be carried into effect by the parties concerned.
- (b) All other disputes shall be referred to and investigated and reported upon by a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation, the Council to be representative of the states which form the league.

¹ From "Approaches to the Great Settlement," by Emily Greene Balch, p. 251. Huebsch. 1918.

3. That the states which are members of the league shall unite in any action necessary for insuring that every member shall abide by the terms of the treaty.

4. That the states which are members of the league shall make provision for mutual defense, diplomatic, economic, or military, in the event of any of them being attacked by a state, not a member of the league, which refuses to submit the case to an appropriate tribunal or council.

5. That any civilized state desiring to join the league shall be admitted to membership.

BRITISH LEAGUE OF FREE NATIONS ASSOCIATION¹

The new British organization to promote an active propaganda for the formation of a World League of Free Nations as the necessary basis of a permanent peace, sends out an official pamphlet which states first these

Objects of the Association

To advocate the establishment forthwith of a League of Free Peoples desirous of ending war forever and willing to agree with one another,

1. To submit all disputes arising between themselves to methods of peaceful settlement.
2. To suppress jointly, by the use of all means at their disposal, any attempt by any State to disturb the peace of the world by acts of war.
3. To create a Supreme Court, and to respect and enforce its decisions.
4. To establish a permanent Council to supervise and control armaments, to act as mediator in matters of difference not suitable for submission to the Supreme Court, to concert measures for joint action in matters political and economic affecting the rights and interests of members of the League.

¹ World Court for November, 1918. p. 672.

5. To admit to the League on terms of equality all peoples able and willing to give effective guarantees of their loyal intentions to observe its covenants, and so to prepare the framework of a World League which shall guarantee the freedom of all nationalities; act as trustee and guardian of uncivilized races and undeveloped territories; substitute for national armaments an international force to guarantee order in the World, and thus finally liberate mankind from the curse of war.

It is the opinion of this Association that such a League should act through a Council representing the wills of its constituent nations, and that in determining the constitution of such a Council due regard should be had to the standing, the stage of civilization and the population of each State. The purpose of the League is to ensure the ordered development of the world. It does not propose to perpetuate existing conditions and boundaries for all time, but to secure that war shall not be the method of their readjustment. The Council of the League should have at least the threefold function of—

1. Maintaining a free and independent Supreme Court in which States may sue and be sued.
2. Providing for the codification, amendment, and extension of international law; for joint consideration of questions affecting transit, tariffs, access to raw materials, migration, health, and international intercourse generally; and for intervention and conciliation in all disputes between the constituent States.
3. Supervising, limiting, and controlling the military and naval forces and the armament industries of the world.

The general secretary of the League of Free Nations Association which was inaugurated at Northampton in September is Capt. W. Henry Williams, 22 Buckingham Gate, London, S. W. I.

FRENCH LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETY¹

A number of eminent Frenchmen are behind a movement to form in France a propaganda organization similar in general purpose and method to the League to Enforce Peace. A provisional organization committee, composed of Ferdinand Buisson, Albert Thomas and J. Prudhommeaux, has written to the League outlining the plan of the new association and asking support. . . . The Honorary President of the French association is Leon Bourgeois, chairman of the commission appointed by the French government to draw up an official plan for a League of Nations. This fact suggests that the plan of the organization may be closely analogous to the French government plan.

The French Society agrees with the new League of Free Nations Society in Great Britain that membership in the League of Nations should be granted only to nations whose sincerity is guaranteed by democratic institutions, and that the League should be established now, before the close of the war. The advance proposals make the interesting suggestion, as one reason for immediate constitution of the League, that the Society of Nations, composed of the present Allies," should control and conduct the negotiations for the coming peace."

APPEAL TO FORM A FRENCH SOCIETY
OF NATIONS²

[The French appeal to form an association to establish a Society of Nations now, which appears in translation below, will be read with great interest for the light it throws upon a French point of view. With M. Buisson, Albert Thomas and J. Prudhommeaux compose the Provisional Committee issuing the appeal. M. Leon Bourgeois is honorary president of the French Association.]

In every land, since four years of war have ruined and worn out the people, one thought is asserting itself more positively day by day: it is necessary for the safety of the world that we

¹ From the League Bulletin, October 12, 1918.

² By Ferdinand Buisson. In World Court for November, 1918. p. 669.

should not have simply a treaty of peace of the traditional type—a peace based on force. The world must not be menaced with such a conflict again. The coming peace must be enduring and certain. The reign of law must replace the reign of violence. Otherwise the battle is lost for all of us.

Thus, that which was the dream of noble precursors is become the conscious aim of the soldiers of the democracies who with one accord, declare: "We ourselves are fighting that our children may not have to fight."

Thus, the project outlined before the war by the negotiators at the Hague, the full realization of which the secret plans for aggression on the part of the Central Powers had blocked, imposes itself to-day as a matter of necessity on Governments which aim to defend the right. It is this project which President Wilson has proposed anew, taking up once more and clothing in luminous phrase the original French formula of a "Society of Nations."

In several countries, statesmen, students, thinkers, and, what is most important, men of good-will, are forming groups to study the problem of such a League of Nations and to propagate its principles. Such a transformation of the world can be realized only by wide popular support and earnest faith.

In America, The League to Enforce Peace, of which the president is Mr. W. Howard Taft, and the World's Court League, under the direction of Mr. Charles Lathrop Pack, Nicholas Murray Butler and Albert Shaw; in England, a League of Nations Society, with Mr. Aneurin Williams, and the League of Free Nations Association, with Major Davies, have worked to this end. In France, despite the useful essays in this direction and plans frequently discussed, as yet no association is found capable of replying with authority to the great foreign associations.

* * * * *

Among the earnest proponents of the Society of Nations there exists in America, in England and in France, a great diversity of conceptions. The French point of view must be defined. We invite to join us all who accept the following ideas:

i. It is necessary that this war should end not with special treaties among the belligerents which would sanction the work of might, but with the establishment of an international authority

imposing on nations for all the struggles present or to come, of whatever kind they may be, the régime, procedure and guarantees of law.

2. The fundamental principle of law, the application of which international authority will guarantee for all, is the right of peoples freely to determine their own destiny. Nations, small and large, have an equal right to complete independence. All sovereignties are equal before the law. All should submit to decisions arrived at in common.

3. The Society of Nations should be open to every nation which fulfills the following conditions:

(a) To enter into an agreement to respect the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, and to resort only to judicial solutions for the settlement of their disputes, the use of force to be reserved exclusively to the international society itself, as the supreme sanction in case one of the member States should resist its decisions;

(b) To be able to enter into valid covenants, especially in matters of war and peace, a possibility conditioned on its possessing a modicum of democratic institutions which will make certain that the will of the people prevails and that the government is adequately controlled. Trustworthy adhesion to the Society of Nations must come not from governments alone but from the people's representatives as well.

This is not the place to consider whether the Society of Nations should be open or closed, whether it should be limited to the Allies alone or should embrace the enemy. The Society of Nations is universal in its nature and every nation, in principle, may be admitted to it. But since its fundamental purpose is the triumph of law, it can be safely established only among free nations which covenant to respect the provisions of a treaty and exchange the necessary guaranties in principle and practice.

The general principles being thus established, that which for us remains certain is that:

1. The Allies should form their association immediately on this basis. They should work it out as completely as possible in the direction of sanctions of every kind, moral, judicial, economic and, in the last resort, military, as well as in that of promulgating general rules of law;

2. Propaganda can and ought to be carried on among all

peoples, even enemy, in order to indicate upon what foundations the reign of law can guarantee the durable peace universally desired;

3. The Society of Nations thus formed should control and conduct the negotiations for the coming peace.

It is to spread these ideas that we ask you to join us.

As M. Leon Bourgeois said in 1909 at Rheims: "Is there a cause which is higher and more worthy, particularly of our country, of that France against whom the doctrines of violence, negation and barbarism cannot prevail, of her who so often in the past has been, and who in the future will remain, the guardian of liberty and the crusader for Right."

The Provisional Committee,

FERDINAND BUISSON,

ALBERT THOMAS,

J. PRUDHOMMEAUX.

Temporary Office:

74, Rue de l'Universite, Paris.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

There have been three stages in the growth of this idea, answering to the germination of the seed, the opening of the flower, and the ripening of the fruit. It germinated, as we said, in the study. Between August, 1914, and the spring of 1915, groups of students and experts in many different countries turned towards the same problem. In its practical effect the American group which issued in the League to Enforce Peace, and of which ex-President Taft was the most distinguished member, was the most important. In this country the group which eventually founded the League of Nations Society, Lord Bryce's group, and a committee of the Fabian Society were all at work upon the same ground: It was natural that at these early stages the difficult problem of means of preventing war and methods of settling international disputes engrossed attention, and that the seed germinated in the various schemes which have since been given to the world.

¹ *New Statesman.* 9:342-4. July 14, 1917.

The next stage was the flowering of the idea among the "common people." It was obtained by propaganda and organisation. In the late spring or early summer of 1915 the League to Enforce Peace in America and the League of Nations Society in England were founded with the object of pushing the schemes which have been worked out by the experts. At The Hague a somewhat similar, but international instead of national organisation, which has had considerable influence among the few European neutral peoples, had come into existence, the *Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable*. But it was the League to Enforce Peace which first succeeded in widely popularising the idea. Its extremely short and able scheme had been drafted by Mr. Taft himself, and among its most ardent supporters was another man who had practical diplomatic experience, Mr. Theodore Marburg. The project was launched at an immense public meeting on June 17th, 1915, in the building in Philadelphia which had witnessed the signing of the Declaration of Independence. The rapid success of the movement showed that the American people, at least, were already ripe for this new idea of internationalism; but it was also partly due to the American genius for propaganda. The organisation was spread over the face of the land, to quote Mr. Marburg, "much in the manner of a political campaign," and the fact that in under two years the League received contributions amounting to 136,000 dollars must make the mouths of propagandist treasurers in this niggardly country water.

Many a fine idea has withered and perished in the stage between its blossoming among people and its maturing in the cabinets of princes and statesmen. No exotic or Utopian flower can survive for long the chilling winds that blow between government offices. But in this case the passage from popular enthusiasm to official recognition and adoption was both rapid and secure. It was due almost entirely to the action of a single statesman, and to the dramatic revolution in international policy which this conversion entailed. The first public sign which President Wilson gave of the direction in which his thoughts were traveling was in February, 1916, when he said: "I pray God that if this contest have no other result, it will, at least, have the result of creating

an international tribunal, and producing some sort of joint guarantee of peace on the part of the great nations of the world." It is noticeable that at this stage President Wilson's conception of the League was confined to its formal and narrower object, embodied in the different schemes—namely, an organisation for preventing war by settling disputes. Three months later, in an address to the American League, he made a pronouncement which immediately carried the idea into practical politics, and, by foreshadowing a complete revolution in American foreign policy, forced it upon the serious attention of all the states and statesmen of the world. For he definitely states that the United States would be willing to join "a universal association of nations . . . to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence." Here again the idea is expressed negatively as the prevention of war and the pacific settlement of disputes. But in America the idea developed politically with surprising rapidity. In August an Act of Congress authorized the President to call a Conference of the Powers after the war for the purpose of organising the League. The program of the League was embodied as a plank in the platform of the Democratic Party for the Presidential election. And in a series of speeches, delivered by Mr. Wilson both before and after his re-election, obviously with one eye upon the American people and the other upon the belligerents, he educated his own people in the notion that in no future war could America be neutral, and he greatly enlarged his original conception of the League. For in these later speeches it is upon the League as a basis for active international co-operation and a new international system that he concentrates attention, and the possibility of this, as he clearly points out, comes from the fact that the League alone can provide an adequate guarantee for international agreements and the basis for permanent common action between different states.

This new orientation of American policy evoked an immediate response from the statesmen of Europe, and particularly from those of this country. As early as May, 1916,

Mr. Balfour gave a cautious recognition to the idea; but eight months later he states categorically that one of the conditions of a durable peace "is that behind international law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor. These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But we believe them to be in general harmony with the President's ideals." Viscount Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Bonar Law in this country, and M. Briand and M. Ribot in France, have all expressed their agreement with the new American policy. Finally the proposal to establish a League of Nations after the war was officially proclaimed as part of the policy of the Entente Governments in the Allied Note to America of January 10th, 1917. It will, perhaps, be useful, as indicating the attitude of the Entente Governments, to quote this document, and the pronouncements of the present Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France. The Allied Governments in their Note stated that "in a general way they desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American Note and their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognise all benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilisation from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations, and so framed as to provide a sanction necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should merely serve to facilitate fresh acts of aggression." Mr. Lloyd George, a day after this Note was presented, said: "The best security for peace will be that nations will band themselves together to punish the first peace-breaker. In the armouries of Europe every weapon will be a sword of justice. In the government of men every army will be the constabulary of peace." M. Ribot, in June, 1917, said: "We echo the whole desire of the President of the United States. Henceforth justice must have as a guarantee the League of Nations which is organising itself before our eyes, and which to-morrow will be mistress of the world."

This would be a remarkable record in the history of any political reform, but its significance is increased when one remembers the immense bias towards conservatism which is inevitably operative in international affairs. In this short sketch we have naturally directed attention to the growth of the idea in America and the countries of the Allies. But the same development has taken place in the neutral countries of Europe. In the Swedish Riksdag, the Dutch Second Chamber, and the Swiss National Council resolutions on the subject have been debated. Those who speak for the Governments of these nations are necessarily inclined under present circumstances to extreme caution, and the attitude of the Dutch Foreign Secretary may be quoted as typical. When the question was discussed in the Dutch Chamber he refused to commit himself, but went on to express the desire that "after the end of the war a collective, international agreement should be created, which would bind the states to submit all international disputes to judicial progress in a Court, or to the investigation and recommendation of a Council of Conciliation, with guarantees for an impartial composition of these bodies, with an obligation in no case to commit an act of hostility until the Court has pronounced or the Council reported, and until the lapse thereafter of an appointed time."

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS ENDORSED

GOVERNMENTS PLEDGE SUPPORT TO A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

Official Correspondence and Resolutions

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command.—*President Wilson's identic note to the warring nations, dated at Washington, December 18, 1916.*

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ENTENTE ALLIES

In a general way they (the Allied Governments) desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American Note (of December 18th) and their wholehearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the benefits that would accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations, and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.—*Joint reply to the American Note, dated Paris, January 10, 1917.*

THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN

His Majesty's Government . . . feels strongly that the durability of peace must largely depend on its character and that no stable system of international relations can be built on founda-

¹ From "A Reference Book for Speakers," issued by the League to Enforce Peace.

tions which are essentially and hopelessly defective. . . . There are those who think that for this disease international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. . . . The people of this country . . . do not believe peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled: the first is that the existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible removed or weakened; the second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples; the third is that behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.—*Letter from Foreign Secretary Balfour to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, dated London, January 13, 1917.*

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

The Chamber of Deputies, the direct expression of the sovereignty of the French people, expects that the efforts of the armies of the Republic and her allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durable guarantees for peace and independence for peoples great and small, in a league of nations such as has already been foreshadowed.—*From a resolution adopted by the Chamber of Deputies and approved by the Senate, dated Paris, June 4 and June 6, 1917.*

The working basis of the committee appointed by the French Government to draft a plan for a League of Nations is outlined in an official report recently received at League Headquarters. A significant feature of this report is the declaration of belief that "whatever the definition on which they (the Allies) may agree as to the juridical rules which must control in a new Europe respecting the functioning of the Society of Nations, it is scarcely probable that the Central Empires will accept them unless forced to do so." The report proceeds:

"In so far as the treaty of peace shall not submit the relations of peoples among themselves to special guaranties of law, they will continue, as they are to-day, to be ruled solely by the right of the strongest. Force alone can therefore create the new régime and establish the rules of justice and the sanctions of

law without which no sincere and durable peace could be founded or maintained. So, while discussing among themselves the conditions of the future Society of Nations, the Allied Powers can never forget that if it is to exist some day, this can only result from the victory of their arms."

"It is necessarily desirable," the report says, "that the same work of preparation should be done in the other countries of the Entente. Thus, when the Allies shall have determined by common agreement their views on this important subject, they will be in a position to advance it with full understanding when it shall be brought forward in the negotiations for the treaty of peace."—*The League Bulletin, October 12, 1918.*

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

Russia has always been in full sympathy with the broad, humanitarian principles expressed by the President of the United States. His message to the Senate, therefore, has made a most favorable impression upon the Russian Government. Russia will welcome all suitable measures which will help prevent a recurrence of the world war. Accordingly we can gladly indorse President Wilson's communication—*From a statement given out by the Foreign Office to the Associated Press, dated Petrograd, January 26, 1917.*

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND

It is with very great interest that we have taken note of the programme of your humanitarian movement. In asking us to associate ourselves in it you have given us a new proof of the sympathy of the United States for Switzerland and we desire to say to you how much we appreciate it. The League to Enforce Peace, which counts among its members so many eminent personalities, aims to insure the maintenance of peace after it shall have been concluded; truly a delicate mission, but the difficulties of which are not to be allowed to discourage your efforts. You regard as one of the most efficacious means to that end a treaty of arbitration conceived in the same spirit as the treaty of February 13, 1914, between Switzerland and the United States, a treaty which all the countries are to sign and by which they will undertake to submit to the decision of a supreme international tribunal the conflicts which may arise between them in order to

avoid, as far as possible, a return of the catastrophe which desolates the world to-day. Switzerland is so much the better placed to appreciate the work of which the United States has undertaken the initiative, because, surrounded on all sides by war, peopled by the race and inheriting the language and the culture of three among the combatant nations, she is better able than any other country to realize the fact that war is inhuman, and is contrary to the superior interest of civilization which is the common patrimony of all men. If, then, at the conclusion of peace, the occasion should present itself for us to unite our efforts to yours, we will not fail to do so, and we will be happy to make our contribution toward rendering peace more secure when re-established.—*From a letter written by Dr. Arthur Hoffman as head of the Political Department of the Division of Foreign Affairs, to the Hon. Theodore Marburg, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Organization of the League to Enforce Peace, dated Berne, December 11, 1916.*

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

His Majesty's Government is following with keen sympathy the idea of establishing, after the end of the present war, an international league for the purpose of preventing the peace of the world being again disturbed, and when the opportunity of doing so arrives, with a guarantee of success, will lend its concourse to the realization of such a humanitarian and lofty project.—*A cablegram from Don Amalio Gimeno, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the League to Enforce Peace, dated Madrid, January 13, 1917.*

NOTE: Viscount Motono, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (January 15, 1917) and Viscount Ishii, Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary to the United States (August 30, 1917) have expressed themselves as in sympathy with the movement for a League of Nations.

MEN AND ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSE A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODEN, FORMER FOREIGN SECRETARY OF GREAT BRITAIN

I sincerely desire to see a league of nations formed and made effective to secure the future peace of the world after this war is over. I regard this as the best, if not the only, prospect of preserving treaties and of saving the world from aggressive wars in years to come.—*Cablegram to the League to Enforce Peace, November 24, 1916.*

The establishment and maintainance of a league of nations such as President Wilson had advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transcend them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of states are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in any state.—“*A League of Nations.*” *Pamphlet published by the University Press, Oxford.*

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, PREMIER OF GREAT BRITAIN

As society is banded together for the punishment and repression of murder, theft, fraud, and all kinds of wrong and injustice inflicted by one individual upon another, so nations shall be banded together for the protection of each other and the world as a whole against the force, fraud and greed of the mighty. To falter ere all this be achieved would be to doubt the justice of the ruler of the world. To carry the war on a single hour after these aims can be attained would be to abandon the world to the spirit of evil.—*Address to the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches.*

A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe, and these will require a league of nations to protect them against the covetousness of ambitious and grasping neighbors. In my judgment, a league of nations is absolutely essential to permanent peace.

We shall go to the peace conference to guarantee that a league of nations is a reality. I am one of those who believe

that without peace we cannot have progress. A league of nations guarantees peace and guarantees also an all-round reduction of armaments, and that reduction of armaments is a guarantee that you can get rid of conscription here.

Of course, we must have in this country an efficient army to police the Empire, but I am looking forward to a condition of things, with the existence of a league of nations, under which conscription will not be necessary in any country.—*Address to his Liberal Supporters, November 11, 1918.*

HERBERT ASQUITH, EX-PREMIER OF GREAT BRITAIN

We are bound, and not only bound, but glad, to give respectful attention to such pronouncements as the recent speech of . . . President Wilson. That speech was addressed . . . to the American Senate, and through them to the people of the United States. It was, therefore, a declaration of American policy, or, to speak more precisely, of American ideals. The President held out to his hearers the prospect of an era when the civilization of mankind, banded together for the purpose, will make it their joint and several duty to repress by their united authority, and if need be by their combined naval and military forces, any wanton or aggressive invasion of the peace of the world. It is a fine ideal, which must arouse all our sympathies.—*Speech in the House of Commons, February 1, 1917.*

Mr. Asquith's endorsement of a league of nations, in his speech before the National Liberal Club on July 10, was unequivocal. "There can be no clean peace," he declared, "which does not clear away the cause of war. "We should realize," he continued, "and act as though we realize, that a league of nations is neither a vague political abstraction nor an empty rhetorical formula, but a concrete and definite idea, and that its embodiment in practical shape is by far the most urgent constructive problem of international statesmanship."

That Mr. Asquith, in his address, was speaking for his party as well as for himself, is further evident from the resolutions adopted by a representative conference of the Liberal party, held at the House of Commons on the very day, as it happened, of Mr. Asquith's speech. The conference, called to consider the political situation, adopted three resolutions intended to serve as a party platform. The first committed the party to the support

of a league of nations. Whether or not Mr. Asquith himself inspired the resolution is of little consequence. What matters is that, when he spoke, he did so with the knowledge that the party was behind him. The other two planks in the conference platform are hardly less important. One, as summarized in a press dispatch, calls for "control by Parliament of the foreign policy and ratification of treaties." The other demands "full restoration of free speech, free press, and rights of civil trial." On these foundations, joined to that of a league of nations, the Liberal party has now taken its stand.—*Nation*, July 20, 1918. p. 58.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, FOREIGN SECRETARY OF GREAT BRITAIN

This is no knight-errant business, in which men, doubtless of high ideals, set forth on some distant quest looking out for wrongs to remedy, for fair ladies to release, with all the other romantic objects of medieval chivalry. This is a hard, practical necessity, and it requires indeed imagination to grasp it. It requires something more than a merely parochial outlook to see our highest interests, but our highest moral and national interests, our noblest aspirations, are bound up with the fate of countries whose language we can not speak and with whose history, I dare say, a good many of us here are very imperfectly acquainted. Slowly, indeed, has the lesson been driven in, but it has been driven into the hearts and consciences of this people in a manner they will never forget, that we can not think merely within our own shores, of our own liberties, of our own developments, but that modern civilized nations are so interconnected, their common interests are so great, that unless they will exercise some coercion over their unruly or criminal members, the very fabric of civilization may be shattered.

I am not going to discuss now whether the League of Nations has reached the stage of being a practical ideal. I myself admit the immense difficulties which lie in the way of that constructive statesmanship which will indeed make it a working, effective instrument, but while I recognize the difficulties I think it mean and cowardly to shrink from them, and I hope the civilized world will take that great problem seriously in hand and see it through.—*Recent Speech at Edinburgh. Reprinted from the Literary Digest.* 56:13. February 2, 1918.

ANDREW BONAR LAW, BRITISH CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

President Wilson's aim is to have peace now and security for peace in the future. That is our aim also and it is our only aim. He hopes to secure this by a league of peace, and he not only spoke in favor of such a league but he is trying to induce the American Senate to take the steps necessary to give effect to it. It would not be right to look upon the question as altogether Utopian. You know that only quite recently, almost up to our own time, duelling was common, and now the idea that private quarrels should be settled by the sword has become unthinkable. I think it is not impossible—I hope it may prove possible—that the time may come when the nations of the world will look upon what Cromwell described as his great work as their work too—that of being a constable to preserve peace in the parish.—*Speech at Bristol, January 24, 1917.*

LORD LANSDOWNE, EX-FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

How are we going to get a durable peace? To my mind, there is only one way of getting it, and that is by bringing about a combination of the Great Powers. . . . I mean a combination of all the Powers, under which they will hold themselves bound to refer international disputes to some kind of international tribunal, and under which they will bind themselves . . . to use coercion against any criminal or unruly members of the combination.

GENERAL JAN C. SMUTS

When the great American Republic joined us in the struggle, it was not only with material weapons, but with all that moral reinforcement which came from the splendid vision and moral enthusiasm of President Wilson, speaking on behalf of the people of the United States. His was the great vision of a League of Nations, and our main concern now must be the saving of Europe for the future of the world. As we organized the world for victory, let us now organize the world against hunger. That will be the best preparation for the new order of international good feeling and co-operation.—*Address to Party of American Editors, London, November 14, 1918.*

**LORD NORTHCLIFFE, BRITISH EDITOR, HEAD OF THE AMERICAN
MISSION**

A close federation of the nations now fighting the good fight will be the only insurance against the autocracy that made this war possible and the horrors that the armies of the autocrat perpetrated on innocent non-combatants. The word must be made for democracy.—*Address before the Players' Club, New York City, June 28, 1917.*

ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

I can speak for no government, but I am convinced that the mass of thoughtful Christian folks in England feel with an earnestness beyond words the force of President Wilson's contention, that for reasons not of policy but of principle, not of national interest but of righteousness and justice and enduring peace, we want a League of Nations on the very lines he has drawn.”—*Letter to the London Times.*

M. ALEXANDRE RIBOT, FORMER PREMIER OF FRANCE

It is necessary that a League of Peace be founded in the same spirit of democracy that France has had the honor of introducing into the world. The nations now in arms will constitute the Society of Nations. This is the future of humanity, or one might well despair of the future. President Wilson upon this point is with us. All nations not predatory must unite to prevent others from disturbing the peace. They must unite in an armed league to make respected throughout the world, peace, justice and liberty.—*Address to the French Senate, June 6, 1917.*

M. RENÉ VIVIANI, HEAD OF THE FRENCH MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES

Your flag bears forty-eight stars, representing forty-eight states. Each state has its own legislature, but all are subject to Federal laws that were made for all. May we not hope for the day when all the nations of the earth will be united as are your states, under certain broad and general restrictions that will make it forever impossible for some mad autocrat to play havoc with the universe.—*Speech at the Boston Public Library, May 13, 1917.*

S.R. AUGUSTO CIUFFELLI, MEMBER OF THE ITALIAN WAR MISSION.

This must be the last war. Nations cannot in the future squander all their money on military preparedness. The new spirit must make us live together in the ideals of peace and justice. Italy is eager to take her place in a new world organized for peace.—*Statement to the press, June 1, 1917.*

GEORG FRIEDRICH VON HERTLING, FORMER CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

XIV.—The last point, the 14th, deals with a league of nations. Regarding this point, I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future a possibility or a probability of war, and will promote a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the idea of a league of nations, as suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality toward all, then the Imperial Government is gladly ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of such a league of nations.—*Reply, before the Main Committee of the Reichstag, to President Wilson's address of January 8, 1918.*

BERNHARD DERNBURG, EX-COLONIAL SECRETARY OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

The situation at large demands international distribution . . . secured by international agreements which bind the states and do not leave a free hand to the individual—that is to say, there must be a league of nations for the universal world supply of a humanity destitute of raw materials.

HIS HOLINESS POPE BENEDICT

We now wish to make a more concrete and practical proposal and to invite the governments of the belligerents to come to an agreement upon the following points which seem to be a basis of a just and durable peace, leaving to them the task of analyzing and completing them.

First of all, the fundamental point must be that the material force of arms be substituted by the moral force of right, from which shall arise a fair agreement by all for the simultaneous

and reciprocal diminution of armaments, according to the rules and guarantees to be established, in a measure necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of public order in each state.

Then in the substitution for armies of the institution of arbitration with its high pacifying function, according to the rules to be laid down and the penalties to be imposed on a state which would refuse either to submit a national question to arbitration or to accept its decision.—*Message to the belligerent governments, August 1, 1917.*

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE

The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall be developed.—*From the program of an international gathering called by the Dutch Anti-War Council, at The Hague, April 7-10, 1915.*

WOMAN'S PEACE PARTY

That the Woman's Peace Party shall in every way possible promote a public demand that an agreement for a League of Nations shall be made the basis of the war settlement, and it hereby petitions the Government to urge as speedily as possible upon the allied governments an explicit agreement to this end, that all nations on the earth may know that they will be assured mutual protection and economic equality upon the complete establishment of such a league.—*Resolutions adopted at the Third Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, December 6-7, 1917.*

NEUTRAL CONFERENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION

Far more important, however, for the welfare of humanity than the solutions thus far suggested is the creation of an international organization, founded upon law and justice, which would include an agreement to submit all disputes between states for peaceful settlement. Hence the almost universal opinion that in the coming treaty of peace, the principle of such an international order of justice must be accepted.—*From the Statement issued by the Conference, in session at Stockholm, on the initiative of Henry Ford, Easter, 1916.*

UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

The foundation of all future hopes of permanent peace lies in the establishment of a League of Nations. . . . Our first task is

to convince the masses of every country that in a League of Nations they may find a means of defense which renders their old militarism unnecessary.—*Peace Program of the Union.*

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF WOMEN FOR PERMANENT PEACE

The Peace Settlement Conference should provide for . . . a concert or league of nations open to all states.—*From Program prepared by the American Section for presentation to the proposed After-the-War Congress of the Committee.*

OPPRESSSED NATIONS OF MIDDLE EUROPE

That there should be formed a league of the nations of the world in a common and binding agreement for genuine and practical co-operation to secure justice and therefore peace among nations.—*From the "Declaration of Independence" adopted at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, October 26, 1918.*

INTER-ALLIED LABOR AND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 22, 1918

Whoever triumphs, the peoples will have lost unless an international system is established which will prevent war. What would it mean to declare the right of peoples to self-determination if this right were left at the mercy of new violations, and was not protected by a supernational authority? That authority can be no other than the League of Nations, in which not only all the present belligerents, but every other independent state, should be pressed to join.—*Memorandum on War Aims adopted by the Conference.*

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF AMERICA AND THE JEWISH SOCIALIST LEAGUE

We approve the peace terms adopted by the Inter-Allied Socialist and Labor Conferences.—*Joint Manifesto.*

INTER-ALLIED PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE

LONDON, Oct. 29, (British Wireless Service.)—Resolutions unanimously passed at the recent conference of the French, Italian, Belgian, and British sections of the Inter-Allied Parliamentary Committee recommended that the nations now united in the fight for liberty should maintain their close association until the dangers threatening them had been removed by the complete overthrow of the enemy powers.

Another resolution said that it was of paramount importance that the governments of the allied nations should forthwith proceed to prepare in consultation a scheme for the establishment after the war of machinery designed to secure and develop a "Society of Nations" as a proper means for attaining a durable peace guarded by the joint action of free nations.—*New York Times, October 30, 1918.*

ASSOCIATED ADVERTISING CLUBS OF THE WORLD

A telegram promising the support of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World to the proposal for a League of Nations after the war was sent to President Wilson yesterday by the Executive Committee of the association. After reviewing the President's proposal the telegram adds:

"This League of Nations would be an essential agency of plan and progress in the era of reconstruction on which this world is entering."—*New York Times, November 17, 1918.*

EARL CURZON'S PROPOSAL IN PARLIAMENT

The House of Lords on June 26, 1918, discussed the proposed plans of a league of nations after the war. Viscount Bryce urged the Government to open an inquiry into the subject and to let the world know that it was doing so.

Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Government leader in the House of Lords, agreed with Viscount Bryce that there was no reason why, without waiting for the termination of the war, the Government should not discuss the proposal for a league of nations, which, he said, ought to be called into existence immediately after the war ended. To a large extent, he said, leagues of nations existed already, as, for instance, the league of the British Empire and the league of over twenty nations allied to resist German militarism. There was also in existence in Paris machinery representing Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States for unity in naval, military, and economic matters.—*New York Times Current History, August, 1918. p. 352.*

SUMMON CHRISTIANS TO LEAGUE OF PEACE

LONDON, Feb. 22, (Delayed).—The following appeal has been issued over the signatures of the archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Winchester, the Bishop of Oxford, the Bishop of Southwark, the Bishop of Peterborough, the Rev. Dr. James

Cooper, Moderator of the Established Church of Scotland; the Rev. Dr. W. B. Settle, the Rev. Dr. J. Scott Lidgett, the Rev. Dr. F. B. Meyer, the Rev. Dr. D. S. Cairns, the Rev. Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter, the Rev. Dr. Alexander Connell, the Rev. Father Plater, Lord Henry Bentinck, Lord Parmoor, the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, George Lansbury, Arthur Mansbridge, Professor A. S. Peake, and Principal T. F. Roberts:

"We, the signatories of this document, belonging to various Christian bodies, have noted with the greatest satisfaction the prominent place given by the President of the United States and by successive Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of our own country to the proposal of a League of Nations. The idea has also, as was to be expected, won wide support among the official representatives of Christian communions, e. g., in the Pope's appeal to the powers last summer and in the recent Convocation of Canterbury.

"But more is yet needed to make manifest and effective the full force of Christian conviction in its favor, still largely latent, but capable of being evoked if only the vital import of the idea be brought forcibly home to Christian people at large.

"In the name, then, of the Prince of Peace, we would call on them duly to consider and openly to welcome the idea of such a league as shall safeguard international right and permanent peace and shall also have power in the last resort to constrain by economic pressure or armed force any nation refusing to submit to arbitration or international adjudication in the first instance any dispute with another tending to war.

"We believe that a new system of international law and authority, acting through an inclusive League of Nations in place of any balance of power, is a condition of a just and lasting peace, particularly as it affords means whereby the fresh demands of national life as they arise can be adjudicated upon and equitably satisfied.

"Accordingly, we hold it to be of the utmost importance, as President Wilson has just emphasized, that such a league should not merely be contemplated as a more or less remote outcome of a future settlement, but should be put in the very forefront of the peace terms as their presupposition and guarantee.

"Whether it be or be not practicable, without any slackening of the energy with which the war must be waged, to make a

beginning upon the league as regards the Allies and neutrals, even before the peace conference, we do not venture to decide, though we think this course has much to commend it. But we are sure of the pressing need there is here and now of giving the League of Nations the backing of an organized body of strong conviction; sure, also, that this task offers to the Christian consciousness an opportunity to make its own spirit felt in national policy such as has not occurred heretofore since the outbreak of this war."—*New York Times, February 24, 1918.*

FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Within the last three months the project of a league of nations has come strikingly to the front in French Socialist politics, stimulated largely by the adoption by the special committee of the French Socialist Party of the proposals in the Stockholm manifesto. In the manifesto the league of nations is regarded as the only permanent guarantee of peace; it maintains that the particular problems of the settlement must be dealt with in accordance with the ideas of public right which the league will uphold. The league itself must be such an integral part of settlement that its formation cannot possibly be left until after the war.

The French Socialists, when formulating the terms upon which they were prepared to enter the projected Ribot and actual Painlevé governments, urged that it would be well for the allied governments to establish between themselves, without delay, a system of arbitration, with published treaties, which would permanently ensure the equitable settlement of disputes between them. The French Socialists have also demanded that the league shall be based "upon the faith" of all the peoples involved, and have formulated certain practical proposals for the establishment of this condition. They propose that the admittance of any nation into the league shall be conditioned by the sanction of the national parliaments.

On September 19, M. Lemery, in an address to the French Government, declared that the question of the establishment of the league of nations was no longer merely an academic one. The league was already in existence, but it should be provided with machinery; the legal and political principles and the economic constitution of the league should be defined. To this M. Painlevé answered, that the government was convinced that

it would be able to carry through the project of forming a league of nations; but he added that the solution did not rest with them alone. The formation of the league depended largely on England's willingness to co-operate.

The idea of the league has been widely discussed in the French press, notably in an article in *L'Oeuvre*, which insists that universal peace can only be led up to and brought into being and guaranteed by the league of nations. The *Petit Parisien* has lately published a striking article by M. Jules Destree, Belgian Ambassador in Petrograd, urging the immediate establishment of the league. He contends that each nation's war program will extend mathematically, or contract, according to the chances of the league becoming good or bad.

The organizing committee of the Stockholm Conference in the manifesto just issued, outlining the general conditions of peace, states that in order to give peace a durable character, the contracting parties are to declare themselves ready to create a society of nations on a basis of compulsory arbitration and general disarmament. The Nationalist Congress of the Socialist Party at Bordeaux has passed a resolution declaring that although the French Government has made satisfactory declaration on war aims, and the Chamber of Deputies has proclaimed at public sessions its intention to prepare the society of nations and reject all tendency towards conquest and annexation, all the Allies have not done the same thing to the same extent. The resolution declares it is therefore necessary that the Government of France, profiting by the initiative of the Russian Revolution, shall obtain from the Allies a common declaration that will make international rights the sole basis of the national claims of each of them.

In the draft of the new constitution drawn up by the Labor Party in this country, the objects of the party under the international heading are defined as follows: "To co-operate with the labor organizations in other countries, and to assist in organizing a federation of nations for the maintenance of freedom and peace, and for the establishment of suitable machinery for the adjustment and settlement of international disputes by conciliation or judicial arbitration, and for such international legislation as may be practicable."—*Advocate of Peace*, January, 1918.
p. 21.

PAN-AMERICAN LABOR CONFERENCE

We declare that the following essential fundamental principles must underlie the peace as well as the principles of all civilized nations: a league of the free peoples of the world in a common covenant for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and therefore peace in relations between nations.—*From the Resolutions adopted at Laredo, Texas, November 13, 1918.*

SWEDISH PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION were given expression at the Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Stockholm in September. These provide for (1) the establishment of a league comprising all of the nations of the world; (2) mutual engagements between the States to submit every dispute which cannot be diplomatically settled and is of a judicial nature to the arbitration either of the existing Hague Court or a specially designated body; (3) an international committee of investigation with power to treat all questions other than these, the while all countries concerned agree to wait peaceably on its decision, and (4) a permanent international council as the centralizing organ of the various international committees.

SWISS INTEREST IN A LEAGUE OF NATIONS, declared President Calonder not long ago, was of a fundamental character, due to the fact that Switzerland itself was but a federation of peoples of four different languages and cultures, yet bound fast with a strong sentiment of mutual interest and common nationality. In his speech before the Swiss National Council, in which he made clear Swiss attitude of high approbation of the League of Nations' idea, Dr. Calonder quoted the motto given Switzerland by her great writer Gottfried Keller as the heart and soul of all international unity: "Friendship in freedom." He referred to the political life of his country as a veritable preliminary to a League of Nations. In this respect, too, Switzerland has an international mission that is unmistakable: "To further peace and friendship among all peoples and to prove to the world by her example that different races and people of a different tongue could, on the basis of mutual esteem, on the basis of freedom and equality, be united into one happy community."

A GERMAN LEAGUE OF NATIONS, not necessarily the same thing as the German world originally planned, is, according to Amsterdam gossip a matter of serious discussion in the German

Foreign Office, in which the collaboration of prominent deputies and jurists has been permitted. Proposals, it is said, have already been drafted which in the main harmonize with the Majority Party's general program. A special commission has been proposed to study these proposals and frame a complete draft of the German version of a League of Nations.—*Advocate of Peace*. November, 1918. p. 312.

DISCUSSION

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A LASTING PEACE¹

If there is one thought and purpose which has been emphasised above all others in the announcements and avowals of responsible statesmen, that this is a war to end war, it is that we are fighting for a lasting peace. But one thing is certain: if the deep underlying causes of this war remain at its conclusion, if after all the expenditure and suffering the nations return to the status quo ante, then the war of to-day will indeed prove to be but the drumfire that prepares the way for the great drive of the next war. But this must not be. The treaty of peace must be a treaty of lasting peace. What kind of a peace will last?

A peace that will last must be a general peace. The reason for this is obvious. It is because the principles of a lasting peace among nations are universal principles. It is because compromise would be surrender. The democratic nations are determined to discredit the doctrine that might makes right.

A peace that will last must be a genuine peace. It must not be a patched-up peace, a temporary truce based on expediency; if it is to be permanent, it must be founded on justice and the principles of public right. It must not be a fraudulent peace, a hypocritical peace. It must be democratic for the reason—as President Wilson has pointed out—that “only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interests of their own.”

A peace that will last must be a generous peace. It must be a peace without vengeance, and a peace without vengeance is a very different thing from a peace without victory. It means the sort of peace Lincoln made with the South—after

¹ By Robert Goldsmith, author of “A League to Enforce Peace.” In The Bookman for May, 1918.

Lee's surrender. But Lincoln saw with unblurred vision that no permanent peace was possible among the states unless and until slavery was crushed. It is not otherwise to-day. Wilson sees now, whether or not he saw at once, that there can be no lasting peace among the nations until the Thing called militarism is crushed and destroyed. Nor is this idea of a generous peace some vague hope of impractical idealism; it is, on the contrary sound political philosophy. History has demonstrated repeatedly that the other kind of peace does not and cannot last.

A peace that will last must be a guaranteed peace. Very well; but how is peace to be guaranteed? The answer is that the structure of peace must be founded on international covenants, international courts, an international constabulary, and international co-operation. Covenants, courts, a constabulary, and co-operation—these are the four cornerstones. A covenanted peace is a peace between peoples. The old diplomacy is played out. Hereafter no treaty can be held to be valid or binding upon the population of a country unless it is underwritten by the people of the country; until it is endorsed by the workers and the women through their responsible representatives in popularly elected parliaments. President Wilson, in his address to Congress on January 8th last, makes this the first item in his programme: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

Hitherto the towering structure of society has been based on the foundations of brute force alone. But the trembling sills and girders of fear and force can no longer be trusted to bear the weight and stand the strain of modern sky-scraper states. New underpinning of reason and justice must be substituted if we would have the edifice endure. The reason civilisation has collapsed and international society become a heap of charred and smoking ruins to-day is because the superstructure has been raised upon such rotten timbers and cross-beams as sinister diplomacy and unconscionable intrigue. International covenants would do away with all this and plant the peace of the world on firm foundations.

International tribunals—courts and councils—would need

to be created, or resurrected, if reason and justice are to be made operative in international relations. The covenant against aggression would pledge all signatories to submit to public hearing before a constituted court or council "all disputes of every nature whatsoever" which might arise between them. In all probability it will be found expedient to set up two tribunals: a Court of Justice to hear and decide questions that can be determined by the established and acknowledged rules of international law and equity, and a Council of Conciliation to compose by compromise and mutual concession all other vexed questions that, unless peaceably settled, would be likely to lead to war. Such a council, it is believed, would discover and apply ways for changing the status quo without resort to arms.

War is the ripened fruit of lawlessness. Society has slowly progressed from barbarism to civilisation by the gradual substitution of law for anarchy. War, which is direct action, may appear to be the shortest distance between two points. As a matter of fact it is clumsy as well as cruel, and as stupid as it is horrible. It is anachronistic and should be obsolescent. Problems of territorial expansion and economic opportunity should be thought out rather than fought out, because howitzers and machine guns do not always speak the truth.

Few of us need to be reminded that the time was when individuals took the settlement of their personal grievances in their own hands. In the tenth century trial by battle was sanctioned by the state. The disputants went to the public field and fought it out. The judge had to adjourn court and render a verdict in favour of the winner. Men no longer appeal to the field of honour but to the court of justice. Individuals, for the most part, have learned to settle their quarrels, and to seek redress for injuries suffered, by law instead of war. It is now proposed that the nations go and do likewise.

The signatory Powers who covenanted among themselves to exhaust every peaceable means of settlement before going to war would constitute what President Wilson has felicitously called a league of honour. In the event of a signatory to the treaty creating the League of Nations threatening war against a fellow-member, without first submitting its disputes to public review and report, all the other members of the League would immediately join in bringing to bear both diplomatic and eco-

nomic pressure to stop the would-be aggressor. If, after this joint protest and non-military coercion, the recalcitrant persisted with overt acts of hostility and actually commenced war, in violation of the terms of the covenant, it is proposed that all the other nations, in fulfillment of their treaty pledge, should, with their combined military and naval forces, come to the defense of the one attacked. Some students of the subject propose that this "mutual defence" stipulation apply likewise in the event of any member of the League being attacked by an outside Power. Some believe that the joint economic and military force of the states of the League should be used only to compel arbitration and enforce delay; others have become convinced that the whole procedure would degenerate into a tragic farce unless the decision of the international court were also enforced.

At the present writing it is the official position of the American League to Enforce Peace that the element of force should be used only to compel states of the League to submit their questions in dispute for preliminary enquiry. However, many of the most intelligent and influential members of that organisation are more sanguine of success for a less conservative programme.

An international constabulary, in any event, would have to be organised to give effective sanction to the terms of the covenant. And this will be true whether much or little is to be enforced; whether, after the war, we are to have an all-around reduction of armaments or a general increase in armaments; whether the several nations are all to retain their distinct military organisations or pool them into some kind of an international military establishment.

Some will ask, Is it proposed that peace should be guaranteed by force of arms? It is; but the arms would not be owned and controlled, absolutely, by an irresponsible imperial state. Pax Romana—or Pax Teutonicus—is precisely the method which Germany wants to impose on a cowed and subject world. It will never do in these times. No modern nation, not even poor, distracted Russia, would long submit to that kind of peace. The peoples of all free nations will refuse to be slaves of the sword of Prussia. If the choice were exigent they would prefer annihilation.

But if not by the method of Pax Romana how then would

peace be guaranteed by force of arms? Is it to be by the method known as an "armed peace"? No, for an armed peace is the inevitable military expression for the political system known as balance of power, concerning which the President has said, "the great game of the balance of power has been forever discredited." The rivalry in armaments made necessary by this system is largely responsible for the present war. We must substitute a league of nations for the balance of power; co-operative armaments for competitive armaments; police force for martial force, and settlement by reason for settlement by might.

It is not necessary to discuss, in academic fashion, the conflicting philosophies of right or wrong as to the use of force. Sensible men, mindful of the realities, assume the right to employ force in defence of civilisation as against an outlaw individual, or an outlaw nation. The justification of force is a worthy purpose. The instruments of force must be dedicated to the cause of law and order. It should not seem so surprising, on reflection, that we dare not put our trust in Christian sentiment or enlightened public opinion, alone, to prevent war: we do not pretend to maintain law and order within nations by good-will; we use force, police and militia.

It should not require any prodigal expenditure of thought to reach the conclusion that those who propose to end war by good-will and moral suasion are the visionaries who are blinded to the realities by the dazzling brilliance of their dreams. The position of the so-called "voluntary groups," who want to get along without the use of force, is identical with that of philosophic anarchism. Some day the world may be ruled by the force of love; but meanwhile why squander time loafing about the corridors of such an air castle? Force must be made to wear the trappings and become the obedient servant of reason and justice.

But, after all, these proposals—covenants, courts, constabulary—are of a negative character. They are all calculated, as lets and hindrances, to postpone or prevent war. But peace is more than the mere absence of war. Some positive provisions must be undertaken; some seawall of community of interest must be constructed if the world is not again to be deluged with a flood-tide of war: there must be international co-operation.

Political autocracy is not the only cause of modern war. Privilege is Protean, taking many forms and shapes. Emperors are not the only arrogant monarchs and imperialism does not always wear the purple robe of dynastic ambition. There is such a thing as financial imperialism; there are czars of commerce and monarchs of the market. Ways and means must be discovered, or invented, to provide for change and progress. The road to peace cannot be paved with cannon-balls for cobble-stones. The parade of progress must not be between serried ranks and bristling bayonets. It is ardently hoped that the Council of Nations will labour to promote justice and discourage privilege. The axe must be laid to the very roots of the Upas Tree of greed.

Now it is quite possible that suggestions have been advocated for guaranteeing peace—such as, for example, the adoption of universal free trade—that are more fundamental and far-reaching than the scheme of an international league. The immediate practicability of the plan, and its logical cogency, should determine our preference. And this is equally true with respect to the particular plan of a League of Nations to which we give our adherence.

It is, of course, quite pertinent to ask whether the Great Powers will so far relinquish their sovereignty as to sign a treaty which will bind them in advance to arbitrate their disputes, particularly those involving vital questions of national purpose and honour. In reply, it may be said at once, that a number of the Great Powers have already expressed themselves—some more, some less officially—as ready to share in the organisation of some such League as is here proposed. And so far as sacrificing a measure of sovereignty is concerned, it is perhaps well to remind ourselves that the interdependence of the modern world and the rapid spread of democratic sentiments have together conspired to make the earlier idea of absolute sovereignty little more than a political heirloom.

Some have argued that even if the Powers did so bind themselves they would not hesitate to break faith when the test came. If that is so (and I for my part do not for a moment believe it is so) then why all this hullabaloo against Germany for breaking faith and invading Belgium! Of course, it must be confessed that nations before now, and other na-

tions as well as Germany, have torn up treaties as scraps of paper. But the fact remains, and is easily verified, that the vast majority of contracts between nations have been scrupulously kept.

Americans will say—they have already said it many times—that Washington warned our young Republic against the danger of entangling alliances with the Old-World monarchies. But 1796 was a long time ago, and since then the American experiment has been quite universally approved. Our line is gone out through all the earth. The advice of Jefferson and Washington, that we come out and be separate; the admonition that we should not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers in democracy, though pertinent in the eighteenth century, is no longer pertinent. The Mayflower has voyaged back to Europe freighted with liberty and democracy. As a matter of history we won our first fight for freedom by an alliance with France. Could Washington speak today he would doubtless hail the advent of a league of liberals to oppose mediaeval monarchs. Did he not, in his day, lead thirteen colonies against the tyranny of a despotic sovereign? To-day more than thirteen nations are threatened by a tyranny far worse than that of George the Third.

This is not to deny that for the United States to join the League of Nations would be a new departure. But such a departure from the policy of aloofness would not really be a break with tradition. Maturity is a new and radical departure from Youth, but it is at the same time a normal development and evolution.

Neutrality is at an end. Isolation is a thing of the past. It is manifest that America can no longer be an anchorite nation. Our intellectual, moral, economic, and financial interests have become inextricably interwoven with the fabric of the whole world. Seclusion is an illusion. America is cast to play an important role in the drama of history.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

There are projects that exist in shadowy form in an atmosphere of tepid idealism, admired by those who see that, if possible, they would be desirable. From time to time an attempt is made to embody them in material form and make them of practical use in national or international politics. It is then discovered that what appeared as an ideal to be wholly desirable and amiable cannot be of practical use, unless we are ready to subject ourselves to some limitations or discipline that may be inconvenient, and unless we are prepared to overcome some difficulties that were not at first sight apparent.

The ideal is found to have in fact a stern and disagreeable as well as an easy and amiable side to it. Thereupon the storm beats against it. Those who never thought it desirable, for there are intelligences to which most ideals seem dangerous and temperaments to which they are offensive, and who had previously treated it only with contempt in the abstract, offer the fiercest opposition to it as a practical proposal. Many of its supporters are paralyzed by difficult aspects which they had not previously considered, and the project recedes again into a region of shadows or abstract resolutions.

This, or something like this, has hitherto been the history of the ideal that has now become associated with the phrase "League of Nations," but it does not follow that the history of this or of other ideals will be the same after the war as before it. There is more at stake in this war than the existence of individual States or empires or the fate of the Continent. The whole of modern civilization is at stake, and whether it will perish, be submerged, as has happened to previous civilizations of older types, or whether it will live and progress depends upon whether the nations engaged in this war, and even those that are onlookers, learn the lessons that the experience of the war may teach them. It must be with nations as with individuals. In the great trials of life they must become better or worse, they cannot stand still. They must learn to profit by experience and rise to greater heights, or else sink lower and drop eventually into

¹ By Viscount Grey of Falloden. Oxford University Press. 1918.

an abyss. And this war is the greatest trial of which there is any record in history. If the war does not teach mankind new lessons that will so dominate the thought and feeling of those who survive it and those who succeed the survivors as to make new things possible, then the war will be the greatest catastrophe as well as the most grievous trial and suffering of which mankind has any record.

Therefore, it does not follow that a league of nations to secure the peace of the world will remain impossible because it has not been possible hitherto, and I propose in this paper to consider shortly, to state rather than examine, for it would take a long time to examine thoroughly conditions that have not been present before, and that are present now, or may soon be present, and that are essential if a league of nations is to become effective.

These conditions appear to me to be as follows:

First, the idea must be adopted with earnestness and conviction by the executive heads of States. It must become an essential part of their practical policy, one of their chief reasons for being, or continuing to be, responsible for the policy of their States. They must not adopt it only to render lip service to other persons whom it is inconvenient or ungracious to displease. They must lead and not follow. They must compel, if necessary, and not be compelled.

This condition was not present before the war. To what extent is it present now? It is not possible to answer this question fully, but it can be answered certainly and affirmatively as regards President Wilson, the executive head of the United States, and this alone is sufficient to give new life and purpose to the idea of a league of nations. President Wilson and his country have had in this matter the great advantage of having been for more than two years and a half, before April, 1917, able to observe the war as neutrals, free from the intense anxiety and effort that absorb all the thought and energy of the belligerents. They were able not only to observe but to reflect and to draw conclusions.

One of the conclusions has been that if the world, of which they form an important part, is to be saved from what they consider disaster, they must enter the war against Germany.

Another has been that if national liberty and peace are to be secure in the future there must be a league of nations to secure them.

It must not be supposed from this that the Governments of the Allies are less ready to draw or have not already drawn the same conclusion from the experience of the war, but their countries have been at war all the time. They have been fighting, it is true, for the same ideal of national human liberty as the United States, but fighting also for the immediate preservation of national existence in Europe, and all their thought and energy has been concentrated upon resistance to imminent peril. Nevertheless, in this country, at any rate, the project of a league of nations has met with widespread, cordial acceptance.

On the other hand, the Military Party in Germany are, and must remain, opposed to it. They resent any limitation upon the use of force by Germany as fatal to German interests, for they can conceive no development and even no security except one based solely upon force. Any other conception is fatal, and this exclusive conception is essential to the maintenance of the power of the Military Party in Germany. As long, therefore, as this rule in Germany continues Germany will oppose the League of Nations. Nothing will change this except the conviction among the German people that the use of force causes at least as much suffering to themselves as to others, and that the security based upon law and treaty and the sense of mutual advantage is better than the risks, dangers, and sufferings of the will to supreme power and the efforts to obtain it, and this conviction must so work upon them as to displace the Military Party and their policy and ideals from power in Germany.

The situation, therefore, of this first condition essential to make the League of Nations practical may be summed up as follows:

It is present certainly as regards the executive head of the United States, which is potentially the strongest and actually the least exhausted of all belligerent States. It either is, or will at the end of the war be found to be, present as regards the Governments of the countries fighting on the same side as the United States. Even among their enemies Austria has publicly shown a disposition to accept the proposal and probably welcomes it genuinely, though secretly, as a safeguard for her

future, not only against old enemies but against Prussian domination. All small States, belligerent or neutral, must naturally desire in their own interest everything that will safeguard the small States as well as the great from aggression and war.

There remains the opposition of Germany, where the recent military success and ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence. Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her, and that when the world is free from the menace of these military rulers, with their sharp swords, shining armor, and mailed fists, Germany will find peaceful development assured and preferable to expansion by war and will realize that the condition of true security for one nation is the sense of security on the part of all nations.

Till Germany feels this to be true there can be no League of Nations in the sense intended by President Wilson. A league such as he desires must include Germany, and should include no nation that is not thoroughly convinced of the advantages, of the necessity, of such a league, and is, therefore, not prepared to make the efforts, and if need be the sacrifices necessary to maintain it.

The second condition essential to the foundation of the League of Nations is that the Governments and peoples of the States willing to found it understand clearly that it will impose some limitations upon the national action of each, and may entail some inconvenient obligation. Smaller and weaker nations will have rights that must be respected and upheld by the league. Stronger nations must forego the right to make their interests prevail against the weaker by force, and all States must forego the right in any dispute to resort to force before other methods of settlement by conference, conciliation, or if need be arbitration, have been tried. This is the limitation. The obligation is that if any nation will not observe this limitation upon its national actions, if it breaks the agreement which is the basis of the league, rejects all peaceful methods of settlement and resorts to force against another nation, they must one and all use their combined force against it.

The economic pressure that such a league could use would in itself be very powerful, and the action of some of the smaller

States composing the league could not perhaps go beyond the economic pressure, but those States that have the power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military, or naval, they possess. It must be clearly understood and accepted that deflection from or violation of the agreement by one or more States does not absolve all or any of the others from the obligation to enforce the agreement.

Anything less than this is of no value. How worthless it may be can be seen by reading the debate in the House of Lords in 1867 upon the Treaty Guaranteeing the Neutrality of Luxembourg. It was there explained that we entered only into a collective guarantee. By this it was apparently meant that if any one of the guaranteeing powers violated the neutrality of Luxembourg, or even if any one of them declined to take active steps to defend it, Great Britain and the other guarantors were thereby absolved from taking any action whatever. This was contrasted at the time with the Belgian treaty, which entailed a separate guarantee. Hitherto the nations of the world had made reserves in arbitration or conciliation agreements, showing that they were not prepared to accept the limitations upon national action that are essential to secure an effective league of nations. An exception is the conciliation treaty between Great Britain and the United States negotiated before the war. But the statement made above is generally true. The nations also carefully abstained from undertaking any obligation to use force to uphold the benevolent rules of agreements of general application that had been recorded at The Hague Conferences. Such obligation had been confined to local objects like the neutrality of Belgium or to alliances between particular powers, made to protect or serve their special interests.

Are the nations of the world prepared now, or will they be ready after the war, to look steadily and clearly at this aspect of the League of Nations; at the limitations and obligations that it will impose, and to say whole-heartedly and convincingly, as they have never done before: "We will accept and undertake them?" Individuals in civilized States have long ago accepted analogous limitations and obligations as regards disputes between individuals. These are settled by law, and any individual who, instead of appealing to law, resorts to force to give effect to what he considers his rights, finds himself at once opposed

and restrained by the force of the State—that is, in democratic countries, by the combined force of other individuals. And we not only accept this arrangement, but uphold it as essential to prevent the oppression of one by another, to secure each person in quiet life, and to guarantee to each the greatest liberty that is consistent with the equal liberty of his neighbors. That at any rate is part of the theory and object of democratic government, and if it is not perfectly attained, most of the proposals for improving it look rather to increased than to diminished State control.

But in less civilized parts of the world individuals have not reached the point of view from which this order of things seems desirable. There is the story of the native chief in Africa who protested to the British official against having to pay any taxes. The British official explained, no doubt in the best modern manner, that these taxes were used to keep order in the country, with the result that men and women and the flocks and herds in the possession of every tribe were safe, and each could live in its own territory without fear of disturbance, and that the payment of taxes was for the good of all. The effect of this explanation was to make the chief very angry. Before the British came he said he could raid the neighborhood, return with captives and captures of all sorts, and be received in triumph by the women and the rest of the tribe when he returned. The protection of his own tribe from similar raids he was willing to undertake himself. "Now," he said, "you come here and tell me that I ought to like to pay taxes to be prevented from doing this, and that makes me mad."

The analogy between States and individuals or groups of individuals, is not perfect, but there is sufficient analogy to make it not quite irrelevant to ask whether after this war the view held by the great States of the relations desirable between themselves will be that of the African chief or that of individuals in what we call civilized nations.

Nothing but experience convinced individuals that law was better than anarchy to settle relations between themselves. And the sanction that maintains law is the application of force with the support of the great majority of individuals behind it. Is it possible that the experience of this war will produce a settled opinion of the same sort to regulate the relations of States with

one another and to safeguard the world from that which is in fact anarchy? What does the experience of this war amount to?

Our minds cannot grasp it. Thought is crushed by the accumulated suffering that the war has caused and is still causing. We cannot utter all we feel, and if it were not that our feelings are in a way stunned by the very violence of the catastrophe, as physical nerves are to some extent numbed by great blows, the human heart could not bear up and live under the trial of this war. Great must be the effect of all this; greater after, even, than during the war, on the working of men's minds and on human nature itself, but this is not what I intend to urge here.

I will urge only one point, and one that is for the head rather than the heart. We are now in the fourth year of the war. The application of scientific knowledge and the inventions of science during the war have made it more terrible and destructive each year. The Germans have abrogated all previously accepted rules of warfare. The use of poisonous gas, the firing from the sea upon open, undefended towns, and the indiscriminate bombing of big cities from the air were all introduced into the war by Germany.

It was long before the Allies adopted any of these practices even as reprisals, but the Germans have forced a ruthless, unlimited application of scientific discovery to the destruction of human life, combatant and non-combatant. They have shown the world that now and henceforth war means this, and nothing less than this.

If there is to be another war in twenty or thirty years' time, what will it be like? If there is to be concentrated preparation for more war, the researches of science will be devoted henceforth to discovering methods by which the human race can be destroyed. These discoveries cannot be confined to one nation, and their object of wholesale destruction will be much more completely achieved hereafter even than in this war. The Germans are not blind to this, but, as far as I can see, their rulers propose to avoid future wars by establishing domination by Germany forever.

Peace can never be secured by the domination of one country, securing its power and prosperity by submission and disadvantage to others; and the German idea of a world peace secured by the power of German militarism is impracticable as

well as unfair and abhorrent to other nations. It is as intolerable and impossible in the world as despotism would be here or in the United States.

In opposition to this idea of Germany, the Allies should set forth, as President Wilson has already set forth, an idea of peace secured by mutual regard between States for the rights of each, and the determination to stamp out any attempt at war as they would a plague that threatened the destruction of all. When those who accept this idea and this sort of peace can in word and deed speak for Germany we shall be within sight of a good peace.

The establishment and maintenance of a league of nations such as President Wilson had advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transcend them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of States are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in any State.

"Learn by experience or suffer," is the rule of life. We have all of us seen individuals becoming more and more a misery to themselves and others because they cannot understand or will not accept this rule. Is it not applicable to nations as well? And, if so, have not nations come to the great crisis in which for them the rule "Learn or perish" will prove inexorable? All must learn the lesson of this war. The United States and the Allies cannot save the world from militarism unless Germany learns her lesson thoroughly and completely, and they will not save the world or even themselves by a complete victory over Germany until they, too, have learned and can apply the lesson that militarism has become the deadly enemy of mankind.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

War is an operation of the social instinct. If tragedy is the conflict of two rights, war is the shock of two social organisms. It is the ultimate expression of the solidarity which knits a social unit. Of the social units which we call national states

¹ From "Foundations of Internationalism," prize essay, by H. N. Brailsford. In English Review, p. 87, August, 1918.

it is broadly true that war is possible between them, but not within them. That elementary fact must be our clue in any investigation of the problem of a durable peace. If, by the creation of a League of Nations, we mean merely that the external bond of a treaty of arbitration is to link states, which retain their old individualism and their traditions of nationalist morals and nationalist economics, it would be folly to suppose that we can abolish war. Theoretically, the only security seems to lie in some organic international association, which, by the creation of intimate and pervasive relationships of interdependence within itself, is at least in process of evolution towards the ideal of international solidarity.

There is certainly no warrant in history for the assumption that the national state, or even the composite empire, is the final form of the social unit, which alone can claim our loyalty and subordinate our egoistic strivings. From the clan to the empire the social unit has passed through many phases of evolution and expansion. To this process the social instinct of the citizens has adapted itself with surprising versatility. In the nineteenth century war was still possible between the States of disunited Germany and Italy. To-day the sons of fathers who knew neither Germany nor Italy fight for the larger national unit with the instinctive passion of clansmen. An academic demonstration that the social unit is elastic and the social instinct adaptable will not carry us far towards our goal. The dominating fact of our generation in world-politics has been the formation of a new type of association, much larger, though much looser in its structure, than anything that endured in the past. The modern alliance is incomparably more intimate than the dynastic groupings and the military coalitions of the past, and promises to be more permanent. The two groups which divided Europe on the eve of this war had formed the habit of concerted action even in the normal operations of peace. Austria was Germany's "brilliant second" in every diplomatic exchange, and France expected, without always receiving, a like support from Russia. When the Dual Alliance became the Triple Entente, British finance fell into line and shared with France the risks of maintaining the financial stability of Tsardom. The fact that in the precarious balance of pre-war Europe the safety of each Power might depend on the prosperity, the solvency,

and the efficient armament of its allies had begun to blur, though not to obliterate, the dividing lines of national egoism and separatism. The war has in both camps carried the evolution immeasurably further. There is a common purse while the war lasts; there is even in our combination a common larder. The rationing among the Allies of essential food supplies and raw materials implies a community of interest that is, even in war, a new fact in international life. Pitt's subsidies were only a shadowy anticipation of this system. It is already recognized that much of this common machinery must outlast the war.

These are political phenomena, but they must assuredly have a large reaction upon economics. On the whole, it was broadly true before this war that financiers acted by preference or necessity in national groups. There were, however, interesting anticipatory types which seemed to point to the coming internationalisation of some of the more highly organised forms of production. An international agreement in the steel trade parcellled out to each of the chief national industries the world-market in steel rails. It needs no elaborate argument to show that the rationing of raw materials after the war by the Allies must involve an understanding not merely as to what each Ally requires for its own national consumption, but also an understanding as to the export trade of each in the manufactured articles. Within each group of Allies commercial rivalry must diminish, and cooperation, or even syndication, tend to take its place. However calculating and self-regarding this process may be, it must play its part in breaking down, at least in the upper world of industry and finance, the cruder and more egoistic assumptions of nationalist economics.

If the closer organisation as permanent military and economic alliances of these two groups involves within them some development and enlargement of the social consciousness, it also carries with it a challenge and menace to posterity. While these two coalitions survive, every war must needs be a universal war. It wants a hardy optimism to believe that after a sullen peace the equilibrium between these two supernational groups could long be stable. Each would labour to detach the less contented and the less loyal partners of the rival coalition. An active contest would proceed between them for the allegiance of the remaining neutrals. Every bitter memory, every new suspicion would give

to their organised rivalry in trade the passionate colour of a political contest. No promptings of economy could long restrain the inevitable rivalry in armaments. As they strove for the opening of closed markets and for access to raw materials, the will to prosper and live would drive them, as soon as the ravages of this war were repaired, to an even sharper conflict over a more elementary issue. A decorous truce, a bloodless rivalry, is barely conceivable if, at the settlement of this war, two unreconciled coalitions confront each other with a programme of economic war. We shall make either one supernational League or two. It is a choice between war and peace.

There is in human affairs a dialectic by which evil cures itself by its mere excess. National strife has led us to a war of coalitions. Let us inquire whether the dread of its renewal in a still more terrible form can impose upon us the immense achievement of constructing a single League of Peace.

We have seen that the social unit is itself variable and elastic, and there are indications that the social instinct can adapt itself with surprising versatility to the variations of this unit. This argument, though it clears away some preliminary doubts, is far from being decisive. We have still to cope with the direct and positive tendencies which in the past have insisted on the forcible settlement of disputes. The mind of Europe, as we knew it on the eve of this war, was, in the mass, precisely such a complex of thwarted impulses and half-successful inhibitions as Freud and his school have studied in the mental life of the individual. Through the subconscious life of most European nations there ran the recurrent motive of a desire for some organic change, some international readjustment, which was hardly to be attained in the world as we knew it by the normal processes of peace. The French desire for the revanche and the lost provinces, the Serbian passion for Jugo-Slav unity, the Bulgarian craving for Macedonia, and Italian Irredentism are the more obvious instances of these restless demands for change. Add to these the romantic passion of the Russian Imperialist for Constantinople, and the sense of the German patriot that the extension of his Empire overseas, measured relatively by that of Britain or France, was far from corresponding to the vigour of his national organism, its population, or its industrial capacity, and you have accumulated fuel enough even for a world-

conflagration. These impulses were restrained from year to year and from decade to decade by prudence, by morals, by the fear of the world's public opinion. The rigid structure of our international life opposed their realisation. Of some of them (notably the Alsatian and South Slav questions) we may say confidently that no radical solution was conceivable without war. Others, and especially the Colonial questions, were capable under favourable conditions of a pacific settlement. Even so, the disputes which turned on our tenure of Egypt, on the French claim to Morocco, on the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, on German ambitions in Turkey and Africa (as the Lichnowsky Memorandum shows), were settled only after prolonged periods of tension and some narrow escapes from war. Even in these more fortunate instances the appeal to force was made, though both sides recoiled in the end, after the dry warfare of armaments, from the actual shedding of blood. The impulses to change, which made no formal war, were none the less active. They worked on the play of national motive; they piled up armaments; they forged alliances. Again, and yet again, such an impulse as the French desire for la revanche, though it made no war, availed to deflect a nation's policy from the course which might have led to peace. To all these radical impulses towards war the Anglo-Saxon peoples are strangers. We have no unredeemed kinsmen; our estate in the world is ample; we possess all that force might win. The consequence is that we are apt to apply to the problem of an enduring peace a set of conceptions essentially conservative. We aim too exclusively at security. We conceive a League of Peace too simply as an organisation which will stereotype the status quo and repress the disturber of the established order. That way lies stagnation and, in the end, the inevitable insurgence of living forces against this death in life. Change is a biological necessity. The damning verdict on the old Europe is not that its suppressed impulses for change flamed at last into a universal war, but rather that its structure was so rigid, its power of self-adjustment so limited, that save through war no radical change was possible within it.

With this preface it is possible to advance to a closer statement of our problem. If the aim of a League of Nations be to restrain lawless force and to prevent the recurrence of such a

conflict as rages to-day, it must furnish an international organisation which can ensure that timely changes shall be effected in the world before any people is driven by an intolerable grievance, or even by a reasonable ambition, to force change by arms. That definition may seem remote to the man whose aspirations are limited to security. Security in every community, however, is purchased only by a constant adaptability. The penalty of rigidity in the state is revolution, as in the world of States it is war. The architect of such a League has a double task before him. He must persuade the satisfied and conservative Powers that their safety depends in the long run on their entry into a combination which must impose some limits on their sovereignty—limits, it is true, of the kind which every permanent Alliance exacts to-day. He must persuade the restless and ambitious Powers that the structure and constitution of the League offer some guarantee that their aspirations, in so far as they can be reconciled with the common good, will be fairly met. He will encounter from both parties an obstinate scepticism.

The Powers which regard the League primarily as an insurance against attack will riddle the defensive basis of its covenant with doubt. That covenant, however it is eventually drafted, must probably provide (1) for the submission of all acute international disputes to the appropriate tribunal, council, or mediator for settlement; (2) for a suspense of all warlike acts, and also of mobilisation, until the supernational authority has published its finding, and for some time thereafter; (3) for the joint action of all the signatory Powers to repress any Government, by economic and, at need, by military coercion, if it should violate this pact. These are tremendous undertakings. The risk is twofold. Some Power may break its covenant, and if it has provided itself with allies the conflict which results will reproduce the present strife with something of the added bitterness of civil war. Again, it is a large assumption that in such a case all the innocent Powers would keep their bond and rally to the defence of the League; and even if in name they did so, they might not furnish their contingents with sufficient generosity or alacrity. There is no final answer to these doubts. No human institution can promise to work with mechanical perfection, and life would lose half its stimuli if all danger were eliminated. The practical answer to this scepticism is, sum-

marily, that on no terms can we avoid these risks, and that any other kind of insurance reproduces them in a more aggravated form. The man who declares that he will never trust the signature of the Power which violated Belgium to any covenant whatever must be invited to follow two simple lines of thought. In the first place, the Power which has given its bond, even if its repute for faith stands low, has some obstacles to overcome before it can break its word, which would be absent if it were unpledged. With some resistance, however ineffective, and on some reluctance it must reckon among its own population, and on some loss of prestige it must count beyond its frontiers. In the second place, so far from assuming that every Power will spontaneously keep its oath, the League is an elaborate system of insurance against oath-breaking. The Entente's combination was built upon divers motives and calculations, in some cases by painful and difficult bargaining, during three years of war, by the gradual adhesion first of Italy, then of Roumania, and lastly of America. The League will be ready, without these delays and without bargainings, to act unitedly on the single ground that its covenant has been violated.

The sceptic who questions whether all the innocent Powers would fulfill their obligation must face the objection that an Alliance itself offers no absolute security. Two late Allies of Germany have fought against her, and one of ours has quitted our camp. "Treaties," as Lord Salisbury said, "are mortal"; and the only inventions which the wisdom of the past had erected as a security against war have ceased to be even plausible illusions. Alliances give no absolute security. The Balance of Power resembles the flux of Heraclitus. There is only one thing which may always with safety be affirmed of it: it oscillates. Nor should we, if we could carve frontiers, annex naval bases, and dominate straits at our good pleasure, be nearer to absolute safety. Invention laughs at strategical locksmiths. The Power which had secured itself on the face of the waters discovered that its peril lay below them. If that danger could be conjured away we should waken to find that our precautions had forgotten the resources of the air. There is, in short, no substitute for a League of Nations which is immune from risks. This, however, one may say: the Partial Alliance challenges and provokes the danger of war. It makes the risk, because by its

constant and costly provision against it, it assumes the probability of war as the central fact of international life. It allows the thinking of mankind to start from the reckoning that war is inevitable, and it is not surprising that the passions of men proceed to verify the prediction which treaties and armaments steadily proclaim. A League of Nations will start from the contrary assumption. It will proclaim that law is the rule and crime the exception. When that belief is embodied in institutions, the thinking of mankind will adapt itself to the new order.

The objections which will come from the more adventurous Powers, whose interest lies in future change, may be somewhat harder to meet. The League's architect must satisfy them not merely that they will receive fair and considerate treatment in its courts and councils, but also that when an award or recommendation is published there will be a reasonable probability that it will be executed. The standard schemes of the League do not propose to make the enforcement of these awards obligatory on the League. That is probably a wise limitation, but the League would promptly dissolve unless, with or without a formal undertaking, it contrived in clear, and grave, and urgent cases that the decisions of its Courts and Councils should be respected. There is probably little difficulty about justiciable disputes, which can be referred to decision by a court following recognised principles of law. The more speculative and doubtful aspect of the League opens out, when we reflect that the disputes which commonly lead to war, turn on issues neither of fact nor of law, and can be settled only by an application of current standards of policy and morals, which vary from generation to generation, and which no two peoples would define in the same terms. Can a Council of Conciliation be composed which will not merely be free from prejudice and bias, but will command an authority so great that both disputants will bow to it? Let us assume that it will not attempt to impose ideal justice—ideal justice is a moral dynamite which would wreck any human society—but will suggest rather compromise solutions which will ease acute disputes. Even so, it is evident that such a Council can neither be set up, nor trusted, nor obeyed, save upon one general condition: that there is a measure of confidence and good will among all the more influential Powers when the League is created. That condition is at the lowest so

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

21

difficult that one must beware of overstating it. It need imply no sentimental reconciliation, no evangelical readiness to love one's enemy. It means primarily this: that all the leading Powers should be so convinced of the necessity for a League that they will make concessions to ensure its smooth working. Not sentiment, but the effective will to make a workable League is the first condition of its creation. Should we make the League, we are realists enough to perceive that it would fail if a Power so considerable as Germany had reason to feel that she met with less than justice within it. Needless to say, the necessity for a like spirit of concession from her would be equally imperative. Without minimising the importance of questions of mechanism in devising the League, it is on the ability to create an atmosphere of confidence that its future depends.

THE LEAGUE OF FREE NATIONS¹

The time has arrived when it is possible to take stock of the accumulating mass of suggestions centering about the phrase the League of Nations. It is a phrase often very loosely used and often very recklessly abused. It must be confessed that to begin with it conveyed to most minds rather an aspiration than any detailed content. It was little more than the expression of a desire for some organized attempt to end war in the world; in some manner the states of the world were to come together in a more or less binding pledge to substitute law for force in their interaction. Thereby men's minds were to be released from the growing obsession with militarism and their energies released for better ends than warfare. But beyond that nothing was clear.

Within the frame supplied by this phrase, however, an enormous amount of mental activity has gone on, and much that was entirely vague has now been thought out. This war has forced upon men of the most diverse types and experiences a common conviction that the increasing range, destructiveness and inclusiveness of modern belligerence threaten to exhaust the resources of mankind and destroy human society; and what was at

¹ By H. G. Wells. Saturday Evening Post. 19110,52. November 23, 1918.

first the suggestion of a few intellectuals has become the basis for a series of weighed and balanced practical proposals, made not as Utopian improvements of human conditions but as plain necessities arising out of an otherwise intolerable situation.

We have, in the last four years, found out the real nature of modern war. The struggle has differed from warfare as mankind has hitherto known it. It has become a more onerous and unstable process, a struggle of uncontrollable inventions that makes insatiable demands upon every human resource. It has rapidly abolished nearly every discrimination between combatant and noncombatant, and it refuses to tolerate any other activity than itself. Everything goes in. It has ceased to be a war of fronts and become a war of whole populations; the submarine defies blockades and the command of the sea; the aëroplane grows not only in size and destructive power but in range of action. And withal, the new warfare remains less conclusive than any warfare has been for long periods of time. Continually it produces new and more costly and destructive weapons and renders wider areas uninhabitable.

When this war concludes, unless it concludes in some absolutely convincing world pacification, it is manifest that there will have to be added to the army and navy of our former ideas, and kept always in a state of acute preparedness, a vast air fleet, a vast antiaircraft equipment, a vast extension of the navy for submarine and antisubmarine work, a huge, constantly developing tank force, a drilled population, and a huge establishment of war factories. We shall, indeed, be eaten up by armaments compared with which the armaments of 1913 will seem trivial miniatures.

Peace under insecure conditions, even if it brings a certain cessation of the slaughter, will bring but little relief of the burdens of armament. The masses will be called upon to bear these burdens still, without any of the stir and excitement of actual war or any hope of an end. Men of the laboring class, no longer under military discipline, will be packed in armament factories, engaged upon the endless tasks of preparedness. Food and every amenity of life will remain, as now, the skimped production of a fringe of inferior workers. Prices will continue to soar above wages.

Few observant people believe that labor will stand the new

armed peace for long in any country of the world; and Russia has shown what may happen to a population strained beyond its breaking point. When a government goes, another government may take its place, but when a social system breaks, it is a stampede.

The nature of the prospect grows so clear that intelligent men of every party and every type of social prepossession are coming together upon this fundamental necessity of putting an end to war and the threat of war. There is no party in the political world that has not given prominent adherents now to the league-of-nations idea.

With this irruption into the league-of-nations movement of practical men convinced of the grave need of a real efficient check on war, there has been, one must admit, a considerable strain upon the exact intimations of the title. From the outset there has been a very understandable disposition to contemplate it as not strictly a league of nations but as a league of states; and the word "league" is now being strained very hard indeed in the direction of federation. A league implies that sovereignty is not infringed; but clear-headed men began to realize quite early in the discussion that there can be no such thing as a secure and permanent world peace without very considerable qualifications of sovereignty.

President Wilson again has introduced a whole new set of considerations by inserting the adjective "free" before "nations." At the present time it is possible to classify the advocates of a league of nations into a number of groups differing very materially among themselves and agreeing exactly, indeed, only upon one idea—the initial proposition that it is a possible and necessary thing to restrain war by an international arrangement. Most of them agree that it is likely to prove an extraordinarily difficult thing to do; but they can see no alternative to the attempt but a fatalistic submission to the complete wreckage of our present civilization.

Roughly one may arrange league-of-nations proposals, as they are to be encountered at the present time, into a series between two extreme positions.

On the extreme left is what is practically a defeatist proposal, a mere rehabilitation of The Hague Tribunal. It is a timid scheme for delay and arbitration; some sort of interna-

tional conference is to meet occasionally; there are to be a supreme court and a court of conciliation—the former to try disputes upon points of international law, the latter to discuss nonjusticiable differences.

No interference with the political constitution or internal arrangements of any state is contemplated; no organized disarmament and control of militarism can therefore occur. Germany, undefeated and unregenerate, will, for instance, be admitted to such a league on the expression of a few pious sentiments.

This is the scope of the American scheme of Mr. Theodore Marburg; and it has the support in England of such extreme radicals as Mr Lowes Dickinson—if we may call men radicals who shrink from revolution. We may call these extremists the weak leaguers, and their proposal the Weak League of Nations. Nothing could be more acceptable to German imperialism, under a cloud, than the schemes they put forward. Such a league of nations would have about as much effect upon Hohenzollern Germany as a blue neck ribbon upon the aims and activities of a tiger. But the common sense of practical men breaks away from this proposal to keep the peace by gossamer. It breaks away in two directions, which are not nearly so opposed as one may think at the first glance. One is to reject and abuse the idea of a league of nations on the assumption that the Marburg scheme exhausts its possibilities—compare ex-President Roosevelt; the other is to put more substance into the proposal. Few of us desire to see, as a principal outcome of this world catastrophe, a collection of eminent jurists at The Hague making nervous gestures at the forces that will prepare the next.

What most sensible people desire is either a strong league of nations or no league of nations at all. If the beast of modern war is to be chained it must have a chain to hold it and not a packthread. The whole drift of recent discussion of the league of nations lies in the direction of estimating what weight of chain is absolutely necessary, and what we must do to get that chain.

For most of those who have recently come into the movement, it is not a question of whether we will have a world league or not, but what price in change, effort and independence we shall have to pay for it. A restoration of the crazy political

world order of 1914, of a patchwork of absolutely independent sovereign empires, competitive, disingenuous and suspicious—and so compelled to be armed to the teeth, uncontrolled by any general understanding—is, in view of the steady development of the means of destruction, the one prospect we cannot endure.

Directly the idea of the league of nations is released from the limitation imposed upon it by the jurists—that it has to meet with the approval of a Hohenzollern-governed Germany—it begins to expand mightily in our minds. It begins to take on a form and an elaboration commensurate with the scale of the war. Instead of being a mere delaying intervention and remonstrance, upon the eve of war, of a respectable but powerless assembly of jurists, it enlarges into a project for a world control of the preparation for war and for a world anticipation of its causes. It becomes a scheme for a new political order in the world. To talk of love is to make love, the wise have said; still truer is it that to organize armies is to make war.

If the league of nations is to be a reality in the days to come it must have sufficient authority and power to inquire into, restrain and suppress armaments on land and sea, wherever and whenever any country in the world gets bitten with the passion for armament. That proposition carries with it tremendous corollaries; but if the league of nations is not to be conceived of as upon that scale, then most sensible men will give the league of nations a very limited and temperate or else an acutely suspicious attention.

A world control of armaments implies—and there is no good whatever in shirking the fact—some sort of world council, some sort of pooling of the naval, military and air forces of the world under that council, and a representation of the states of the world thereon in a manner commensurate with their strength and will. This is going beyond a league; this is an approach to world federation.

Mr. Belloc declares it amounts to a World State, and the Fabian Research Committee, in its league-of-nations project, calls it, in the Shavian jargon affected by that society, a Super-state. But the discussion of the relations between a central control with delegated powers on the one hand and of sovereign states thereunder on the other has been one of the chief employments of American publicists for more than a century; and

a European writer should go warily among terms they have long since technicalized and brought to a very keen and cutting edge.

The practical man is far less interested in the exact legal and terminological value of this council or standing conference or group of committees—or whatever the exact form of world control may be to which the plain logic of human necessity is driving mankind—than in the way that control will work, the powers it must have, and the means by which it will keep itself in touch with the general consciousness of the people of the world.

The present war has made nothing more manifest than that the effective control of militarism must extend to issues that are not in themselves military. The development of war, as I have already pointed out, has been steadily abolishing the noncombatant; modern war is a struggle of whole populations, fighting with all their industrial and economic strength, and an effective world control of food supplies and of the supplies of staple articles generally—of coal, iron, and the like.

Moreover, a world control of war implies a world control of the causes of war. Modern wars, it has been said, are invariably economic; they are struggles for markets and raw material. And it is evident, therefore, that a world control of militarism which does not provide some substitute for war settlements upon these questions will be no better than restraining a suffocating man from smashing a window that gives upon fresh air.

A world control of militarism will lead, it will be found, to a world control of shipping and of the world distribution of staples; to restraint upon tariff wars; and, indeed, to a general control of international trade. This is a large order, both for the free trader and the tariff reformer; but it is a necessary part of any scheme for an effective control of war.

The experience of the Allies confirms this proposition. It has been asserted again and again that even now a league of nations exists in the alliance against the Central Powers. But the steady pressure of necessity has already carried the Allies beyond the mere League stage, and it must ultimately take them beyond mere exclusive dealing with their allies. The attainment of a unity of military command has been accompanied by a progres-

sive pooling of interests and resources, less conspicuous perhaps, but more significant.

In matters of food, coal, metals and shipping the Allies have been forced to scrap, first in this instance and then in that, the idea that they were separate competing entities.

America goes easy with the bacon that England may be fed, and England will shiver this winter that Italy may not be frozen out of the alliance.

Though the faint-hearted gentlemen of the Weak League of Nations movements are assuring us that the nations of the earth are far too jealous to tolerate the slightest infringements of their sovereign rights, these poolings are going on upon a tremendous scale. When at last the German mind is attuned to revolutionary ideas and the Hohenzollern incubus is set aside, so that a chastened Germany can come to the peace conference, it is inevitable that these pooling organizations must assume a practically world-wide scope.

However much Englishmen may dislike Germans, they must get back to some momentary footing in common, even if it is only to secure the economic reinstatement of Belgium. There must be some restraint upon a desperate and planless resumption of industrial competition. There must be no scramble for food. These are matters that will not be settled in a few weeks or months.

It is natural to look to such committees of world control that will necessarily be formed at the peace conference to restore the shattered financial and economic order, as bodies that may be given permanence by treaty, that may be supplemented by permanent world committees to deal with health, navigation, emigration, and other general purposes, to form the civil administrative side of a world league.

The creation of a general sense of the world league in men's minds through propaganda and education, and its embodiment in political forms, may, indeed, be rather the culmination and recognition of a process of human unification already in full progress than a real new departure in human affairs.

From being a proposed addendum to human life, in the form of a court of jurists, the league of nations has now become the outline of a broad and hopeful scheme for the reconstruction of international relationships upon a sound and enduring basis. It

is a new world policy. It is a scheme that may inaugurate a new and happier phase in the troubled history of mankind. But at every step it demands sacrifices of prepossessions.

There is no good in clinging to ideals of a world of unrestricted free trade and *laissez faire* if the world controls of the league of nations are to come into existence; it is equally unreasonable to dream of schemes of a self-contained British Empire, taxing the foreigner and economically hostile to all foreigners, including those of France, Italy and the United States.

We must cease to think imperially as we have had to cease thinking parochially; and we must think now in terms of the peace of the world. The league of nations points straight to a pooling of empires, and it is no good blinking the fact. And, since it cannot operate in an atmosphere tainted by suspicion, the league of nations demands for its effective operation a change in our diplomatic methods.

The world has become too multitudinous for secret understandings. In this swarming world of half-taught crowds, with its imminent danger from class hostility and distrust, governments must say plainly what they mean and stand by their declarations unambiguously.

It may at times be difficult and tedious to inform a whole population upon the values of some international situation, but the danger of misconception and spasmodic crowd action outweighs the desire of the expert for an uncriticized freedom. There must be an end to secret diplomacy. Nations must understand their responsibilities.

The welfare of the world requires that the very children in the schools should be taught the broad outlines of the treaties that bind their nations into the mosaic of the world's peace. They have to grow up understanding and consenting, if only on account of the grim alternative the precedent of Russia suggests.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

A League of Nations provides an instrument and a basis for international co-operation which did not exist under pre-war diplomatic conditions. International relations in the last century were continually jeopardised by the absence of an adequate guarantee for international agreements and of a centre for the unification and co-ordination of international action. By constituting the League the world would for the first time have taken a real step towards supplying these deficiencies. We propose to prove these statements by considering certain particular instances of a political and economic nature. One of the most important of these is the international economic right of way.

The result of the revolution in industry and means of communication in the last century was that to-day there is hardly a single international question of importance which is not complicated seriously by economic considerations. The economic lines of communication, whether on land or sea, have become increasingly "vital" to the material existence of the majority of states. After all, the war itself has shown this with appalling clearness, for whereas the strategy of previous wars was directed mainly to the cutting of military lines of communication, the present combatants have settled down to a bitter struggle to cut the economic lines. Now war only illuminates, it does not create, the international forces and conditions of this kind which continue to operate in times of peace. On the Danube and the Rhine and the Scheldt; on the railways of Austria and Hungary, of the Balkans, of Asia Minor, of East and West Prussia, even of tropical Africa; in obscure bays and harbours of the Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, and South America, political and geographical boundaries have combined with modern commerce to raise the most acute questions which may be conveniently classified as questions of economic rights of way.

The general character of all these problems is the same,

¹ New Statesman. 9:367-9, 392-3, 416-18, 440-1, 464-6, July 14-August 18, 1917.

and can be stated shortly. The geographical and political position of one state can be used as a tremendous weapon economically against another's commercial lines of communication with the outside world. This can be and is achieved by a variety of methods: by tariffs, by manipulation and discrimination of railway freights, by administrative regulations as to the entrance and transit of commodities, by tolls and dues on river navigation, by harbour dues and duties, even by sanitary regulations. How widespread and how dangerous for the world's peace and progress these questions are may best be shown by some examples. The free navigation of rivers was the earliest of these questions which engaged the attention of foreign policy. It is the most obvious instance of a question of economic right of way. A riparian state which commands the mouth of a navigable river can close the economic route to the sea for all states along the higher reaches either by exorbitant navigation dues or by allowing the river to become unnavigable. The matter has forced itself upon the attention of statesmen in many different parts of the world, but particularly upon the Danube, the Scheldt, the Rhine, the Vistula and the Congo. In fact, the last century saw the principle of an economic right of way on navigable rivers established for a particular case by the Treaty of Vienna and gradually extended to nearly all the navigable rivers of the world. The control of narrow straits or of inter-oceanic canals produces cases of precisely the same nature as that of navigable rivers. Thus the question of Constantinople derives its international importance from the fact that the political control of the Straits vitally affects the economic communications of Russia and Rumania. Again, the problems raised by the Suez and Panama Canals and their political control have differed from that of Constantinople not in kind but only in degree.

Railway communications produce international problems of the same nature. The whole Balkan question has been complicated and embittered by conflicting attempts to bar and to open economic rights of way. This is perhaps most obvious in the relations of Austria and Serbia. The "economic dependence" of Serbia and Austria, of which so much has been written, comes from the power which her geographical position con-

fers upon Austria of controlling the entrance and exit of commodities to and from Serbia.

So universal are these political and economic forces that if we look across the world to another continent, we see the same causes producing similar problems. In South America, Argentina to-day controls, and Argentina and Brazil will to-morrow control, the economic communications of the Republic of Paraguay with the Atlantic and Europe, and this circumstance had produced an international situation which is similar and is subject to the same treatment as that in the Balkans.

The conditions which we have been considering have in the past been one of the most prolific causes of "international unrest." They have been at once the cause and the weapon of the bitterest international hostility. In Constantinople, Belgrade, Vienna, Berlin, and in Africa, rivers and railways have again and again served as a kind of conducting wire of fear and suspicion, and illicit international ambitions. And as the world becomes more and more completely industrialized, so will these questions of economic communications become more and more vital and dangerous. There can be no peace in the world if half the nations live in fear of the arteries of their commerce being cut or obstructed, while the other half are occupied with plotting and planning to cut and obstruct them.

Moreover, as the case of Poland will show, as long as this problem remains unsolved, it is impossible to reconstruct Europe politically and nationally on a just or sound basis. The whole problem can, of course, only be solved if co-operation takes the place of hostility and rivalry in international relations. But in conditions so complex as those of international relations, co-operation will never persist unless the broad principles of international action are definitely formulated and means of putting the principles into action are consciously provided. A League of Nations alone would provide such means.

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If in future even a moderate amount of co-operation is to take the place of hostility and aggression in international relations, the principle of the complete freedom of economic

rights of way must be recognised and enforced. This has already to a great extent been recognised by one important and practical statesman. President Wilson has stated as one of the chief conditions of a just and stable peace the principle that "so far as practicable, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea." And he went on to lay down this principle of policy, that "where this (the assurance of a right of way to the sea) cannot be done by the cession of territory, it no doubt can be done by the neutralisation of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right of comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce." In practice President Wilson's principle would have to be restated rather more fully as follows. Without prejudices to the right of each state to exact duty on and to exercise the fullest administrative control over the import of all goods for consumption or use in its territory, there should be a guarantee of complete freedom for goods in transit. That freedom would include freedom from duties and from hostile discrimination by administrative measures, e. g., the manipulation of railway freights. This principle of international policy would imply a guarantee of universal international right of way of rivers and railways. As soon as the facts and the principle are stated in this way, it is clear how impossible of achievement they would be under the old international and diplomatic system, and how on the other hand a League of Nations would make their achievement possible. Three conditions are necessary if this general principle is to be translated into practice. The guarantee must be neither a vague one nor a sham; it must be a definite and joint guarantee of all the states, or at least all the great states of the world, and with the full sanction of their power behind it. Secondly, if the guarantee is to be fulfilled, it will require the close and permanent co-operation of the states concerned. Thirdly, it will require the creation of machinery through which this co-operation may work. Only some sort of an international organisation of states like the League of Nations could fulfill these conditions.

The nature of the alternative to such co-operation in a League may best be shown by returning to the question of Poland. The problem of the reconstitution of an autonomous Poland is, as we said, one in which nationality and economics play an equal part. Polish economic needs stretch out far beyond the confines of geographical nationality to the sea at Danzig and to the industrial regions of Silesia. No solution is possible so long as the German Empire and the new autonomous Poland are to be organised on a basis of international competitive hostility. Take the case of the northern boundary of the new Poland. If political boundaries are strictly to follow nationality, a narrow strip of territory along the western bank of the Vistula from Thorn to the west of Danzig would be added to autonomous Poland. But to run a narrow strip of Poland through the middle of Prussia and to expect a "durable peace" would be to yield to the hallucinations of either ignorance or optimism. To propose to make West Prussia and the German port of Danzig a part of Poland, thus separating East Prussia from Germany, is an even more disastrous fantasy. The alternative is to leave West and East Prussia to Germany, and this once more cuts off Poland from its northern economic outlet to the sea at Danzig.

Here we have an impasse created by irreconcilable ideals, political and economic. Under the old system there is no way out. But there is an obvious and practical solution if the League of Nations and the principle of the economic rights of way be established together with the means of putting the principle into operation which we have indicated. For there are two main conditions of a reconciliation between the political and economical ideals and needs: (1) a guarantee of political rights for such Poles as would remain within the Prussian province of Germany and for such Germans as would be included in the autonomous Poland; (2) the guarantee of an economic right of way on the Vistula and the German railways to Danzig and the sea for Poland. Both these conditions can be fulfilled by a League of Nations, but only if machinery be provided by which Poland can bring for decision before an authoritative international body, like the Commission and Tribunal suggested, any complaint that

the guarantee of an economic right of way is not being carried out.

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The present war is due to so great variety of different causes that it is a dangerous thing to isolate any one of them and say, "The war is due to that." But few persons with any knowledge of international relations during the last thirty years will deny that deep down in the origins of the present conflict the question of overseas possessions, of the control, economic or political, of Africa and Asia, played a very large part.

There can be no peace in the world so long as the competitive and exclusive policy with regard to overseas possessions holds sway. Political control in Africa and Asia is very unequally divided between the Great Powers of the world. If that political control is used through protective tariffs, concessions, and other exclusive privileges (including similar methods applied in spheres of influence) to exclude participation of other countries in the economic privileges and opportunities, the economic struggle will inevitably be transferred first to the field of diplomacy and finally to the field of battle. Englishmen are naturally slow to see this because of the position of their Empire in the world. And it would be folly to imagine that this is a question merely between Germany and the possessory Powers. If the policy of exclusiveness and competition continue, it will not be long before the financial, industrial, and commercial interests in America, Italy, and Japan are claiming their right to places in the sun—in fact, the recent history of Japan shows that the process has already started.

On the other hand, history shows that a policy of co-operation and equal privileges—a policy embodied in the open door, free trade in dependencies, international control by financial national groups in association with their own government as in China—does not involve any sacrifice of the economic interests of the European state. It is true that as pursued in the past it has unquestionably often involved the sacrifice of the interests of the Asiatic and African peoples. The financial and commercial exploitation of Africa and China is a page in its history which Western civilisation

can hardly view with pride or even complacency. If European commerce, finance, and industry are going to find some means of dividing among themselves the fields for profit in Asia and Africa, or if they are going to co-operate in promoting their interests in those fields, then it is essential that some method should exist for representing and protecting the interests of the inhabitants of Asia and Africa.

These considerations indicate both why the old attempts at international co-operation finally failed and how the League of Nations would afford a greater probability of success. What was lacking under the old system was against any adequate guarantee. Take the case of China for instance. Here a right principle of policy had been laid down, embodied in the "open door" and the "most favored nation" clause. Under this principle no European nation should obtain any exclusive economic privilege. But there was no adequate guarantee behind this arrangement. It rested not upon a common international agreement to which the parties were definitely and jointly pledged, but upon isolated treaties between the several Powers and China and the bare enunciation of policy by statesmen in their speeches. Again, even when, as in the Congo Treaty, joint action was taken, and the principle was maintained in practice.

The League provides means of meeting both these difficulties. In the first place it can lay down definitely the principle to regulate the economic relations of the Powers in Asia and Africa. The principle must make impossible the competition for exclusive economic privileges. That implies a guarantee of the Open Door and Free Trade in Africa and Asia, and a regularised system of common action in finance, railway construction, etc., on the model of the Sextuple Syndicate in China. And it should be remarked that the old principles of the Open Door and Free Trade would require under modern conditions the adoption of a supplementary principle of international economic policy—namely, an agreement through which an equitable allocation and distribution of tropical raw materials would be assured to all industrial nations. Behind this agreement would be the full guarantee of the League and the sanction of its collective power. And being a permanent alliance and association of states, the

League would be able to create the permanent machinery necessary for seeing that the provisions were carried out in detail.

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Everyone can see now that if questions of nationality, territory, colonies, and trade are not handled in a manner very different from that in which the world was content to approach them before the war, history will tragically repeat itself. There are two alternative directions in which policy can move, one of international hostility and the other of international co-operation, and a League of Nations can alone provide a firm basis for the latter. But there are other regions of international relationship in which the Nemesis of international hostilities is not so certain nor the need for co-operation so clearly insistent, but yet in which the benefits to the world of close joint action between states through a League can be shown to be enormous. In this article we propose to consider one or two of these obscurer instances.

When the Prime Minister of France spoke the other day of "the League of Nations which is organising itself before our eyes," he referred no doubt to the Alliance of the Powers of the Entente. The thought had already found expression in America. In the organisation of this Alliance, it seems, we have already the beginnings of a League. It is worth while pausing for a moment and endeavoring in as detached a frame of mind as possible to compare the international structure of to-day with that of August, 1914. It is difficult to be quite certain that one is correct as to the numbers, but there are, we believe, eleven sovereign states in the Alliance. These states between them control about five-sevenths of the territory of Europe, half Asia, and the whole of the continents of North America, Africa and Australia. In other words, they control about 35,000,000 square miles out of the total 50,000,000 square miles of territory (excluding the Polar Regions) of the world. And if you look at their existing organisation you might be pardoned the boast that here already is the United States of the World in embryo. For history can show no example of independent states welded into closer or more highly organised co-operation. Military, economic, and even the details of internal administration are

settled in a continuous series of conferences in which the states are represented by their highest executive officers and by the permanent officials of government departments. The sovereignty of these states is entangled in and restricted by a network of reciprocal international agreements which deal with every imaginable subject, from the right of the individual state to make peace to the right of its subjects to dispose of their oranges. The whole of the communications in the vast area under the control of the Alliance—the railways, ships, road transport, even aerial transport—is gradually being brought completely under state control, and is then used not for the use of this state or of that state but to supply the needs of the Alliance. In the same way the commodities needed by the Alliance have to a great extent been internationalised, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the whole output of the world's staple food products and metals is taken up into the hands of this world state and distributed as occasion requires to such parts of it—Britain, for instance, or France or Italy—which for economic and industrial purposes are federal divisions.

Here, then, is a League of Nations with a system of international government so advanced and so highly organised that not even the most optimistic internationalist would three years ago have imagined it practicable this side of the millennium. With this Federation of the World before his eyes, no one will be able to say again that international agreements are useless, that international co-operation is impossible, or that international government is a chimera. The only question remains whether man is so ferocious an animal that he will build up this enormous system of international co-operation for the purposes of war and will refuse or allow his rulers to refuse to employ it for the purposes of peace. A few examples will show how long the necessity for such a League of Nations for the purposes of peace has existed.

International co-operation for industrial and economic purposes in times of peace is, of course, no new thing. The Universal Postal Union, the Telegraphic Unions, the Railway Unions and other organisations are all examples of Unions of States for the purpose of improving international communications through international administration. The

International Institute of Agriculture was created to perform the same function for the world's production and supply of food. Nearly all of them originated in the minds of "internationalists" who hardly escaped the popular title of cranks. Their history, which extends back nearly three-quarters of a century, is one of uninterrupted success. But these efforts after international co-operation through unions of states have always suffered from one great difficulty. The Unions were effected for specific purposes, for arranging the international postal system, or for promoting the interests of agriculture. To carry out this purpose a permanent organ of international government was created by treaty, composed of the representatives of the signatory powers. These little islands of internationalism were dotted about—at Berne or Rome or some other town—in the great sea of European nationalism. There they were left forgotten, if indeed they had ever been remembered. It is only because the officers who represented the different states upon them were keen upon their work that they achieved much—Incomplete obscurity. But their success was continually hampered by the complete lack of co-ordination in international effort, by the want of any centre for international co-operation on a large scale. This is most obvious in the history of the International Institute of Agriculture. The Institute was created by International Treaty in 1905 entirely owing to the imagination and pertinacity of an American, Mr. Lubin. Its work was to be, besides study and publication, the elaboration and submission for the approval of Governments of "measures for the protection of common interests of farmers and for improvement of their condition." The Institute has undoubtedly accomplished extremely useful work in the collection and publication of information, but its most fervid admirer would not deny that it has accomplished nothing in its twelve years of existence compared with what the organisation of the Alliance has accomplished in the sphere of international agricultural production and distribution. And a very little study of the subject will convince anyone that international action and co-operation with regard to agricultural products is just as necessary in time of peace as in time of war. Thus the Italian Government in 1905 drew attention to the immense

benefits which would result from co-operation between states for agricultural insurance. A large reduction of premiums could only be attained by extending the area of insurance—for the probability, e.g., of a drought occurring in two widely separated countries at the same time is small—and this could only be done by international action. The whole crops of a country could be insured, and this would require a states enterprise, after which the states enterprises should be federated. In 1905 such a suggestion sounded almost Utopian, but it is primitive compared to some of the international financial and industrial operations of 1917. Again, the Italian Government in the same year proposed international organisation against rings, monopolies, and speculative dealings in staple agricultural products, for such operations have a disastrous effect not only upon the consumers but upon the producers, and they could only be dealt with effectually from joint international action. Finally, in 1914, the Senate and House of Representatives of the U. S. A. passed a resolution instructing their delegate at Rome to take steps to obtain, if possible, a Conference on Freights and the Establishment of an International Commission on Freights. The important effect of the movements and manipulation of transport charges upon the price of agricultural products has been brought home to most people during the war. There is no possibility of dealing with freights in the interests of producers and consumers except by international co-operation and regulation. Mr. Lubin himself had long ago seen this, and his idea was that the International Institute of Agriculture should lead up to the establishment of a permanent International Freights Tribunal or Commission, modelled upon the Inter-States Commerce Commission of the U. S. A., and entrusted with definite powers of regulating freights for food products. The action of the two Houses of the American Legislature was a hesitating step in this direction.

Now, whatever be the merits of these particular schemes, one thing is clear. There are enormous possibilities of advantage to the world in international co-operation and administration with regard to agricultural products. If those possibilities were realised, the effect upon the material pros-

perity of the world would travel far beyond the ultimate dreams of the most Utopian dreamer. For few people remember, if they are born and bred in an industrial city, that the whole population of the world is still composed of consumers of agricultural products, and an immense majority of its inhabitants are still either cultivators or herdsmen or shepherds. But the nineteenth century with its revolution in transport and trade converted agriculture from a national into an international industry. National regulation of the distribution and transport of agricultural products, even national organisation of agricultural production and insurance, is to-day an anachronism. In these matters, it is not the internationalist who is a dreamer living in the future, but the nationalist who is a dreamer living in the past. But before the war came and forced Governments of the Entente to face either the facts or defeat, only a few groups of financiers and capitalists in each country realised the truth that national organisation of production and distribution is out of date, and they acted upon it with great benefit to their own pockets.

Now the League would be an Alliance for the purpose of peace of the same kind as existing alliances for purposes of war. It would provide those elements which the isolated international bodies lack. It would be the centre for International action. The Institute would be its scientific and deliberative organ which would study and draft projects of international insurance or international control of the distribution of agricultural products. These projects would no longer be transmitted to and filed in the pigeon-holes of European chancelleries. They would immediately be submitted to the Council of the League as definite proposals for international agreement and action. And the League would perform another most necessary function in co-ordinating the work of different international bodies which have already sprung up to meet actual international needs. Take, for instance, this question of the control of the distribution of agricultural products. It requires, as the American Houses of Parliament have seen, international action. But it is not a question which can be confined to agriculture. It forms part of the larger problem of inter-state co-operation for the organisa-

tion and regulation of international communications and transport. But so insistent is this problem that, as we saw in a previous article, international organs like the Railway Unions have already been created for dealing with some sides of it, and we indicated how the League could with advantage develop the existing organisation. It is, however, absurd that the Institute should be dealing with one corner of the problem at Rome, the Railway Union with another corner at Berne, and the Danube Commission with yet a third at Galatz, with no link between them to give space and strength to their efforts. Once the League is formed, and once men feel that it is a real alliance for the purposes of peace, we have in its Council a means of uniting and co-ordinating these scattered international efforts. The Institute of Agriculture would then combine with the Permanent International Commission on Rights of Way (and therefore with all the international bodies dealing with communication) to work out a scheme for the development and control of international communications. The possibilities of such action are so illimitable for the material prosperity of the world that the mere idea of mentioning them in cold journalistic print makes us shudder before the inevitable shower of epithets like "dreams" and "Utopias." But, after all, the whole of the future is to-day nothing but a dream, and its depends upon ourselves whether it is to be a pleasant dream or a nightmare.

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The idea of a League has naturally not been allowed to grow up and flourish without being subjected to criticism, objections, and attacks. A curious and enlightening fact will very soon become apparent to anyone who reads the hostile critics with any detachment. Leaving on one side all those objections which are concerned with details of the various schemes—objections which are often valuable and instructive—and ignoring objections which are merely frivolous, ignorant, or ill-tempered, he will find that all the serious criticism centers about a single point. That point is the value of the League's guarantee.

The fact that nearly all serious objections about this point as to the guarantee is both curious and enlightening. The

reason is this. The fundamental idea in the schemes of a League of Nations is itself the provision of an adequate international guarantee, and as we have repeatedly argued in the preceding articles the fact that the League would provide a new basis for co-operation among nations is such a guarantee. Thus the critics and the supporters of a League both at least agree in this, that the problem of international reconstruction turns upon the possibility of providing an adequate guarantee for international agreements. What divides the critic from the supporter is little else than the difference between optimism and pessimism or between hope and despair—for the one, concentrating upon the repeated instances of international bad faith and broken treaties, is unwilling ever again to believe in the efficacy of international agreements, while the other hopes to find in the failures of the past a lesson for the future.

In the first place the critics too often demand of a League of Nations what no conceivable international system could under any circumstances give us, namely, certainty as to the future. Let us take a concrete case. What we all desire is the certainty that in future the independence of Belgium and other small states shall be safeguarded against aggression. No League of Nations is ever going to give us that certainty, but then equally nothing else ever will. Nobody has ever suggested or can suggest an international arrangement at the end of the war which will make certain that a successful attempt against the independence of Belgium will not be made in 1930. But the critics too often demand of the League of Nations what they cannot possibly provide themselves. The truth is that much misconception is caused by this loose thinking about the word guarantee. Whatever arrangement of the affairs of nations be made when peace comes, it cannot give us any certainty, it will only at most make it more or less probable that we shall attain our ends.

Whether the League of Nations be formed or not, the world of states, its peace, stability, progress, and righteousness, will depend upon international treaties and agreements. And ultimately every agreement must depend upon the faith and good faith of the parties to it. The ultimate guarantee of a League of Nations, as of any other future international

arrangement, must consist for us in our own good faith and our trust in the good faith of others. The whole question is a relative one, for it concerns our belief in the probability of obtaining conditions under which states will keep their promises. Now, in this sense it can be argued reasonably that a League will create conditions which did not exist before the war and which will increase the probability of international agreements being respected. In the first place, the treaty which establishes the League will create a permanent union of states for certain specific purposes of international co-operation. The agreement will not only specifically define the rights and obligations of the different states, but the measures to be taken to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled. Now, incredible though it may appear to persons who are not intimately acquainted with the details of international history, these elementary guarantees never existed in the case of the most important international agreements. Even where several great states signed treaties upon which the peace of Europe obviously depended, their obligations have not been clearly defined. It is the rarest thing in the world to find any mention in a treaty of the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with, or performance of, its terms.

The League of Nations does create and define a joint obligation, and therefore it may correctly be said to create a guarantee which did not exist before the war.

Thus the difference between the critic and the supporter of a League may, as we said, be reduced to the difference between pessimism and optimism. The critic overwhelmed by the spectacle of international lawlessness and bad faith despairs over international law, and swears never again to trust to an international treaty. The other sees that the cure for lawlessness is not less law but more law, that the cure for broken treaties is more and better treaties, and that the cure for bad faith is more faith.

WHAT A LEAGUE OF NATIONS SHALL BE¹

The conviction has dawned that there is a morality of states as truly as a morality of persons; and that the whole Macchiavellian scheme of diplomacy—of mutual lying and cheating and outwitting—is an outrage to our human decencies. In the light of the new conviction, we see the state as, in its true nature, an instrument of human welfare. Either it is that or out it must go. In all sorts of ways we are impatient to-day of the exploitations. We are increasingly refusing to allow the adult to exploit the child; the man, the woman; the capitalist, the laborer. And in the same measure we are refusing to accept the notion that a state, just because it is a state, has the privilege of gaining its special weal out of the woe of its neighbors.

We are, in short, fashioning a new philosophy of statehood, a philosophy which, in the event, will be as epoch-making as the Christian repudiation of the older group-morality view that it is perfectly justifiable to hate one's enemies. It is the philosophy which regards the state as serving best its own welfare when it serves the welfare of the world of states. It is the philosophy of the cooperative as over against the antagonistic state, of the state as member of a generous fellowship of states. It is the philosophy which had its glimmers of official expression when the United States gave back Cuba to the Cubans; when the United States returned the Boxer indemnity; when President Wilson refused to permit this country to join the capitalistic enslavement of China through the Six Power Loan; when the same President refused to give way to the cries of concession hunters and exploiters to "intervene" in torn and revolutionary Mexico. It is the philosophy which had its expression in the grant by Great Britain of self-government to the conquered South African colonies. It is the philosophy which is animating the liberal minds of England in the settlement of the Irish question. It is the philosophy denied by annexionists, pan-Germans, pan-Slavists, British Tories, American protectionists, economic imperialists the world over. It is the philosophy of political

¹ From "World Organization," by Harry Allen Overstreet. An address delivered before the Women's Peace Party of New York State, February 19, 1918.

generosity, of mutual give and take, of international cooperation and integration.

It is the coming philosophy of international life. It is the great new venture of the human spirit!

If there were no such spirit animating mankind, we might well be dubious of all the elaborated plans for a leaguing of nations. Plans to the same effect were made in the past—plenty of them; but no one of them ever came to realization. Truly. But never before has there been the well-nigh universal conviction that there is to-day; never before has the human mind recognized so clearly and so decisively the point of error in its nationalistic philosophies. A revolution, has taken place within the human spirit. The outer revolution is now but a matter of finding out how what the spirit demands is to be accomplished.

There are persons who point the finger of scorn at the various programs for a society of nations. "How thin," they say; "How creaking at the joints; how lacking all power to inspire; how inadequate here and here and here!" But those persons should look at a model of the first locomotive ever projected! What a spindling caricature compared with the beautiful giants of later days! And yet the spindling caricature had within it the creative germ of all that came later.¹

That, I believe, is the truly liberating point of view, to realize that the human spirit to-day is inventing. Necessity is ever the mother of invention. Never in all the world's history was necessity so tragically insistent! There *must* be a way of escape from the old mad antagonisms. There *must* be a leaguing of nations. How? That, perhaps, we do not yet know with clearness and finality. We shall seek as best we can. We shall fail as often as not. But somehow, union of nations there must be, or, in literal truth, our boys have died in vain.

It is necessary then that we who care should inform ourselves very accurately as to this new project of a League of Nations. If we are to help clarify and equip public opinion, our advocacy must be more than sentimental; it must be more than an utterance of platitudes. It must be a vigorous and thorough grappling with the problems and possibilities of the international situation.

¹ I am indebted for this comparison to some remarks of Senator Henri La Fontaine.

Speaking generally, I believe it may be said that the thought of most of us regarding an international organization which is to secure a durable peace suffers from two defects: it is over-legal, and it is overstatic. Trained as we are in the conception that law is the great stabilizer of social life, when we hear of a serious and apparently irreconcilable contention arising between two parties, our first thought is of a court of law to settle the case. Settling the case means to us finding in precisely what manner the "law" applies in the particular situation. In our social life, however, contentions constantly arise to which there is no accepted body of law that can be applied, as, for example, contentions between capital and labor. In such instances, with some reluctance, we have passed beyond reliance upon the more rigorously legal type of court and have developed a less legal type of organization—a board of arbitration. But even here the "court" conception has still been predominant. For example, there is always a "case"—two sides in conflict; and there is always, too a tribunal to "hear" the case and "decide."

It has been only with greatest difficulty that we have reached a third conception, namely, that a conflict to be really settled, must be settled through *a change of view of the parties themselves*. When a court or a board of arbitration hands down its decision, it usually leaves one party defeated and resentful. Where, as in many cases, issues are not clean cut, where there is no unequivocal body of principles to apply, such a solution is eminently unsatisfactory. It is really no solution at all. It is simply a makeshift to keep the peace.

The salient defect of the Hague Tribunal, apart from the fact that reference to it was wholly voluntary, was that it was overlegalized to a degree which made it ineffective as a truly mediating body. It could interpret established international law; it could, to a degree, make new international law; it could arbitrate differences that had come to a head, provided the nations were willing. But it was not a body, in permanent session, which could place its finger upon the pulse of nations and detect the first beginnings of international disaffection; which could exert its good offices continuously through inquiry and suggestion and conciliation until the disaffection was eased and the nations restored to harmonious relations.

It is that function above all of which the world stands in

need. Most of the disputes which lead to war are of the so-called justiciable type, disputes, in other words, like treaty interpretation or breaches of international law for whose settlement there is a recognized body of authoritative law or agreement. Most of the disputes which lead to war are of the type for which there is no recognized basis of settlement. To what law or treaty or authoritative agreement could any court have turned in order to "adjudicate" the long rivalry of Slav and Austrian ambitions which came to a head finally in the Serbian tragedy. To the ordinary mind it is apparently axiomatic that if the Serbian difficulty could only have been "arbitrated," this war would have been averted. Perhaps so; and also, perhaps not. For to what recognized principles of adjudication could the arbitrators have turned? The conflict was a long standing clash of ambitions, hatreds and suspicions, complicated by almost hopeless misunderstandings superinduced by a mischievous secret diplomacy, complicated the more, too, by the fact that back of and supporting and encouraging the nationalistic ambitions were the competitions of capitalistic groups.

Arbitration at that tragic time in August 1914 might have stayed the battles for a short period; might even have postponed the war for a number of years. But no real settlement of the issue was possible short of a long process of inquiry, mediation and conciliation, a process open and known of all the world.

The outstanding difference between the international plans hitherto in operation or proposed and the typical plans now proposed for the international settlement of disputes is the large emphasis which the latter place upon this deeply important process of conciliation. In all the plans there is indeed a place for an international court whose function it shall be to try justiciable cases. In all of the plans there is provision as well for a Court of Arbitration. But in all of them there is a primary insistence upon the creation of a permanently functioning Council of Conciliation.

The second defect of our customary thought about international organization is that it is overstatic. We believe—most of us—rather naively in "settlements." When the peace congress shall meet, we rather fondly anticipate that if it is but constituted of honest men of real intelligence, a plan may be hit upon

for solving once and for all the perplexing difficulties about boundaries, nationalities and so on that have kept our world in unrest. Our doubts are not as to the possibility of such a permanent settlement, but rather as to the possibility of obtaining peace delegates of this character.

There could be no greater fallacy. What is chiefly characteristic of the world is the quality of change. No national group maintains, decade after decade, the same unwavering point of view, the same ambitions or lack of ambitions, the same prides or lack of prides, the same pressure of population, the same economic outlook. Germany is a striking example in point. The Germany of to-day is so little the Germany of Goethe's time that, save in language and geography, it is scarcely recognizable as the same land. Much has transpired in the world since Goethe's time—particularly the industrial revolution—to bring to Germany new solidarities, new outlooks, new ambitions. The same is true of Russia, of the Balkan States, of Poland and Turkey. The same is true of the United States. The America of to-day would be scarcely recognizable by the men who fought for its deliverance in the Revolution.

The trouble with the Congress of Berlin was that it made its decision and went home. It expected that decision to be good for all time. It had a naive faith in the ability of the world to "stay put," particularly after the greater part of the civilized world had bidden it so to stay. It provided no means whereby its decisions might be "stretched" to cover changes in tempers and powers that any one might easily have predicted would inevitably arise. The Congress of Berlin went home. And so instead of controlling the changes, directing them into salutary channels, the changes more and more controlled it, until flagrantly, in one case after another, they set the august decision of the Congress flatly at naught.

What is needed if decisions are to live and operate is an international adjusting body that will not go home, that will be continuously on the job. Brailsford has made this convincingly clear in his book "A League of Nations." He has insisted that there be an international body—he calls it the International Executive—not only permanent but small enough in size and with a sufficient breadth and flexibility of powers to make possible

not only a constant alertness to changing international situations but an instant power of suggestion and mediation.

Many of the plans proposed neglect this fundamental desideratum. They are constructed in the spirit of the conventional thought that all that is needed for secure peace is some international body of reference to "settle" disputes. What is needed just as truly, Brailsford shows, is a body capable of assisting in the unsettling of settlements when old settlements no longer adequately apply to changed conditions. At the present time the only way of unsettling old settlements is the drastic way of war.

MAIN LINES OF ORGANIZATION

The main lines of organization of a League of Nations are not difficult to trace.¹ There is first the criterion of admission to the League. In this respect two radically different tendencies are noticeable among the plans proposed. There is, in the first place, the conviction that all states of the world should at once be freely admitted to membership in the League. There is, in the second place, the conviction that League membership should be restricted in the first instance to the Great Powers, and that other states should be admitted only as these Powers agree. There is much to be said for each plan. For the second, it may be argued that the leap from the sheer independence of sovereignty of the large number of states, big and little, mature and immature, of the world, to the immediate federation of the entire world is a very long leap indeed, which may quite easily prove disastrous. It may not be an altogether unwise move, therefore, to take the first step toward the federation of the world by the effective leaguing together of those states which are sufficiently similar in standard and political ideal to make the league immediately workable. For the first proposal, it may be said, on the other hand, that any initial exclusion from mem-

¹ The following is a list of the most carefully elaborated plans: Central Organization for a Durable Peace; Fabian Research Committee; Brailsford's League of Nations; League to Enforce Peace; Draft Convention for a League of Nations (Recommendations of the Study Group of the League to Enforce Peace); Community of Nations Pamphlet; La Fontaine's Great Solution; American Peace Society; World Court League; Cosmos; International Congress of Women; Proposals for the Avoidance of War (British Group; Lord Bryce); League of Nations Society; Otlet, World Charter Organizing the Union of the States.

bership tends to continue the old balance of power which proved so disastrous to the world in the past, besides allotting to the Great Powers a leadership that may easily become an injustice to the remaining states of the world. The problem involved here is a real one which demands careful thought.

In the second place, all the plans proposed provide for a legislative function of the League. In some cases this takes the form of periodic conferences of the member states of the League. In others, it takes the form of an International Council always complete and in being; in others, of International Conferences from time to time. The Bryce plan provides for conferences only at such crucial junctures as may arise when states fail to abide by the conditions of the League. The unwillingness to provide for a permanent or periodic legislative body, is undoubtedly a weakness of the British plan. Brailsford, who fears that a parliament with full legislative powers would be too swift a leap from our present situation, suggests a consultative or advisory parliament, which would, he believes, eventually develop into a true parliament of the world.

In the third place, all the plans provide for a tribunal. The tribunal in all cases is of two kinds—a Court (or Courts) for the settlement of justiciable disputes; a Court of Arbitration and a Council of Conciliation for investigation and recommendation with reference to non-justiciable disputes.

In the fourth place, all the plans deal with the question whether the decisions of the Court or recommendations of the Council are to be binding or not. In most plans, acceptance of the decisions of the Court (justiciable issues) is compulsory. In practically all plans, acceptance of the recommendations of the Council of Conciliation (non-justiciable) is voluntary. In the fifth place all the plans indicate the type of sanctions that are to support the decisions and recommendations. In most plans, failure to refer a dispute subjects the recalcitrant nation to the military or economic pressure of the League; in some plans such failure subjects it simply to the condemnation of world public opinion. In some plans failure to accept the decision of the Court subjects the recalcitrant nation to the military or economic pressure of the League. In other plans, states, having referred a dispute, are at liberty to accept or reject as they please.

Perhaps the deepest cleavage in principle among the plans for a world League is upon the question whether physical force (military or economic or both) or moral force is to be employed as a sanction. And yet it would seem as if there ought be no difference of view on this matter. Everyone, save an exceedingly small body of extremists—and even they are not consistent—will admit that force may be legitimately employed in restraint or correction. For example, in ordinary social life, force (violence) is illegitimately employed when it is used for personal or interested ends, as when a man strikes another in wrath or hatred, or to secure for himself the other's possessions. When, on the other hand, a policeman forcibly restrains a would-be murderer or thief, force, being employed impersonally or disinterestedly in the service of weakness and through the arm of the state, is wholly legitimate. In the same manner, group force is illegitimately employed when a nation, for its own interests of conquest or glory, etc., makes war upon another nation. On the other hand, when a group of nations, pledged to support an international agreement made for the welfare of all, restrains or chastises a rebellious nation, force is legitimate because impersonally or disinterestedly employed.

There should be no confusion of ideas here. It is not force that is immoral. It is the immoral use of force. A League of Nations with no instrument of force to back its decisions will, apparently, be little more than the rope of sand which the Hague Tribunal at the moment of crisis proved to be.

So much for the structure of the international state. But a structure without foundations is a shaky affair. What of the underlying principles?

One of the striking and hopeful aspects of all this thought of world rebuilding which we have outlined is that it focuses with entire clearness upon a few essential principles which are to serve as the foundation principles of the new world charter. There is no scattering in one doctrinaire direction and another. The thought of men to-day is terribly serious and terribly united.

In the first place there is overwhelming agreement as to the necessity for Open Diplomacy. "Parliamentary control of foreign policy . . . so that secret treaties and secret diplomacy may no longer endanger the most vital interests of the na-

tion."¹ "Secret treaties shall be void."² "Diplomacy in all nations must be put under the control of parliaments and public opinion."³ "Foreign politics shall be subject to democratic control."⁴ "Abolition of secret diplomacy."⁵ and so on. Such are the phrases used to express the one overwhelming conviction that the old diplomacy of hidden bargains, of suspicions and dreads and surprises, of lyings and cheatings must be completely eliminated from a decently organized world society of nations.

In the second place there is practically equal agreement upon the principle that no transfer of territory shall take place without the consent of the population involved and that nations shall have the right to decide their own fate.⁶ The German and Austro-Hungarian Socialists (Vienna, April, 1915) expressed this by the phrase: "Recognition of the right of every people to determine its own destiny." The German Socialists, as reported in the *New York Times* of August 26, 1915, expressed it as follows: "Annexations of foreign territories violate the rights of peoples to self-rule. . . . Therefore, all plans of short-sighted politicians favoring conquest are opposed." The Australian Peace Alliance expresses it in the words: "No province or territory in any part of the world shall be transferred from one government to another without the consent by plebiscite of the population of such province." The Federation of British Peace Societies: "No territorial change without consent of the population involved." So the Women's Movement for Constructive Peace (English), the British Independent Labor Party, the Fabian Society, the Union of Democratic Control, the Socialist Party of America, The World Peace Foundation, The American School Peace League, the Women's International Peace Congress, Brailsford, La Fontaine, Hobson, Dickinson, Bryce and a host of others. The principle of No Conquest is therefore the second principles which has emerged out of the uncertainties and confusions of earlier thought into the clarity of a world conviction.

¹ Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Stockholm.

² Central Organization for a Durable Peace.

³ International Bureau of Peace.

⁴ International Congress of Women.

⁵ Conference of Socialists from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland; 1915.

⁶ Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Stockholm.

In the third place, as might be expected, there is a concerted voice calling for a sincere attempt at reduction of armaments. "Armaments must be reduced according to general agreement and placed under international control" (International Bureau of Peace); "Considerable reduction of armies and application of war budgets to education," etc. (Union of International Associations, Brussels); "The States shall agree to reduce their armaments" (Central Organization for a Durable Peace); "Disarmament to be brought about by international agreement" (Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation); and so on. With this goes, in some of the plans, the demand that "as a step to this end all countries should . . . take over the manufacture of arms and munitions of war and should control all international traffic in the same, since in the private profits accruing from the great armament factories" there is "a powerful hindrance to the abolition of war." Whether the disarmament shall be gradual or immediate, partial or complete, the agreement, again, is overwhelming that no future world organization can be contemplated that does not take effective steps to root out the war breeding evil of competition in armaments.

In the fourth place there is a large agreement, an agreement that is growing into a more emphatic insistence as the war progresses and the underlying issues are more clearly seen, upon the demand for Commercial Freedom. Whether this takes the form of a demand for a removal of tariffs, for neutralization (freedom) of the seas, or for freedom of investment opportunities in foreign lands, or for all of them, it is an indication that the world has become instructed, as it never has been before, upon the war-breeding quality of all hindrances to the free movement of legitimate economic enterprise. By the more penetrating of the thinkers, like Brailsford and Hobson, commercial freedom is taken to be the *sine qua non* of a world organized for secure peace. Brailsford indeed calls, in his plan of international organization, for an international commission to guarantee freedom of investment opportunity and freedom of access to raw materials.

Open Diplomacy, No Conquest, Reduction of Armaments, Commercial Freedom—these apparently are to be the four bed-rock principles upon which the new international order is to be

built, the forsquare foundation, as it were, upon which the international structure of the future is to rest.

Foundation and superstructure! The twentieth century has its clear task before it, its contribution to make to the centuries. May there be no cooling of the heart, no slackening of its great intention!

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

What are the minimum obligations which the nations entering into a free league will be willing to accept, but which will be sufficient to make the league effective for the purpose for which it is primarily created—the prevention of war?

All the proposals that I have seen concerning a League of Nations provide for a separation of cases arising between the members of the League into two classes—justiciable and non-justiciable. All agree that justiciable cases should go to a regularly constituted court, either the existing Hague Court or a new court formed directly under the League.

For the non-justiciable cases it is agreed that in the case of a difference between two nations which they themselves are unable to settle, they shall not go to war with each other until the members of the League, not parties to the controversy, have had the grounds of difference investigated and have made recommendations for settlement.

The method of reaching the recommendations raises the question of the nature of the organization of the League. It is suggested that it will be advisable for the body created by the direct representatives of the nations in the League to confine itself to essentially legislative functions. This body should control policies; it should create instruments and agents to carry out these policies. The actual work should be done by these instruments and agents. A League of Nations composed of a considerable number of members could well consider and control policies. It could not wisely undertake the investigation of a difference between two na-

¹ From an address by Charles R. Van Hise, late President of the University of Wisconsin, before the Wisconsin State Convention of the League to Enforce Peace, at Madison, November 8, 1918.

tions and make recommendations concerning the same. These duties should be performed by a quasijudicial body analogous to a commission.

Presuming, therefore, that the investigation in any case will be made by a commission or council appointed by the members of the League not parties to the controversy, its recommendations, whether unanimous or by majority, must be final, precisely as the determination of a court, whether unanimous or by majority, is final. To require that the recommendations of a tribunal shall be unanimous, or after their consideration by the members of the League itself shall be unanimous, as has been seriously proposed, would be a decision at the outset to make the League of Nations futile.

The case of the nobles of Poland, who acted under the principle of unanimity with calamitous consequences to that country for more than a century, is a conclusive illustration. On the other hand, the acceptance by the American people of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, often with a bare majority, upon most momentous questions, some of these between the several States during the early years of the Union, when the States were being cemented into a nation, is conclusive evidence of the soundness of the principle advocated.

The next question that arises is what is to happen if a nation of the League goes to war contrary to the recommendations made. It has been proposed, indeed strongly urged, by many who are advocating a League of Nations that all members of the League shall bind themselves in such a case to support the attacked state with their armies and navies, and also economically.

It does not seem to me that it will be practicable to secure the agreement of the nations to such a condition, and I, therefore, propose as a substitute that they agree that any nation in the League shall be free, if it so desires, to support the attacked state with its army and its navy; and that all the members of the League agree absolutely to boycott the offending nation, to have no trade or communication with it in any way whatever, to treat it as an outlaw among the free peoples of the world.

So dependent are nations upon one another in these days

of instantaneous communication, rapid transportation, and international commerce, that it seems to me any nation would be very slow to go to war contrary to recommendations which had been made upon its case, with the certainty that the war would have to be prosecuted entirely upon its own resources, that no help could be in any way derived from any other nation; not only so, but that in relations other than war it will be treated as a leper.

In regard to differences between states members of the League, and states not members of the League, the League of Nations should be free to follow precisely the same procedure as if both nations were members of the League, and whether or not the nation outside the League requested it, should take steps for the investigation of differences and the making of recommendations. If the nation outside the League attacked a nation within the League before the case was investigated and recommendations made or contrary to the recommendations, then, again, the nations of the League should be free to support their ally with their armies and navies and should be bound to support it by complete boycott of the offending state.

In case of a controversy between two nations altogether outside the League, probably it is not wise to propose that the League should do more than tender its good offices to settle the difference which threatens war, precisely as if the two states were members of the League. This offer might not always be accepted, but if it were accepted by one state and not accepted by the other, it is inevitable that the state that was attacked contrary to the recommendation would have at least the moral support and influence of the nations of the League, and no war has ever illustrated the mighty power of moral support as has this war which is just being finished.

A question which immediately arises is, Shall Germany, which country is already committed to the principle of a League, be admitted under the terms of its constitution?

My answer is that as soon as the German people have shown that they are a free people, wholly independent of autocracy, have completely abandoned the evil doctrine of Might and are ready to support the existence of a moral

order in the world, that nation should become a member of the League of Free Nations. This would mean that Germany, once admitted to the League in the matter of armaments as well as others, should be treated upon the same basis as the other five Powers. But there should be the strictest guarantees that the agreements should not be surreptitiously disregarded. If Germany is allowed to unduly expand her armies, this will start again in the world the race for enormous armaments.

Another question that arises in connection with the admission of Germany to the League is the economic treatment of the Central Powers after the war. In this matter, to my mind, there are two phases, that of reconstruction and that of a permanent policy following reconstruction. It is possible, indeed probable, that during the period of reconstruction, there will be a shortage of essential materials. I hold that during this period the needs of the Allies must have preference, since the restoration of Belgium, France, and Serbia has been made necessary in large measure because of the ruthless and unlawful acts of the Central Powers.

Following the reconstruction period, when the world has assumed its normal condition, the Central Powers should be placed upon precisely the same economic basis as are other nations. Each nation, with regard to tariff and similar policies, will retain its own autonomy; but the League of Nations must see that no nation within the League which has equal treatment with regard to raw materials shall pursue unfair practices in international trade. In short, unfair practices in international trade, illustrated by dumping, must be outlawed precisely as are unfair practices in national trade. In this respect Germany has been an offender in the past; and only when she reforms completely shall she have the same treatment as other nations with regard to raw materials.

In order that the League of Free Nations shall have permanence and its influence grow, it is necessary that it shall have something to do. In the matter of justiciable cases this is provided for. The non-justiciable cases would be sporadic. They would doubtless be handled as they arose by appropriate agents, appointed for the purpose. However, the terms of peace are likely to require a number of international

obligations. It is clear that the Dardanelles must be made open to the peoples of the world; they must be internationalized. It is generally believed that the German African colonies should not be returned to that country. With the exception of Southwestern Africa, the administration of these colonies in the interest of their peoples might well become an international obligation. New states have been created through the disintegration of Russia and will be created by the disintegration of Austria. It will be necessary that these states have a big brother to assist them when necessary until they get on their feet, precisely as the United States served as a big brother for Cuba and she was able to act independently. This is international work. It seems to me that this function should be exercised directly through the League of Free Nations. An organization shall be created by it to handle international responsibility in the interests of the world. This will involve the setting up of an appropriate government in each case, the apportioning of the necessary protection and the allocation of the required funds among the members of the League. From time to time, as need arises, a helping hand should be given, but always with the purpose of developing a province exclusively in the interests of its inhabitants, and finally when the time comes, of establishing self-government. This passage from government by an instrument of the League of Nations to self-government in each case should be the ultimate goal.

The foregoing discussion assumes that the United States will become one of the great nations of the Free League. This is a complete abandonment of the traditional policy of isolation.

Already in this war the United States has abandoned the policy of isolation and has acted in practical alliance with the great Powers fighting Germany. It is true that the President has always alluded to the other Powers as our associates in war rather than as our allies; but in every respect in the conduct of the war the United States has acted precisely as have the other members of the alliance. Indeed, the United States has taken leadership in making the alliance stronger and firmer through a common command of the fighting

forces, through coöperation in the feeding of the Allies, and through the apportionment of the materials of war.

In the second place, even if we had not already abandoned the policy of isolation, sooner or later it would have been necessary to do so under the conditions of the modern world. The policy may have been wise when the Atlantic Ocean was a great gulf between America and Europe. Transportation and communication were so slow that the United States could pursue policies independent of those followed in Europe. However, now that communication is instantaneous and transportation so rapid that goods cross the Atlantic in less than a week, and the trade of each nation depends upon materials derived from other nations, isolation is no longer possible. The world has become one body, and no great member of it can proceed independently of the other members. They must act together; and this is only possible through formal treaty covenants.

It seems clear that if the United States now shirks the responsibility of entering the League of Free Nations, it is inevitable that some time in the future she will again be obliged to intervene in a war for which she is in no way responsible and the initiation of which she had no means to control. Because of the intimate international relations, if a world conflagration again starts, it is almost inevitable that we shall be drawn into it precisely as we were into this.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the proposal to join a League of Free Nations is fundamentally different from joining an alliance of the kind which was meant when the doctrine of avoiding entangling alliances was developed. The danger of joining an alliance is that this alliance will get into an armed conflict with another alliance. The plan of balance of powers between alliances in Europe, we know, has led to disastrous wars from time to time. If it were proposed that the United States should enter into an alliance with one or two Powers of Europe, the objection would hold that it would be entering into an entangling alliance; but the proposal is that the United States shall enter a League of Free Nations, which shall at the outset include the great dominant free nations and which shall finally include prac-

tically all nations. This is not an alliance, but a step toward coöperative world organization, and therefore World Peace. Not only should the United States enter the League of Free Nations, but she should take the position of leadership in its formation to which she is entitled from the commanding influence which she is exercising at the present time in the councils of the world.

MEMORANDUM ON WAR AIMS¹

THE WAR

I. The Inter-Allied Conference declares that whatever may have been the causes of the outbreak of war it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting peace for the world.

The Conference sees no reason to depart from the following declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations on February 14, 1915:

"This Conference cannot ignore the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society and of the policy of Colonial dependencies and aggressive Imperialism, against which International Socialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every government has its share of responsibility.

"The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the very existence of independent nationalities and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In these circumstances a victory for German Imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Russia do not pursue the political and economic crushing of Germany; they are not at

¹ Adopted by the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference in London, February 22, 1918. Reprinted from the London Times, February 25, 1918.

war with the peoples of Germany and Austria, but only with the governments of those countries by which they are oppressed. They demand that Belgium shall be liberated and compensated. They desire that the question of Poland shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another state, or in that of complete independence. They wish that throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by force shall receive the right freely to dispose of themselves.

"While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved to accomplish this task of liberation, the Socialists are none the less resolved to resist any attempt to transform this defensive war into a war of conquest, which would only prepare fresh conflicts, create new grievances and subject various peoples more than ever to the double plague of armaments and war.

"Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles of the International, the members of the Conference express the hope that the working classes of all the different countries will before long find themselves united again in their struggle against militarism and capitalist Imperialism. The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the world."

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

II. Whatever may have been the objects for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the Inter-Allied Conference in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy.

Of all the conditions of peace none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war.

Whoever triumphs, the peoples will have lost unless an international system is established which will prevent war. What would it mean to declare the right of peoples to self-determination if this right were left at the mercy of new violations, and was not protected by a super-national authority? That authority can be no other than the League of Nations, in which not

only all the present belligerents, but every other independent state, should be pressed to join.

The constitution of such a League of Nations implies the immediate establishment of an International High Court, not only for the settlement of all disputes between states that are of justiciable nature, but also for prompt and effective mediation between states in other issues that vitally interest the power or honour of such states. It is also under the control of the League of Nations that the consultation of peoples for purposes of self-determination must be organized. This popular right can be vindicated only by popular vote. The League of Nations shall establish the procedure of international jurisdiction, fix the methods which will maintain the freedom and security of the election, restore the political rights of individuals which violence and conquest may have injured, repress any attempt to use pressure or corruption, and prevent any subsequent reprisals. It will be also necessary to form an International Legislature, in which the representatives of every civilized state would have their allotted share and energetically to push forward, step by step, the development of international legislation agreed to by, and definitely binding upon, the several states.

By a solemn agreement all the states and peoples consulted shall pledge themselves to submit every issue between two or more of them for settlement as aforesaid. Refusal to accept arbitration or to submit to the settlement will imply deliberate aggression, and all the nations will necessarily have to make common cause, by using any and every means at their disposal, either economical or military, against any state or states refusing to submit to the arbitration award, or attempting to break the world's covenant of peace.

But the sincere acceptance of the rules and decisions of the super-national authority implies complete democratization in all countries; the removal of all the arbitrary powers who, until now, have assumed the right of choosing between peace and war; the maintenance or creation of legislatures elected by and on behalf of the sovereign right of the people; the suppression of secret diplomacy, to be replaced by the conduct of foreign policy under the control of popular legislatures, and the publication of all treaties, which must never be in contravention of the stipulation of the League of Nations, with the absolute re-

sponsibility of the Government, and more particularly of the foreign minister of each country to its Legislature.

Only such a policy will enforce the frank abandonment of every form of Imperialism. When based on universal democracy, in a world in which effective international guarantees against aggression have been secured, the League of Nations will achieve the complete suppression of force as the means of settling international differences.

The League of Nations in order to prepare for the concerted abolition of compulsory military service in all countries, must first take steps for the prohibition of fresh armaments on land and sea and for the common limitation of the existing armaments by which all the peoples are burdened; as well as the control of war manufactures and the enforcement of such agreements as may be agreed to thereupon. The states must undertake such manufactures themselves, so as entirely to abolish profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in the war scares and progressive competition in the preparation for war.

The nations, being armed solely for self-defence and for such action as the League of Nations may ask them to take in defence of international right, will be left free, under international control either to create a voluntarily recruited force or to organize the nation for defence without professional armies for long terms of military service.

To give effect to the above principles, the Inter-Allied Conference declares that the rules upon which the League of Nations will be founded must be included in the Treaty of Peace, and will henceforward become the basis of the settlement of differences. In that spirit the Conference expresses its agreement with the propositions put forward by President Wilson in his last message:

1. That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case, and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

2. That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game now forever discredited of the balance of power; but that

3. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.

4. That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and, consequently, of the world.

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

III. The Inter-Allied Conference considers that the proclamation of principles of international law accepted by all nations, and the substitution of a regular procedure for the forceful acts by which states calling themselves sovereign have hitherto adjusted their differences—in short, the establishment of a League of Nations—gives an entirely new aspect to territorial problems.

The old diplomacy and the yearnings after domination by states, or even by peoples, which during the whole of the nineteenth century have taken advantage of and corrupted the aspirations of nationalities, have brought Europe to a condition of anarchy and disorder which have led inevitably to the present catastrophe.

The Conference declares it to be the duty of the Labour and Socialist Movement to suppress without hesitation the Imperialist designs in the various states which have led one Government after another to seek, by the triumph of military force, to acquire either new territories or economic advantage.

The establishment of a system of international law and the guarantees afforded by a League of Nations, ought to remove the last excuse for those strategic protections which nations have hitherto felt bound to require.

It is the supreme principle of the right of each people to determine its own destiny that must now decide what steps should be taken by way of restitution or reparation, and whatever territorial readjustments may be found to be necessary at the close of the present war.

The Conference accordingly emphasizes the importance to the Labour and Socialist Movement of a clear and exact defini-

tion of what is meant by the right of each people to determine its own destiny. Neither destiny of race nor identity of language can be regarded as affording more than a presumption in favor of federation or unification. During the nineteenth century, theories of this kind have so often served as a cloak for aggression that the International cannot but seek to prevent any recurrence of such an evil. Any adjustments of boundaries that become necessary must be based exclusively upon the desire of the people concerned.

It is true that it is impossible for the necessary consultation of the desires of the people concerned to be made in any fixed and invariable way for all the cases in which it is required, and that the problems of nationality and territory are not the same for the inhabitants of all countries. Nevertheless, what is necessary in all cases is that the procedure to be adopted should be decided, not by one of the parties to the dispute, but by the super-national authority.

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ECONOMIC RELATIONS

IV. The Inter-Allied Conference declares against all the projects now being prepared by Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an economic war, after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations, as such an economic war, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defence be driven. The main lines of marine communication should be open without hindrance to vessels of all nations under the protection of the League of Nations. The Conference realizes that all attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the working class see in the alliance between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal Protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace. On the other hand, the right of each nation to the defence of its own economic interests, and in face of the world-

shortage hereinafter mentioned, to the conservation for its own people of a sufficiency of its own supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, cannot be denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Labour and Socialist Parties of all countries, the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the Government toward commercial enterprise, along with the necessary control of supplies for its own people, on the principle of the open door, and without hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But it urges equally the importance, not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development, by appropriate Government action, of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, a maximum eight-hour day, the prevention of "sweating" and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression, and the prohibition of night work by women and children.

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

V. To make the world safe for democracy involves much more than the prevention of war, either military or economic. It will be a device of the capitalist interests to pretend that the Treaty of Peace need concern itself only with the cessation of the struggles of the armed forces and with any necessary territorial readjustments. The Inter-Allied Conference insists that in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships, and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries, in proportion, not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs; and that, within each country, the Government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities, in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market mainly to the richer classes in proportion to their means, but, systematically, to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community on the principle of no cake for anyone until all have bread."

Moreover, it cannot but be anticipated that, in all countries, the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition makers and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of millions of soldiers—in the face of the scarcity of industrial capital, the shortage of raw materials, and the insecurity of commercial enterprise—will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several Governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment more or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the Conference holds that it is the duty of every Government to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unemployed, when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. It therefore urges upon the Labour Parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their Governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads, railways and waterways, the erection of schools, and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings and the reclamation and afforestation of land) that will be required in the near future, not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed, but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level year by year, and throughout each year, the aggregate demand for labour; and thus prevent there being any unemployed. It is now known that in this way it is quite possible for any Government to prevent, if it chooses, the occurrence of any widespread or prolonged involuntary unemployment; which if it is now in any country allowed to occur, is as much the result of Government neglect as is any epidemic disease.

RESTORATION OF THE DEVASTATED AREAS
AND REPARATION OF WRONGDOING

VI. The Inter-Allied Conference holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries immediately peace is declared

will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communication whatever destroyed by war operations; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage earners and peasants themselves in homes and employment; and that to ensure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so far as the cost is contributed by any international fund, should be made under the direction of an International Commission.

The Conference will not be satisfied unless there is a full and free judicial investigation into the accusations made on all sides that particular Governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence and theft against individual victims, for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of war. It draws attention in particular to the loss of life and property of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including women and children) resulting from this inhuman and ruthless conduct. It should be part of the conditions of peace that there should be forthwith set up a Court of Claims and Accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or Government to answer the complaint, pronounce judgement, and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or Government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong, or to their dependents. The several Governments must be responsible, financially and otherwise, for the presentation of the cases of their respective nationals to such a Court of Claims and Accusations, and for the payment of the compensation awarded.

LABOR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

It is my purpose here to consider in the light of labor's demands and of existing facts in the world of international events the one big constructive suggestion which the world has now to work upon—the idea of a league of nations. Labor is lending earnest support to the proposal for a league. Yet, oddly enough, despite the widespread and almost sudden popularity which this idea has attained, it is still a somewhat tentative and nebulous one. It still suffers from too great a generality of statement. Until it is removed from the realm of the abstract, until the conception of the society of nations is broadened to include something more than political functions and interests, there is grave danger that the idea may prove an impractical instrument of genuine democratic internationalism, in exactly the same way that the nineteenth century state proved ill-adapted to effective democratic national council.

As endorsed by the inter-allied workers the idea contemplates the immediate establishment "actually as a part of the treaty of peace with which the present war will end, of a universal league or society of nations, a supernational authority, with an international high court to try all justiciable issues between nations. . . ." But what these justiciable issues are, upon what matters the "international legislature" should legislate—these are vital questions for which no answers are suggested. Nor has there been any public attempt to relate these plans for supernational political machinery to labor's industrial program. Indeed, there has been an almost complete hiatus between the thinking regarding the political structure involved in a league of nations and the economic functions which it is becoming increasingly obvious, the league must assume. Labor has urged a league with an organization patterned on familiar political forms. Yet it also demands in the next breath an international control over commodities and materials for which conventional political government offers no analogies and no clues. Can the democratically minded workers achieve any reconciliation between the ideas of

¹ By Ordway Tead, member of the firm of Valentine, Tead & Gregg, Industrial Counselors, and a contributor to various economic journals. International Conciliation. No. 131:533-42. October, 1918.

a political and economic internationalism? Does the league of nations offer any ground for such a reconciliation?

It is largely the popular over-emphasis of the political analogies which gives point to the objection that the projected world society appears to contemplate no definite job. Yet, clearly, if it is to make good, the league requires specific functions. Any organization possessing vitality has come into being only in response to a need recognized and pondered until some coöperative way of meeting it is seen. Demand for the performance of a function is the only valid occasion for the creation of a body to perform it. Of international organizations this is especially true. To be successful they must be functional in character—that is, they must exist in response to a felt need and be so constituted as to meet that need. This is a simple truth; but it can be of immense value in helping to keep our thinking on international problems clear. If we hold this truth in view, we can get the right perspective on organizations and can be on our guard against those with resonant names but vague duties.

But the league of nations, it is popularly supposed, will be charged with the duty of enforcing peace. As Mr. Wells puts it, there is a "plain necessity" for a universal society as a condition of organizing the world for peace. Yet whether or not "keeping the peace" involves a concrete program and definite activities is still not a matter of wide agreement. Certainly, as we have construed it in political and diplomatic affairs down to the present the peace-keeping job is very much in the air, related to a thousand projects and policies, but having no single and genuine rallying point of its own. In existing institutions the task generally characterized as "preserving the peace" is largely a negative one. No one would seriously suggest, for example, that the municipal court by virtue of its function of maintaining order provides the cohesive force which holds the local community together. There are a thousand local functions more indispensable, more vitally contributory to the preservation of law and peace. In reality, it is through the administration of health, education, municipal training and the various local utilities which are urgently required by common necessity that the local community is unified and stabilized.

Internationally, it is equally true that functions upon which

common necessity dictates coöperation are the ones for which the nations should provide joint organizations. This is in line with the war's great lesson: that peace is best maintained not so much by efforts to keep the peace as by common efforts to solve the problems that provoke the nations to war. If, as a recent writer observes, "all nations act from self interest," it is only honest moral economy to entrust to supernational bodies definite tasks in the performance of which each nation is undeniably and permanently interested. Where the common self-interest of each country is best served by common participation in the solving of common problems, can we afford not to act together? Can labor after the sacrifices of the war stop short of demanding bodies on a world-wide basis to which some more positive work than the maintenance of peace is assigned?

If there is doubt concerning the reality of the function popularly attributed to a league of nations, it can be removed only by clarifying the statement of the function. The world's problem becomes one of discovering what issues require international action to ensure national salvation. Such necessitous problems are obviously to a large extent economic in character. They relate to food supply and sustenance. Concerning precisely in what difficulties coöperative action is imperative and isolation equivalent to starvation, is therefore a subject for close analysis by the members of a society of nations.

In line with this conclusion is the recent statement of Professor Gilbert Murray concerning after-war problems. "There will not," he says, "be enough food and there will not be enough shipping. . . . We must, to some extent, pool our ships and pool our food supply. And those who do not join the pool will starve. I think there will have to be a great and drastic international association—a vast Hoover commission—to which the various state governments will have to bow under pain of their people's starvation."

Two other important considerations regarding the league of nations may appear at first sight to be somewhat metaphysical. Actually, however, both have very practical bearings and consequences. As Professor Seignobos says in *The New Europe*,¹ the league of nations is a "translation into international terms

¹ Seignobos, *The New Europe*, vol. vi, No. 77.

of the doctrine of the social contract." The doctrine of the social contract was formulated to explain how people became associated together under systematic governments. It stresses the idea of a deliberate rational intention shared by a group of people, as the actuating motive in the creation of government. It minimizes the element of a common necessity. The Pilgrims signing the compact in the cabin of the Mayflower have become the classic example of this theoretical explanation of the origin of constitutionalism in a conscious act of thought and will.

Yet this example rightly interpreted illustrates the exact opposite of the social contract theory. Actually it illustrates the fact that *some common necessity, some situation in which the interests of each are best served by common action*, is the real occasion of the signing of a common contract—is the real occasion for organized group activity. The Pilgrims did not say: Go to now, let us have a government. Their thought was rather: How can we best secure common loyalty, joint protection, assured stability in the conduct of those affairs which interest us all? Similarly, if the league of nations is to be built on no deeper foundation than the deliberate rational intentions of the several nations—no matter how good those intentions are—it will partake of the same unreality which vitiates the social contract theory itself. Good intentions, rationally conceived plans of things that ought to be—these are not the groundwork on which a sound and permanent superstructure of internationalism can be reared. If there are to be contracts and if contracts are to have force and effect, the ties that bind must be ties of necessity, of common need, of joint gain and advantage by the upholding of the contracts.

Again, the stressing by all the advocates of a league of nations of the demand for a "supernational authority" has in it serious elements of risk. It is one thing to say that with respect to any particular issue which arises between nations there should be some one body to which final appeal in those special matters may be taken. It is quite another thing to say that with respect to all issues, all appeal should be to *one* great, supreme "International High Court." We know, as Professor Seignobos has phrased it, that "modern civilized states are founded on the idea of national sovereignty which, in naked terms, is simply the legalization of the force possessed by the respective govern-

ments." We have seen the uses and abuses to which that force can be put in the hands of states, whether they be nominally democratic or nominally autocratic. Labor, especially in England, has lately come to have a strong antipathy for the degree of centralized responsibility which the absolute sovereignty of the state entails. The organized workers the world over have come to fear the state to the extent that the state means not common action for the common good but rather action enforced upon the people by a dominant governing group (regardless of how that group gets its power). Claims of absolutism, of final authority and ultimate power are as inimical to personal freedom and growth when they are made in behalf of states as when made in behalf of churches or institutions of any kind.

For these reasons the practice of absolute sovereignty and faith in it are everywhere on the wane. The power of the state, as state, promises to decline as power for public and social control is better organized through functional and more or less voluntary groups.

Yet in the face of this tendency people are proposing—and labor is supporting the idea—not alone to have one supreme source of authority in international matters, but to enforce its decrees by the use of an overwhelming aggrandizement of internationalized force. This idea gets its clear acknowledgement in the title of the League to Enforce Peace. I repeat that as respects any one question over territorial divisions or matters of economic adjustment between nations it *may* be necessary and practical to create a temporary umpire to secure adjustment. But it is a fair question whether the transfer of absolutism in sovereignty from the state to the super-state (which is what the proposal for a highly centralized league to enforce peace really comes to) would not be paying too dearly for a very doubtful gain.

Mr. G. D. H. Cole in his "Self Government in Industry" proposes that within the state the problem of adjusting the claims of sovereignty to the claims of personality can be solved by dividing sovereignty between the supreme organization of the nation in its producing capacity (an industrial parliament) and the supreme organization of the consumers (the present political parliaments). If issues come to a deadlock between these two groups, the only recourse, as he conceives it, is to effect what-

ever ultimate adjustment is possible without an appeal to force. In the contest for power between the state as producer and the state as consumer, the individual gets his chance to preserve and advance the claims of personality and freedom. Perhaps this approach has its suggestion for our thinking in international affairs. Certainly it is becoming daily clearer that if international government means the re-establishment of absolute sovereignty on a basis twice removed from popular control, the weakness of that government will be fundamental and the allegiance it can summon will diminish as soon as its exercise of power becomes significant.

But let no one imagine that for these reasons the league of nations is an impractical suggestion. The foregoing discussion has attempted only to point to the dangers inherent in the popular understanding of the idea. The central notion of joint action on those problems which the nations share and which can find no solution in the absence of joint action is fundamental. I am only asking for a slight shift in emphasis in our thinking about the league. The task really is to find the problems upon which the nations admit the need for joint action, and to advocate the creation of supernational bodies which are adapted to solving each particular problem in question, whether it be, for example, distribution of the world's wheat or fertilizer supply, the protection of patents and copyrights, a reserve board to administer an international gold clearance fund, the framing of uniform labor laws for the nations, or the adjustment of territorial boundaries.

The league of nations will be effective, real and successful to the extent that it directs its attention to analyzing the common needs of the nations and to instituting functional organizations of administration and control. This is its first important work. Far from being without function, the league has this indispensable task. It must set up under sound representative control agencies calculated to solve the problems upon which the nations *must* coöperate if they are to be solved at all.

This brings us, I believe, to a point of definite intersection between the idea of an international political structure and the demand for world control of economic matters like raw materials and shipping. The workers will find in the league an instrument of control in the economic sphere which will give

abundant promise of vital social usefulness. They may even find that, in demanding genuine international control over the difficult matters of industrial readjustment, they are in that way best effecting the creation of a society of nations. This society may very possibly grow first out of the agencies of economic control which the war has brought and only afterwards come to take on the desirable attribute of a political superstate.

But should this happen, labor will have to be zealously on guard against two dangers. It must be sure that these international agencies are absolutely above any suspicion of maintaining or erecting economic barriers. And, in order to have assurance on this first point, it must be certain that the national representation on these world bodies is genuinely in the national interest, and not in the interest of special privileged groups in any of the affected countries.

Whatever world organization is projected, there can be no deep-rooted and abiding peace and good will among the nations in the absence of a definite motive to administer, as the workers have finely said, "the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world."

THE STRUCTURE OF LASTING PEACE¹

Why the constitution of a league of nations ought to be the first proposition in the agenda of the peace conference should be obvious enough. Once certain principles of public law are established, the adjudication of all specific racial, territorial, economic, and military issues will follow easily and smoothly enough from them. The converse is not true. Let these issues be taken up severally and separately, without regard to an international rule, and the peace conference will become a bargain counter between dickering diplomats representing military forces. The specific adjudications will preclude a general principle which must necessarily contradict them. At best we shall have restored a precarious balance of power; at worst we shall resume fighting. If the peace conference be permitted to begin at the wrong end of the series of problems, there is little hope for a good end to the conference.

¹ By Horace Meyer Kallen, author of "The Structure of Lasting Peace," published by the Marshall Jones Co., Boston. 1918. Dial. p. 180. February 28, 1918.

Whether or not it begins at the right end will depend on two factors. These are the pressure of enlightened public opinion upon it and the personnel of the conference itself. The former must be awakened by free discussion; the latter will be determined by the manner of their choice and the considerations leading to it. In this regard the experience of the "sovereign and independent" American states is illuminating. At the Constitutional Convention the only statesman who had also been a member of the Continental Congress that had conducted the war against England, was James Madison. The rest were "demigods" who had won the confidence of the citizens of their states through very specific and signal service during the war or through intellectual leadership during and after it. So now. Diplomatists are by training, habit, and usage unfit for the particular service in hand. Servants of international conflict for exclusive national advantage, their skill is only in the arts of innuendo and dickering which such service demands. They would be as unsuited to a task requiring frankness and mutual accommodation as a pork-magnate to settle a strike in his own packing plant. The men needed are the men of international mind, who have been studying these diplomatists in action, who are aware of the defects of present state system, and who have thought out alterations and improvements. Such men are Sidney Webb, Brailsford, Henderson, Lowes Dickinson, Norman Angell in England; Thomas and his fellow Socialists in France; the members of the present Russian government and innumerable others in Russia; John Dewey, Louis Brandeis, Secretary Baker, David Starr Jordan, and Tharsten Veblen in America. And so in every country. Representatives should be chosen from the effective leadership of that great body of sentiment and opinion which has for the last quarter of a century kept the creation of a league of nations and the establishment of lasting peace constantly before the minds of men, which has so taught these ideals that the present war is unique in that the democratic urge to see it through to victory is the community of sentiment and opinion against all war. In short, a league of nations can be most effectively established only by representatives who are for it by habit of mind as well as desire, who have given it prolonged study, and have made themselves expert in the programme of its inauguration.

But there is yet a further necessity in the delimitation of personnel. "Self-determination" for nationalities, sincerely applied, would give place and voice in the conference to representatives of all nationalities whose fate and status the conference is to decide. An autonomous Poland, for example, is undoubtedly desirable, but the unspeakable Polish overlords maintain a vicious hegemony over Lithuanians, Letts and Jews, no less than over Polish peasants. Lithuanians, Letts and Jews as well as Poles should have voice and place at the peace conference. Serbo-Croats, Bohemians, Poles, Jews, Rumans should represent Austria no less than Magyars and Germans. Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, to mention just a few, should have voice and place equally with the Osmanli Turks for the Ottoman empire. How the representatives of the minorities are to be elected, what their proportionate weight should be, are questions to be solved by free discussion and public opinion. That the cases for their peoples must be put by the chosen representatives of these peoples, that they must necessarily have a voice in deciding their own fate in the community of nations, is beyond argument. So much so, indeed, that following the principle involved, Mr. Norman Angell suggests the representation not alone of nationalities but also of political parties within nations, according to their numerical strength. Thus Germany would be represented by her Socialists as well as by the party in power, England by her Laborites as well as by her Liberals and Conservatives, and so on. In this way fundamental differences in political principle would get representation, no less than differences in national character and interest.

What the peace conference defining itself as such a congress would need to establish is the law of a minimum genuine international control. Now all political control consists in the exercise of two functions. One is limitation; the other, liberation. Limitation and liberation are distinct but not different, since every just and relevant limitation is a liberation—witness the traffic policeman. International limitation would apply to national armaments, to quarrels between states over the "stakes of diplomacy," to quarrels within states over national hegemonies. The limitation of armament is of course basic. For no matter what may be the provocation to a fight, the lack of weapons compels the substitution of persuasion for blows and funda-

mentally alters the focus of the "national honor," a figment for the defense of which most blows are struck. Hence the International Congress should determine for the nations of the world, as the Continental Congress was by the Articles of Confederation empowered to determine for the original thirteen American States, the extent of the armament of each state. The simplest way to do this would be to fix annually the amount of money each state might spend on armament. Control of expenditure would require the complete socialization of the manufacture of munitions, its subordination to the inspection and control of an international commission on armaments and absolute publicity of records and accounts. All uses of armament should require license from the International Congress, particularly such uses as go by the euphemism "punitive expedition." Failure to carry out these provisions or to submit to the rule of the International Congress should be regarded tantamount to a declaration of war. It should be regarded with respect to the other causes of quarrel between and within states. Interstate disputes of whatever nature should be submitted to the International Congress, which would be also the highest and final court. There has been a good deal of silly differentiation between "justiciable" and "non-justiciable" disputes, but there's nothing that's one or the other but thinking makes it so. All group disputes are justiciable if public opinion says they are. When the International Congress has passed on them, they are settled. Failure to accept the decision of the Congress should automatically constitute a challenge of international power and be dealt with accordingly.

The devices for dealing with such failure are not exclusively military. The military machine, indeed, should be the last resort. Initially, there is the tremendous force of public opinion, which the Church wielded in the middle ages as the Excommunication and the Interdict. These should be revived. The economic, social, cultural, or total ostracism of states or portions of states involves tremendously less hardship and suffering than actual military assault and in the long run is bound in an industrial society like ours to attain the same end, far more than in earlier, less interdependent ones.

What degree of coercive power these provisions would have at the outset will depend of course on the will of the signatories to any international constitution not to turn it into a scrap of

paper. The governmental organs of the public will can be regulated only by the public opinion of each state, and the public opinion of each state can be kept internationally-minded only by means of the completest publicity regarding all international relationships. Publicity and education are the cornerstone of any international system that shall be democratic. Hence the rule of publicity is a paramount limitative rule.

The foregoing provisions would, I believe, supply the coercive force the lack of which rendered the American Confederation so instructive a failure. That they will absolutely prevent war cannot be claimed. Even the Constitution of the United States failed to do that, and the interstate unity it provided for became a permanent constituent of American political common-sense only with the Civil War. No doubt history on the terrestrial scale will repeat history on the continental. No doubt there will be, as in America, blocs and combinations within the combination, nullification and attempts at dissolution; but there will be in operation also, as in America, a definitely formulated, agreed to principle of unity, insuring mankind against a great many wars almost certain to come without it.

Yet the chief power of this insurance would reside in the function of liberation that the instruments of internationality would perform. Those turn on the satisfaction of the basic wants of men, and the consequent release of their spontaneous energies in the creative activities their natures crave. Such satisfaction and release demand, as we have already seen, a free trade in material commodities at least equivalent to the free trade in things of the spirit—in science, for example, or art, or music. It would be fundamental for the International Congress to create international commissions concerning themselves with the coordination of efforts to increase and properly distribute the food supply, to maintain and improve international health, to maintain and keep internationally open the world's highways, to secure the equality of all men before the law of any land, to expand and intensify the world's sense of community by internationally coordinated education.

Most of these functions have already been forced on the allied democracies by the exigencies of war; they would need only to be made relevant to conditions of peace. Such are the food and fuel administrations, acting purely in view of interna-

tional needs. Others existed long before the war. Such are the postal union, and Mr. David Lubin's indispensably serviceable agricultural institute, now living a starved life in Italy. Still others have gone on as voluntary and private enterprises. Such are the various learned societies, particularly the medical and the chemical societies. These would need endowment, endorsement, establishment under international rule. In none of these enterprises, please note, is a novel material necessary. All the institutions exist. Attention needs only to be shifted to their cooperative integration, expansion, and perfection by the conscious joint effort of the nations of the world to turn them into a genuine machinery of liberating international government.

The most important instrument of internationality is, however, education. Take care of education, Plato makes Socrates say in the "Republic," and education will take care of everything else. Internationally, education must rest on two principles: one, that it must be autonomous; the other, that it must be unprejudiced. Regarding the first: We have already seen how, in the case of Germany, the state's control of education laid the foundation for the present war. The school served the state's vested interest in the school. From the dark ages to the present day the Church has held a vested interest in the school, an interest from which events have more or less freed it, but which still makes itself felt. With the rise of private educational institutions or the secularization of theological ones—such as Harvard or Yale or Princeton—with the elaboration of the public school systems of the different states of this country or any other, the powers of government, visible or invisible, have determined largely what should and what should not be taught, what is true and what is false, always from the point of view of the interests of these powers. Heresy has been consistently persecuted, with means varying from the auto-da-fe of the Church to the more delicate tools of contemporary university trustees or school committees. Heresy consists of that which is not in accord with the interests or prejudices of the ruling power.

Now the art of education involves three forces: First, its theme—the growing child, whose creative spontaneities are to be encouraged, whose capacities for service and happiness are to be actualized, intensified, and perfected. Second, the investigator and inventor who discovers or makes the material and machin-

ery which are the conditions of the child's life and growth, which liberate or repress these. Third, the teacher who transmits to the child the knowledge of the nature and use of these things, drawing out its powers and enhancing its vitality by means of them. Obviously, to the last two, to the discoverers and creators of knowledge, and to its transmitters and distributors, to these and to no one else beside, belongs the control of education. It is as absurd that any but teachers and investigators should govern the art of education as that any but medical practitioners and investigators should govern the art of medicine. International law would best abolish this external control by making the communities of educators everywhere autonomous bodies, vigorously cooperative in an international union. Within this union the freest possible movement of teachers and pupils should be provided for, exchanges of both between all nations to the end of attaining the acme of free trade in habits and theories of life, in letters, and in methods.

Regarding the second principle of internationalized education—that it must be unprejudiced: This requires the systematic internationalization of certain subject-matters. In the end, of course, all subject-matters get internationalized. The process is, however, too slow and too dangerous with respect to some of these, history being the most flagrant. Compare any collection of history textbooks with any similar collection in physics, for example, and you will find the latter possessed of a unanimity never to be attained in the former. Why? Because every hypothesis in physics is immediately tested in a thousand laboratories and the final conclusion is the result of the collective enterprise of all sorts and conditions of physics. In the writing of history such cooperative verification never occurs. Most histories, particularly those put into the hands of children, utter vested interests, not scientifically tested results; they utter sectarian or national vanity, class privilege, class resentment, and so on. Compare any English history of the American Revolution with any American history! Fancy the wide divergence of assertion between friends and enemies in the matter of German atrocities! Naturally, the interpretation of historic "fact" must and should vary with the interpreter, but the designation of the same "fact" should clearly be identical for all interpreters. To

keep education unprejudiced requires therefore the objective designation of historic fact—"historic" to mean the recorded enterprise of all departments of human life. The "facts" of history should be attested by an international commission. So the second function of education is served.

With this we have established the full pattern of the house of peace—an international democratic congress, limiting armaments, judging disputes, coordinating and harmonizing the great national institutions by means of which men get food and clothing and shelter and health and happiness, making for a free exchange of all excellence, punishing default with interdict or excommunication or war, resting its authority upon public opinion and strengthening it by internationalized education.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

The experience of Rome in ancient times shows us what the Empire of the Caesars did for the enfranchisement and peace of the universe, so long as it continued to be a league of nations. The peoples which made up that Empire did not depend upon an Emperor, but upon a political association, a body of senators, magistrates, and citizens; and they realized that they had at the same time a great and a smaller country.

This happy equilibrium was destroyed on the day when the Roman Empire undertook to transform itself into a single entity; when it ceased to be an organization of different nations and cities, and mingled all that it included in one confused whole, without proper differentiation.

In the Middle Ages we have the example of the Church, which exercised rights of sovereignty in each of the states under its jurisdiction. Its role in the termination of wars, in the conclusion of treaties, affords an example of numerous supra-national interventions which were effective down to the period when religious authority was checkmated by the coming of modern times and the development of lay elements.

More recently still, it has been impossible to disregard the

¹ By Albert Thomas, Leader of the new (French) Socialist Party of the Right. Atlantic Monthly. p. 677. November, 1918.

scope of international conventions; for example, those which were created to abolish slavery and to establish the Universal Postal Union.

Since the meeting of the Anti-Slavery Conference at London, that is to say, from 1841 to 1910, there have been 175 inter-governmental conferences, some of which have met with quasi-regularity; for instance, there have been fifteen geodesic conferences, thirteen sanitary, and eight penological.

Lastly, there have been the conferences at The Hague, where we find a significant alignment of the powers in making important decisions. When, in 1907, the nations had assembled to enter into compulsory arbitration treaties among themselves, the main principle was ratified by thirty-five votes, with only five in opposition—those of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Roumania, and Turkey. That is to say, only eleven years ago, at the time of signing the arbitration treaties, the Entente stood almost solidly on one side, with the neutrals, while on the other side were the Central Empires and their allies. In these beginnings, made in the face of opposition, we see the first form of that League of Nations which, since the war began, has resolved itself into the present system of inter-Allied relations. In the federation of all the nations who are fighting for the Right; not one is, at this moment, acting with entire independence. They must, one and all, unite and act together, not only in what concerns their armies, but also in respect to the general conduct of all the diplomatic and political affairs of the Alliance.

In face of the unity of control of the enemy, the restrictions upon their individual sovereignty to which the Allied nations assent go constantly deeper and deeper. Every day further progress is made among them toward a closer and closer bond of union, a subordination of all alike to the common, higher interest which guides them and unites them in this conflict.

This bond of union, freely accepted, and this subordination of all to the general interest, have extended from the general conduct of the war to the domain of supplies, of finances—in a word, step by step, to the whole life of the nations.

The reciprocal oversight thus exercised does not appear in the light of an annoyance or an encroachment but, on the contrary, as a guaranty and constant assurance of the continuity

and fair distribution of the efforts of each one of the nations in the common struggle.

In this closely knit bond of the Entente, the smaller nations are neither sacrificed, nor even subordinated more than the greater ones, to the general interest. But they feel that they stand on an equality as to their rights, no less than as to their duties, in the councils which decide upon the common action and upon the means of putting it in execution. It was these councils which reached an agreement to define our war-aims. They will lay down our terms of peace also, which will include no private terms for any member of the Entente.

We see, then, that it has been found to be necessary, in order to bring the war to a successful issue, to establish between the various nations of the Entente a system of international relations, more strictly defined and more restrictive of their individual sovereignty than would be possible in times of peace. And this is the decisive, peremptory argument which answers by anticipation all the objections as to practical obstacles in the way of the creation of the League of Nations. What remains to be solved is nothing in comparison with what has been solved and with the benefits we may expect to derive therefrom.

If the League of Nations had been in existence in August, 1914, Germany probably would not have declared war; but even if she had dared to do so in defiance of the conventions signed by her, all the nations which are willing to guarantee justice and the law would have found themselves compelled to enter at once into the conflict. Instead of intervening without concert and one by one, all the nations of the Entente would have come forward together, armed and ready to defend the Right, at the precise moment in August, 1914, when the crime was committed.

Such is the world-organization at which we aim, and which has been proved to be practicable by the experience of four years of war. It is in process of realization; to perfect it, nothing more is needed than perseverance on the part of the governments, and the concurrence of all the free nations.

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To progress from the anarchical condition of the world before the war to a complete organization deserving the name of a League of Nations in the fullest sense of the word—that will

unquestionably be a long, long road; but we can clearly make out the first stage, which we can traverse during the war.

A court of arbitration must be set up—that is to say, a method of procedure for settling controversies between nations, analogous to that which has already been resorted to in a certain number of cases. But to avoid the repetition of an experiment which was tried in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and of which the acid test of this war has demonstrated the inadequacy, we must invest the tribunal with the function of drawing up the rules to be applied, and reinforce it with the power to execute them.

In reply to President Wilson's eloquent appeal in favor of compulsory arbitration, we saw last year the Central Empires, and even the Sultan of Turkey himself, give in a solemn adhesion to the principle. There was just one small restriction: the principle of arbitration was accepted by the representatives of our adversaries only with reservation of the 'vital interests' of either of the three Empires concerned. We know to-day, by the example of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, what those Empires mean by their 'vital interests,' and how far they carry their contempt of the most legitimate interests of other nationalities.

Of course, nations more considerate of the rights of others might refrain from such excesses; but we must recognize none the less that an attitude of distrust with respect to any given system of unconditional arbitration is altogether justifiable, even for states honestly well disposed to the principle.

The supra-national organization should therefore take for its immediate task to establish the essential rights likely to be agreed upon by the participating nations. General formulae are not enough. Upon general formulae the whole world may declare itself to be in accord—even Chancellor von Hertling and President Wilson; but as soon as we come to precise applications, unconquerable opposition appears.

The supra-national organization will have to study one after another, in connection with the great principles offered for its scrutiny, the formulae and the rules capable of transforming a general platonic ideal into a workable law, susceptible of practical judicial execution.

This scheme may seem over-ambitious, and so it would be, in

fact, if it were proposed to solve all questions at a single stroke; to secure at the first attempt a complete code of relations between the different states. But we consider, on the contrary, that, in this more surely than in any other matter, the questions to be solved must be divided into categories. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Let us give to this organization, to begin with, the general commission to establish and maintain between its constituents, as well as with regard to all others, the law of nations as defined by parties contracting under it.

This would relieve us from the necessity of bothering our minds immediately about a host of problems, and would also enable us to promulgate the most essential and most urgent rules looking to the conclusion of the present conflict.

But when these rules shall have been once laid down, when the law of nations shall have been formulated, there will still be left for us to face the most serious difficulty of all—the stumbling-block which has thus far caused the breakdown of all the plans of the pacifists: that is to say, the creation of an executive force at the service of this law, and of penalties to be imposed upon those who may be tempted to violate it.

Such penalties are possible; different categories have been suggested. The first, which have sometimes aroused a smile of incredulity, have nevertheless real merit. They take the form of an appeal to be made to public opinion, to the opinion of the whole world. Our adversaries, who, at the beginning of the war, defied this opinion so far as possible, have finally recognized its importance. They have put forth their utmost efforts, by means of a propaganda no less false than frantic, to reverse, not only in neutral countries, but among the Allies, the moral judgment which they saw to be altogether adverse to them. They have resorted to all possible methods to cast upon us the responsibility for the conflict, or, at least, for its continuance. And this fact demonstrates the unquestionable efficacy of moral penalties.

There are also the economic penalties, the most potent of which are the boycott, reprisals, expulsions, sequestrations, judicial isolation, the economic blockade, and the abolition or restriction of international commerce.

All these methods, which have been utilized during the war, must be retained after the war, against powers which might

still claim to dominate the world; which should refuse to recognize the rules and principles established by common action. Our adversaries attach very great importance to this species of coercion. They are tremendously anxious to find out to what extent and for how many years the 'economic weapon' will be used against them after the cessation of hostilities.

It is certain that this economic weapon is to-day, and will remain, a most powerful one in the hands of the Allies. But in order to assure the possibility of its employment as long as may be necessary, we must be prepared to support it at need by military force.

At this point, we have to deal with the problem of creating a military force in the service of the law of nations, whose duty it shall be to compel obedience to the decisions made by the League of Nations; and we find ourselves confronted by two equally vital requirements which seem contradictory. On the one hand, we are convinced that, if this war does not result in lessening for the future the burden of an armed peace, we shall have accepted to no purpose all the sacrifices which it has already cost us. And, on the other hand, unless we are to fall asleep prematurely in the delusions from which our Russian friends have just had such a cruel awakening, we face the necessity of maintaining, in the service of the very peace that we seek to establish, a force strong enough to punish infractions of plighted faith.

But these two requirements are not so incompatible as they seem at first sight. If the limitation of armaments were imposed on every state, we can readily see that the sum of the forces of all the others exerted against an isolated state would be irresistible. It would be essential, of course, that there should be perfect coördination between these forces—a connection so intimate as to assure their immediate, simultaneous, and therefore effective employment. But there would be no need to place all the national armies under a single, absolute supra-national command; it would suffice to maintain, in times of peace, the close relation which already exists between the Allied armies.

Whatever the difficulties in the way of carrying through such a scheme, the fact remains that we cannot evade the problem. If we do not solve it, we shall fall back sooner or later

into the condition of rivalry and competition in armaments with which the world was familiar before the present war.

Doubtless the composition of this international military force will be the most delicate question for the League of Nations to settle. But other essential questions will demand settlement with equal urgency, immediately upon the advent of peace, and even before it is concluded.

Provision will have to be made for the economic life of the nations which have taken part in the conflict, and for distributing among them raw materials and the means of subsistence.

Finally, there will have to be provided a supra-national authority which will be indispensable in the matter of liquidating the finances of the various states and enabling them to return to a normal economic régime after the tremendous upheavals caused by the war in the economic life of the whole world.

Again, it will be necessary to appeal for the intervention of the supra-national authority to settle many peculiarly delicate and complex questions, as, for example, censuring the neutrality or the freedom of the Dardanelles.

Here, then, are certain very urgent, very clearly defined tasks, which we offer for the action of the League of Nations. It alone can perform them, and reestablish order after the immense upheaval which will leave in utter disarray the men and the bodies politic of the world before the war. On all sides new problems and duties arise, and it is enough to enumerate them, to show that, beside the skeptics who do not believe in the League of Nations, beside the wise men who postpone them to a later date, if we are idealists,—in other words, fools,—we are very positive idealists.

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There has been a deal of discussion as to whether Germany should be admitted to the League of Nations, or be debarred therefrom. It is for her alone to furnish the reply.

It is quite evident that imperialist and militarist Germany, which assumes to impose her domination upon Europe and to hold the civilization of the twentieth century under the perpetual menace of her big guns, could find no place in a league of nations destined to establish and maintain respect for the Law. But we should commit a serious mistake if we imagined that Germany forms a single mass, inspired solely by the ideal

of its General Staff, and sharing all its aspirations. However feeble the reaction in Germany may be, it exists; numerous strikes offer to the observer unmistakable signs of internal disturbances, and presage, if not a revolution, at least an evolution.

It is this evolution which the world awaits. It is this evolution which President Wilson predicts in the masterly address delivered on July 4 last, at the tomb of Washington:—

"The blinded rulers of Prussia have roused forces they knew little of—forces which, once aroused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph."

Lord Grey of Fallodon, in a pamphlet recently published, declares that the Allies cannot save the world if Germany herself remembers nothing of the lessons of the war; if she does not realize that militarism is the deadly enemy of mankind.

To the same purpose Lord Curzon said in a recent speech in the House of Lords, "It is essential that there shall be a general agreement among the nations; and to obtain a useful result, all the nations on earth must become parties to it."

From all these solemn and impartial declarations it follows that we must not only conquer Germany, but convert her. And that will be the great, the supreme victory to which President Wilson beckoned us when he defined the principles of the League of Nations.

THE DEFEATISTS¹

One by one the enemies of President Wilson's plan of a League of Nations as the instrumentality of impartial justice at the Peace Conference are coming out into the open. . . .

A peculiarly interesting declaration of hostility has recently appeared in the *Villager*, a journal of limited circulation in Westchester County, New York, whose expressions of opinion derive exceptional significance from the ability of its editor. It protests against Mr. Wilson's uncompromising association of a League of Nations with America's war aims, for reasons which,

¹ *New Republic*. p. 327. October 19, 1918.

if true, would condemn the whole project as impracticable and dangerous. "We can and must defeat Germany," says the *Villager*, "but we cannot defeat her ambition." "We cannot change her heart." The Germans are incorrigible. The Allies should treat them as if under no circumstances could they become worthy of confidence. The dominant object of the peace settlement should be the permanent organization of a preponderance of power, not to promote impartial justice, but to guarantee the future safety of an anti-German alliance. A nation such as Germany has proved herself to be will cease to be dangerous only because she ceases to exert power and only in so far as she ceases to exert power. Any association of nations which may result from the President's efforts should be designed as an instrument of force so overwhelming that a policy of future discrimination against Germany would be irresistible.

The attitude towards the problem of winning the war registers a frank and an illuminating departure from the former attitude of such journals. Last fall and winter they protested against any statement or discussion of war aims because, they said, victory was the only war aim. Military victory would be all sufficient and would by its own intrinsic virtue teach the German people the indispensable lesson and deliver the world from the threat of German domination. But now that military victory is imminent, the *Villager* assures us that it is not sufficient and is not the only war aim. The defeat which the Allied armies are inflicting on the Germany army at such a terrific cost will not impair the predatory disposition of the German people. The Allies must continue the war after the war. The measure and guarantees of the ultimate victory do not derive from military success, no matter how overwhelming. They derive from the political policy which prevails during and after the peace conference. That policy, according to journals such as the *Villager* and statesmen such as Senator Lodge, must be determined chiefly by the politics of power. Military victory in the war, having failed to effect any change for the better in the disposition of the German people, military policy and military values should mould the terms of peace.

Thus conservatives are now beginning to admit the impotence of military victory alone to assure the greater and more permanent political victory upon which the winning of the war

finally depends. They are in this respect coming around to the position which has been occupied by the *New Republic* before and since America entered the war. They concede the need of supplementing a victory of the Allied soldiers with a victory of Allied statesmanship. But the political policy with which they propose to secure the fruits of military victory is in sharp conflict with that proposed by the President. After concealing for many months their political solution of the war under the dictum that victory was the only war aim, and after condemning all discussion of Allied political purposes as an attempt to win the war with words; they are now gathering to defeat the solution which the President has explicitly and repeatedly proclaimed to be the official policy of the American government. They may well succeed, for they represent a deeply rooted tradition (that of "*macht-politik*")—and intense emotion (that of fear, hatred and revenge)—and a powerful body of interest and opinion in all the Allied countries (that which seeks to preserve the international status quo ante). But if they succeed, they will succeed also in frustrating the generous emotions in defeating the liberal purposes and in preventing the salutary political results which the liberal democratic leadership has associated with the cause of the Allies. What boots it if we break up Middle Europe, emancipate the Slavs, and root out the Turks if we do not take advantage of the victory over imperialism to organize a new society of nations based on equality of right?

We wonder whether they have fully considered the implications and consequences of their possible success in substituting a victory of power for Mr. Wilson's proposed victory of justice. In the address to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Germany the President clearly indicated the liberal and ultimately conciliatory nature of the political purposes of which military victory was to be the instrument. In his subsequent series of war papers and speeches, he reiterated and expanded his original proposal for a League of Free Nations as the essential agency of international justice, and for a permanent political defeat of Prussian power politics. As a result of these pledges hundreds of thousands of his fellow-countrymen entered the war sustained by the conviction that they were fighting to give birth to a new world of international peace and justice. Reassured and fired by his words, labor leaders in France and Great

Britain persuaded thousands of their followers to overcome war weariness and to support their governments without flinching. His winged words were distributed in enemy countries for the particular purpose of gaining confidence of the Bulgarian, Austrian and German people, and of making them believe in the disposition of the Allied governments to work for impartial justice. During all this time these doubters and opponents of the President's plan, except in one or two instances, remained silent. They permitted the victory for which all were working to be associated with the League of Nations. They conducted no propaganda in the press which clearly revealed to the world the existence of any quarrel between Americans as to the final political solution of the war. They never raised in Congress the question of repudiating the pledge made by the President of American participation in the League. They were satisfied with suppressing their own fears, scruples and convictions, and with abusing those of the President's supporters who emphasized the need of associating the winning of the war with the formation of a League of Nations. Yet now in spite of the unqualified nature of the President's pledge, the extent to which it is believed by the plain people in all countries and the suppression hitherto of overt opposition, his enemies are now planning to defeat it. If they succeed, the American citizens and the citizens of other countries who accepted the President's pledge at its face value would be tempted not without reason to charge the American government with being perfidious.

It is these opponents of the League of Nations who are the genuine defeatists. If the vindictive passions which they incarnate dominate the work of the peace conference, democracy will have fought the war in vain. For no sooner is military victory assured than the opponents of democratic internationalism proclaimed the moral and political ineffectuality of what the armies have achieved. We must treat the Germans, although defeated, just as if they were not defeated. We must fear them just as much, and we must take just as many precautions against them. And because we fear them we must use our victory over them chiefly to make them fear us. We must treat them, that is, much as they would have treated us and neutralize the necessary lack of impartial justice in our policy by a preponderance of power. In fine, we must ourselves adopt perma-

nently a politics based on power as a safeguard against the possibility of German recovery. We must ourselves organize into an international system the Prussian "*macht-politik*" as a precaution against its use by the Prussians. They are ready to have Prussianism conquer us just at the moment of our victory over Prussia. It is from this fate that the President has sought and still seeks to save the western democracies by organizing the League of Free Nations. If we needed any further proof that there was no other way, the arguments and the alternative policy of his critics would supply it. They postulate the impossibility of any change in the disposition of the German people as the reason for a permanent system of international discrimination against Germany which would itself act as an insuperable barrier to any such change. The Germans would be offered a choice between being the victims of the new world order or its conquerors. If the counsel of these men is followed, the Allies will be apotheosizing force and perpetuating war as the best method of securing the fruits of a military victory won by the proclaimed guardians of democratic liberty.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

How stands the project of the League of Nations? Does it go forward or is it simply marking time? Since I wrote on this subject in the July number of *The Fortnightly Review* two important discussions have taken place in the British Parliament. On June 26th the long-adjourned debate in the House of Lords on Lord Parmoor's motion was resumed, and Lord Curzon made a carefully worded declaration of policy. On August 1st the House of Commons discussed the project for the first time, and Mr. Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil spoke favourably and hopefully. The Foreign Secretary said that he was prepared to preach the doctrine "vehemently," and there are not many themes which can move Mr. Balfour to vehemence. Lord Robert Cecil was of opinion that "a workable plan for establishing this safeguard against war in the future could be found," and it was the

¹ By J. B. Firth, member of the editorial staff of the London *Daily Telegraph*. In *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1918. p. 367.

same Minister who declared on another occasion that he could not remain for an hour in any Administration which was not pledged to the League of Nations. When Lord Curzon was asked to say definitely whether the Government were in earnest, he replied "Yes," and added that they were carefully exploring its possibilities. As for the Prime Minister, he never loses an opportunity of applauding the principle, though he eschews details. Moreover, on this subject there is no fear of trouble from the Opposition. Alas! The League of Nations has become a popular catchword. If there is to be a General Election late in November or December, all the political parties will have to subscribe to it, and every candidate will pledge himself to support any practical scheme that may be put forward. The pledge will not amount to much, for anyone who refused to subscribe to what he believed to be a practical proposal for a League of Nations for the prevention of war, with the awful experiences of this war before his eyes, would be either a German or a fiend. But that, unfortunately, will not bring the ideal an inch nearer to the grasp of human statesmen. It is certain, therefore, that the British Government will continue to explore the possibilities of the idea in the hope of evolving a workable scheme, and that they and the United States will not be satisfied till they have persuaded their Allies to join with them in setting up some new instrument of international machinery for the prevention of war, which they will call the League of Nations.

The British Government have already taken one important step. They appointed some months ago "a very well-chosen Committee"—the description is Mr. Balfour's—"on which international law and history were powerfully represented," to examine and report. The report has been drawn up, but its contents have not been divulged. Neither Lord Curzon nor Mr. Balfour alluded to it; they did not even say that it had been considered by the War Cabinet. By a curious coincidence the same official reticence is being observed in France. There, too, an authoritative Commission, presided over by M. Bourgeois, was appointed by the Government, and issued its Report last January. But it has not yet been published in France, and, according to Lord Curzon, no copy of it had reached the British Government on June 26th. Why this secretiveness, both in London and Paris? If there had been practical unanimity in favour

of the project there could be no reason for reserve. But it is far more likely that the Commissioners have reported in a critical spirit and that the two Governments do not think it discreet to make known the fact, lest the powerful friends of the movement should be discouraged. Inasmuch as the establishment of a League of Nations has been put forward as one of the principal war aims of the Allies, it would be a little disconcerting if serious differences of opinion were disclosed among the Allies as to the practicability of the idea. The chief sponsor of the League of Nations is President Wilson, and it is in the United States that the most active propaganda in its favour is being carried on. They will have the whole world with them—save an unregenerate Germany—if they can offer the nations of Europe what they all desire above everything else, *viz.*: Security. But hitherto the French and British Governments seem to have had little luck in the search which they have conducted on their own account.

In fact, the more closely Lord Curzon's pronouncement is studied, the more certain does it become that at any rate the immediate realisation of the League of Nations as a League to Enforce Peace is outside the range of practical politics. (That description of the League, it should be observed, drew heated protests in the House of Commons from Pacifist speakers, though a League of Nations which cannot "enforce" peace will obviously not be able to prevent war, and the prevention of war is surely the final cause of the League.) Lord Curzon, for example, pointedly reminded the House of Lords that opinion in this country was "rather in advance of the opinion of any of our Allies save the United States," and he said that if the British Government went ahead too quickly, or too abruptly, there was danger of a rebuff. That is the official way of stating that British opinion is very much in advance of Continental opinion, and the truth is that nothing like the same attention has been paid to the subject in the French and Italian newspapers as in the British. And although the Report of the French Commission has not been published, it is an open secret that its judgment was adverse to any proposal for establishing an international force which shall be always ready to enforce the decisions of the League upon a recalcitrant member. That is a fact of the utmost consequence, for this international force is vital to the

establishment of a really effective League of Nations. It is the very keystone of the arch. The French Commission has knocked it out, and it may be shrewdly suspected that the British Committee has done the same. Is it not, therefore, an extraordinary fact that during the discussion in the House of Commons a month later not a single member alluded to the French decision, and the two Ministers steered far away from this dangerous rock? It must have been present to their minds, for all the speakers avowed themselves warm friends of the idea of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, they kept this circumstance in the background, and with it the equally important fact that Lord Curzon himself had also most unmistakably ruled out this international force when speaking on behalf of the Government on June 26th. The passage is so important that it must be quoted textually:—

"We must try to get some alliance, or confederation, or conference, to which these states shall belong, and no state in which shall be at liberty to go to war without reference to arbitration, or to a conference of the league, in the first place. Then if a state breaks the contract it will become, *ipso facto*, at war with the other states in the league, and they will support each other, *without any need for an international police*, in punishing or repairing the breach of contract. Some of them may do it by economic pressure. This may apply perhaps to the smaller states. The larger and more powerful states may do it by the direct use of naval and military force. In this way we may not indeed abolish war, but we can render it a great deal more difficult in the future."

Exit, therefore, the international force, and with it, as I believe, any prospect of an effective League of Nations, because with it goes the League's sanction. Lord Curzon leaves the coercion of a recalcitrant Power to the mutual support of the other members of the League. They may use economic pressure or they may use military pressure. Apparently there are to be no neutrals. All are, *ipso facto*, to be at war with the offending Power. They will have to decide among themselves who shall do the fighting. It will not be an easy or a quick decision. The chances of the League being solidly united and welded together by the same interests and the same motives are small. The more powerful the transgressor, the smaller the chances and the greater the reluctance to set their forces in motion. The abandonment of the idea of an international army involves the abandonment of the real efficiency of the League itself. Mr. J. M. Robertson's contention was sound that a League of Nations ought to command the immediate services of a strong

military force, and he suggested, therefore, that "all members of the League should undertake to contribute, in the event of it being required, a certain contingent of military force to be used under the direction of the League in the carrying out of the League's decisions." That is the clear logic of the position. But, unfortunately, as the French Commission admits, it is wholly impracticable. . . . Let anyone consider the perpetual intrigues of the campaigns and alliances against Frederick the Great, or the squabbling in the Crimea where, as Kinglake says, the alliance of the Western Powers "lay in abeyance for five days," while St. Arnaud and Raglan were completely at cross purposes. Or, coming to more modern days, let Mr. MacNeil recall the tedious wrangling in the so-called Concert of Europe over the simple appointment of a Mixed Commission of European officers in Macedonia before the Balkan wars, or the irritation that arose over the officering of the gendarmerie in Persia, or the insane jealousies which attended the preposterous international expedition which was sent to China to put down the Boxers, and he will, if he is candid, expect nothing but failure and disappointment from an international army. Does he find his Irish omens so encouraging? If the *flebilis unda* of a ditch like the Boyne cannot be bridged, how will he span the boundary rivers of Europe? How can these idealists talk airily about the establishment of an international army or the dispatch of an international expedition to deal with an aggressor against the League of Nations, when they see how long it has just taken Japan and the United States to come to an understanding on the subject of joint action in Siberia? Every hour was of priceless value. Both Powers knew that the rehabilitation of Russia would be as deadly a blow to Germany as her humiliating secession from the ranks of the Allies was a complete triumph. Yet the days and weeks were suffered to slip by for political reasons which are perfectly well known and thoroughly understood. Will it be any different when there is a League of Nations? The military difficulties are equally insuperable. Would not an international army require an international General Staff? If the international army were to be ready for prompt and immediate action, would it not be necessary to concert measures beforehand and draw up plans of campaign? And if all the Great Powers of the world were members of the League, would not

this lead to extraordinarily embarrassing situations? A proposal of this enormous magnitude is either practicable or impracticable. If it is fantastic, the super structure built upon its insecure foundation comes toppling to the ground. But that is just what the enthusiastic advocates of the League of Nations refuse to recognise. In spite of Lord Curzon's explicit rejection, the international army still continues to find a place in the various schemes that are put forward, because it is necessary for their full and logical completion, and the fatal difficulties in the way of its effective fulfilment are ignored as though they did not exist.

The idea of the League of Nations is most popular where least understood. Credulity, as usual, is being freely exploited. People are encouraged to assume that the problem is simple, that President Wilson has an infallible plan, and that the duty of the Allies is to follow his lead with trusting faith. Where the dull eyes of British or European statesmen cannot pierce the gloom, his can. Where they fail in pure idealism, he will succeed. Some of the most earnest advocates of the League think it enough to "Laugh at impossibilities, And cry 'It shall be done.'" Professor Gilbert Murray, in the course of an eloquent pamphlet, dismisses the problem of how to enforce peace in a single sentence. "A number of nations," he says, "which act together can be strong enough to check an aggressor, though no one of them alone is so strong as to threaten its neighbours." That is true enough as a bare theoretical possibility, and it is the only passage in the pamphlet in which he alludes to the force at the disposal of the League. But is this a fair way to present the case, when it has taken the Allies four years to "check" the prodigious onslaughts of Germany, and the war is still being waged on Allied soil? In all these discussions it is Germany who must be considered as the potential contract breaker: it is Germany who, on her past history and on her theory of the rights of the strongest, will be the probable aggressor; it is Germany, therefore, for whose "checking" adequate provision must be made. The truth is that it is just the enormous strength of Germany, therefore, for whose "checking" adequate provision must be made. The truth is that it is just the enormous strength of Germany which makes the advocates of the League so earnest in their endeavours to establish it, and which also makes its effective establishment so utterly impossible.

To judge from their Press, Germans believe that, if the worst comes to the worst, they need only offer to join what is contemptuously called "the Wilson-Grey League of Nations" and the Allies will welcome them with joy to the fold. If the Allies are content with such an ending, the League of Nations will be a death trap for the free peoples of Europe, whatever it may be for America, which, from her size and situation, stands in a separate category. Germany, in that case, will not be defeated, and German militarism will not be overthrown, for the world will not be made safe for Democracy until the Hohenzollerns have been dethroned and Germany has been compelled to make restitution for her crimes. There is no occasion to talk about war indemnities. If the Central Powers are made to pay merely for the havoc they have wrought, and to restore the factories and machinery of which they have so cunningly stripped the industrial districts of Belgium and Northern France, they will be financially crippled for long years to come. The whole German people, which shares the guilt of its rulers and would greedily share their plunder, must be convinced that war does not pay by experiencing the ruinous expensiveness of defeat. Moreover, as Mr. Balfour has well said, one of the principal duties of any League of Nations will be to maintain the "tolerable territorial status" which must be established before the League can start with any prospect of success. That involves a drastic rearrangement of the map of Europe, involving the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, the creation of a new Poland, the destruction of the Turkish Empire and the re-creation of a great Russia. What a gigantic programme is spread before us! The problems of the Congress of Vienna were childishly simple compared with these, and surely it is worth while baring in mind that the plenipotentiaries of the victorious Allied nations quarrelled so bitterly among themselves at that Congress that they were actually on the point of turning their arms against one another, when they were startled into sanity by the news that the Devil had broken loose again and was marching on Paris. Let this, too, be remembered, that the Congress which meets at the conclusion of this war to re-frame the boundaries of Europe will be required to satisfy the intense longings of an irrepressible Nationalism! And yet at one and the same time it is to be

actuated by the new spirit of internationalism and brotherhood by which alone the world can be saved.

There are, indeed, some hardy thinkers who profess to see no contradiction here, and scarcely even a paradox. Internationalism, they say, must be based upon nationalism, which is very much what the moral philosophers say when they define altruism as enlightened selfishness. Fresh from his prayerful *séances* with Madame Krudener, Alexander I, talked in precisely the same evangelical style rather more than a century ago, but that did not prevent him from falling under the influence and proving the aptest pupil of Metternich. Everyone knows that nationalism is infinitely stronger than internationalism. Lawyers talk about the surrender of sovereignty. If it is surrendered to-day, it will be taken back tomorrow. Remember Canning's exultant cry when he shook himself—and England—loose from the bonds and restraints of the European Alliance which had grown so irksome. "No more Aeropagus now! England will be free to look after her own interests in her own way." What is the real, permanent, instinctive feeling of insular Britons towards Alliances and Leagues? When the danger from which we have escaped is but an evil memory, when the peril ahead seems faint and distant, when the enemy is fawning and protesting and "Kamerading," and insidiously getting back to his foothold, what will be the instinct of the average Briton? If someone astutely revives the once popular cry of "Splendid Isolation," will not his heart leap up at the sound? If there is any prospect of war and British interests are not directly and vitally concerned, and if the League of Nations desires the British Government not merely to use the British Fleet—that very likely would not be unpopular—but to dispatch a military expedition on a large scale, involving conscription, what then? Who would be the first to protest if not the Socialists and Radicals who are now so hot and strong for the League? These surely are fair questions. Great Britain, naturally, has always been the most insularly minded Power in Europe. She has from time to time been the backbone of Continental alliances, but always when the direct danger to her has blown over she has relapsed to her ancient insular mood. This has often been made a ground of reproach to her; it has been said that she is a bad European. The Liberal tradition especially has almost always been a non-

European tradition. Is the country now ripe for a permanent change? He is bold, indeed, who would say so. We shall be told, of course, that the new internationalism will make all the difference and that a new era is to begin after the war which will continue even when the miseries of the present time begin to be forgotten. They are happy who believe it; they will be foolish who trust to it.

At present the Allied statesmen have no definite scheme of a League of Nations in their mind. They hope to make a beginning on much the same lines as the co-operation of the nations in the Hague Conventions. The members will doubtless give pledges to one another that in case of dispute they will not draw the sword until after they have laid their case before some Court of Conciliation, but whether they will pledge themselves to wage war on any wilful aggressor is a far more doubtful proposition. We may expect, also, a widespread extension of the system of arbitration treaties, on the lines of the one already in existence between Great Britain and the United States. But the first searching test question will be disarmament, and the nations will not disarm until they feel that they are safe and can trust the new international machinery that is set up for their mutual protection. There can be no Security—to use Mr. Pitt's famous catchword—unless German militarism is completely destroyed, together with the whole German system of which it is the spirit and the life. On that the first beginnings of a permanent League of Nations depend, and even when so much has been accomplished, nationalism will still find itself stronger than internationalism. Extravagant hopes are being aroused which can only end in bitter disappointment.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

"When the League of Nations," said Mr. Arthur Henderson, M. P., on January 22, 1918, "with its necessary machinery becomes an indispensable part of the national and international life, then, and then only, will it be possible for a world democracy to go forward to the full realization of its prosperity."

¹ Living Age. p. 113. July 13, 1918.

There is less in a League of Nations than is dreamed of in Mr. Henderson's philosophy, or even in that of President Wilson, as Sir F. E. Smith showed in his address to the New York Bar on January 11th. How is the question of military service to be settled, since if one Power has it and another has not, the weak will always be at the mercy of the strong? Or the freedom of the sea, when land powers might outvote sea powers? What of the alteration of frontiers and nationalities in the course of history? Or the problems of the air, when "peaceful" factories could turn out in secret unlimited quantities of war material? And if elementary questions such as these are unanswerable, what becomes of your League of Nations?

The League of Nations is no modern idea: it was tried nearly 2,500 years ago and found wanting. Go from Naples to Paestum, a Life of Piranesi in your hand, and you will see the most wonderful remains of Greek architecture extant with the exception of the temples at Athens. Among them are the remains of a Doric Basilica which Paranesi etched and called the House of the Amphictionic Council. That Council was the League of Nations of the democracies of the Ancient World, and its history is not without interest.

But, you say, those Ionians, Dorians, Phocians, Thessalonians, Magnesians and the rest who formed the League were not nations, but municipalities. In size, perhaps; but nations they were in days when it took as long to go from Athens to Messene or from Platea to Pella as it takes to go from London to New York. The world was smaller then, and analogies must be founded on position and not on population. Everything is relative. What happened when this Council tried to enforce its own rules? Look at its history, and remember that in the days of its greatest activity Demosthenes called it the shadow of a shade. Mr. Henderson will please note that.

The Council of the Amphictionic League was made up of representatives of twelve tribes, each with two votes. It met twice a year; at Delphi in the spring, at Anthela near Thermopylae in the autumn. Its duties were to watch over the interests of the Temple of Delphi and the Sacred Land; to regulate the relations of the leagued states in peace and war; to act as arbitrator; to take charge of roads and bridges; to arrange loans from the Treasury—and a levy on capital was not an unheard-

of measure on its part; to supervise the Pythian Games; to erect public monuments, one to Gorgias the orator, for instance, one to the heroes of Thermopylae; to adjust quarrels between members of the League, as in the case of the complaint of the Plataeans about the boastful inscription set up by Sparta on the monument at Delphi commemorating the battle of Plataea; to punish offenders against international law, as in the judgment passed on Ephialtes for his treachery in showing the Persians the secret path over the hills which enabled them to destroy Leonidas and his Immortals. It possessed the right of sanctuary, of which Orestes took advantage; it exempted religious bodies from military service. The Amphictionic oath bound each state not to level an offending city to the earth and not to cut off the water supply from a belligerent; the oath thus contemplated a state of war as anything but abnormal. And how was the oath carried out? Look at the history of the First Sacred War: the very name is an irony. The city of Crisa levied dues on the pilgrims who passed through its land to consult the Delphic Oracle, the Amphictionic Council declared a Holy War, and, after a favorable response from Apollo proceeded to divert the water supply, poison it with hellebore, and make a way into the weakened city, which was thereupon leveled with the ground: the Crisaean plain was laid waste with such "frightfulness" that it was still a scene of desolation in the days of Hadrian, six centuries later.

This Association of democratic neighboring states, with their representatives meeting at a common centre to transact business of the League and to celebrate religious rites, with its record of international law, its binding oaths, its claim to arbitrate, so as to ameliorate the horrors of war, its nominal equality of great and small, its plea for self-determination among smaller states, its guarantees against the abuse of power, presents an extraordinary parallel to the Hague Conference on the one hand and to the proposed League of Nations on the other. The result was just what might have been expected. Powerful democracies used the League for their own purposes, observed or ignored their obligations to suit themselves; there was no redress. Let those who hanker for a League of Nations recall the history of the democratic Amphictionic League; see it becoming the instrument of one powerful party after another, breaking its own

laws, its own oaths; see Delphi itself taking vengeance on Crisa, Thebes on Phocis, Thespiae, and Plataea; Argos on Mycenae, and see what comes of it in the end. As the First Sacred War had disclosed one member-city poisoning the waters of another, so the Second Sacred War showed the same cynical Welt-politik, followed in this instance by the tragedy of Chaeronea and the rise of Macedon. In the middle of the fourth century B. C., Thebes, having been successful in getting the Spartans fined for their seizure of the Cadmea, saw an opportunity of using the League in the same way against the rival state of Phocis. A number of prominent Phocians were fined for alleged sacrilege, the League decreeing that if the fine were not paid within the time prescribed, their lands should be confiscated for the benefit of Delphi. Thereupon the Phocians seized Delphi itself; the League met at Thermopylae and decided that an Amphictionic army should rescue the sacred city, whose treasures were being used by the Phocians to purchase new allies in the North. Thessaly, threatened by this move, turned for help to Philip of Macedon, and thus changed the history of the world. While Demosthenes urged the cause of liberty and thundered out his Phillipics, warning the Athenians of the intention of Macedon to subjugate all Greece, the League went on as usual. The board of temple builders met at Delphi; the Amphictionic Council—with the trifling exception of the anti-Phocian states—assembled as before; Dorians and Ionians sat side by side and talked and talked and talked in the peaceful Council Chamber, and held the Pythian Games; while the world outside was a welter of blood and confusion brought on it by the League.

The crazy Declaration of London was the fruit of the Hague Conference; the rise of Macedon the fruit of the Amphictionic League. By their fruits ye shall know them is as true of leagues and conferences as of men and states. Has the experience of the past no value for the future? Are we like the Bourbons, forever learning nothing, but, unlike them, forever forgetting? If so, we shall form and rely upon a League of Nations and talk and talk and talk, and cry out, when it is too late, for the regretted whips of independent states in place of the scorpions of "Allies" in a League of Nations who work in

secret and reward us openly with the penalties of a stupidity born of sloppy sentimentality, the offspring of self-deception.

Fear God and learn to take your own part, said George Borrow of the ancient city of Norwich. Not bad advice! If followed it will be more likely to prevent wrongdoing than will reliance on the insincerities of a League of Nations.

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE¹

We are not going to weary our readers by pointing out again, what we have so often pointed out in these columns, that the Holy Alliance, though started with the most genuine and sincere desire to form a League to Enforce Peace, ended in the erection of a reactionary tyranny, and that it took all the efforts of Castlereagh, Wellington, and Canning, together with enlightened Whig opinion in Britain, to prevent it from bringing about the destruction of liberalism throughout the world. How this happened is one of the most curious examples of the terrible nature of logic when working unrestrained in human affairs. If you have Leagues of Powers bound by a great common object which demands large sacrifices, the first thing that the constituent Powers must and will demand is a mutual guarantee of each other's national rights and interests. Before they can be sure of acting unanimously as a League they must be sure of not quarrelling among themselves. But they cannot be sure of doing this unless they are sure that there will be no interference—no attempt to curtail their own possessions and alter their own system of government. Hence any kind of international League is always bound to guarantee the *status quo*. But the *status quo* may in some particular country be the "negation of God erected into a system." This first stumbling-block the Holy Alliance tried to some extent to remove by means of periodic International Conferences which were to meet every three years and keep the various states of the world in good order. For example, the sixth article of the Holy Alliance bound the high contracting Powers to hold at fixed intervals "meetings consecrated to great common objects and the examination of such measures

¹ *Spectator*, October 14, 1916.

as at each one of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." The first of these meetings, the Conference held at Aix-la-Chapelle, can hardly be described as a success, except that it produced a perfectly admirable memorandum from Castlereagh in which he, like a true Briton, tried to find a sensible *via media* between the two extremes, and, while not attempting the impossible, to do something practical for the cause of peace. The words in which he discusses the Emperor Alexander's idea of a universal union of the Powers are so good that we cannot resist the temptation to quote them:—

"The problem of a Universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world," the memorandum runs, "has always been one of speculation and hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can be. But you may in practice approach towards it, and perhaps the design has never been so far realized as in the last four years. During that eventful period the Quadruple Alliance, formed upon principles altogether limited, has had, from the presence of the sovereigns and the unparalleled unity of design with which the Cabinets have acted, the power of travelling so far out of the sphere of their immediate and primitive obligations, without at the same time transgressing any of the laws of nations or failing in the delicacy which they owe to the rights of other states, as to form more extended alliances . . . to interpose their good offices for the settlement of difficulties between other states, to take the initiative in watching over the peace of Europe, and finally in securing the execution of its treaties. The idea of an Alliance Solidaire, by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government and possession within all other states from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised, the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the text to which it was abused. Till a system of administering Europe by a general alliance of all its states can be reduced to some practical form, all notions of a general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and the states must be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems, and the aid of other states according to the law of nations."

Before we leave the subject of the Conference at Aix-la-Chapelle we must not forget to mention the curious, but no doubt inevitable, result of the attempt to mitigate the hard logic of the guaranteed *status quo*. The Conference was, in effect, asked to act, and attempted to act, as a kind of European Supreme Court which heard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from Sovereigns and subjects alike. For example, the Elector of Hesse asked to be allowed to exchange his meaningless title for that of "King," a request which, Mr. Alison Phil-

lips tells us, was refused because it was not considered expedient to make the Royal style too common! The people of Monaco, again, presented a list of grievances against their Prince, while Bavaria and the Hochberg line of Princes referred to the Conference their quarrel about the succession in Baden. Finally, the situation of the Jews in Austria and Prussia was brought under discussion. But though these minor issues were either settled or got rid of, it will be found that jealousy of British sea power at once awoke, and threw obstacles in the way of even so great a benefit to humanity as the suppression of the slave trade. Though the Powers had agreed in principle to our carrying out this immense reform, they were not willing to accept that mutual right of search by which we sought to suppress it. Again, when it came to an attempt to mediate between Spain and her revolting colonies, the Powers could not agree. It is true that they succeeded in calling the King of Sweden to order; but, while obeying, he protested against the dictatorship arrogated to themselves by the Great Powers, a course in which he was backed up by the indignant King of Württemberg. No wonder that, when the Conference broke up with a considerably damaged reputation, Canning made the cynical but common-sense comment that "things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all! Only bid your Emperor be quiet, for the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by." That, we fear, must be our comment on all schemes like that of the League to Enforce Peace.

But is there no hope for peace? Yes, there is. If, as the result of this war, the world learns that it does not pay to act the part of Frederick the Great, and that in the end severe punishment falls on the promoters of such an evil policy, and if, further, the system of military autocracy can be made to give way to that of government of the people for the people by the people, we see no reason to doubt that peace may be maintained for another generation. More than that it is not safe to prophesy. But let us remember always that even if universal peace could be bought, the price we should have to pay for it would be too high. The price is international slavery.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

Now, I want to call attention to this, that once we have entered into a league of nations I assume that the Senator from Montana will admit that this league, its representative government, of whatever kind it may be, which has not yet been defined, will have power to curb any one of its constituent members from beginning a war against another member. Otherwise there will be no object whatever in forming it, as it would be no advance at all over the Hague convention which already exists, the worthlessness of which in the face of the perversities of human nature, as exemplified by the German nation, has shown to all the world.

Once we form this league, that league having the power, the league, and not any member of it, will determine what its powers shall be, whether they shall be curtailed or whether they shall be extended. That, in general, has been the tendency of the Federal Union in its relations with the states. The inventions of science, however, and the spread of intelligence have made our happy domain as one community. Its independence, its sovereignty, is the chief jewel in its crown. It cannot be surrendered without a struggle.

Only a few days ago on the floor of the Senate the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations committee said that in the question of international trade, as to whether or not there should be any discrimination between the United States and any other nation, that question would be determined by the league. Now, there is the whole proposition admitted away, for if this plan is adopted the power of determination has gone from the United States. It is in the hands of an alien power; it is in the hands of rival powers; it is in the hands of Europe. The United States will have surrendered its birthright; it will have given up the spirit as well as the fact of sovereignty. Your Monroe doctrine will be absorbed in your league of nations. It will become obsolete, as some of the internationalists have already been preaching, circulating pamphlets with the phrase, "The Monroe doctrine

¹ By Senator Miles Poindexter, of Washington. Congressional Record. p. 12662. November 15, 1918.

an obsolete shibboleth." That will become a realization if this league of nations that is proposed by the Senator from Montana, as near as I can gather his idea, is carried out.

Now, let us see. In the first place, I think the Senator is too optimistic, and I might say idealistic, to assume that as a result of this war the same passions and ambitions that have actuated the governments of nations in the past are not going to be in full play in the evolution of the future. Your league of nations is established. We all know that most of the European nations have never accepted, perhaps none of them in express terms, the validity of the position taken by the United States in setting up the so-called Monroe doctrine. They have not admitted its validity. The populations of these powers are going to increase, the struggle for existence, for bread, is going to continue in the future as it has in the past. The necessity for expansion and for colonization are not matters that are determined by the form of government or by the terms of peace. They are governed by fundamental influences, the primal instincts of man, and they are going to be in as full play after the terms of peace between Germany and the allies have been settled as they were at the time the Monroe doctrine was set up by the American statesman of a previous generation. Trade is going to be carried on. Rivalry and controversy about trade, about property rights, about personal rights, are going to arise. Does the Senator from Oklahoma suppose that Europeans are not going to seek business, to acquire property, to have rights in Mexico, in Brazil, in the Argentine Republic in the future as they have in the past? If he does, then it seems to me he leaves out of account the necessary continuity of the ambitions and activities of mankind. They are going to continue these activities.

Now, let us suppose that some question of that kind arises. The league of nations is in control. We set up the Monroe doctrine in opposition to some proposition of a European member of this league, of a protectorate or direct government control in order to protect the property, or the trade, or the person of its nationals in Central or South America or in Mexico. What is the result? It inevitably goes before the league. The constituted authority of the

league will pass on it, not the United States. They will determine it. Do you suppose that they are going to accept for their guidance the Monroe doctrine, which has never been admitted by them and which the United States alone, for its protection and for the preservation of a democratic form of government, has set up and maintained by physical power? Of course not. They are going to determine it according to their own ideas. The sovereignty of the United States in maintaining its doctrine, its principles, its tradition, its Constitution will be gone.

In the second place, Mr. President, a league of nations as proposed by the Senator from Oklahoma and the Senator from Montana and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Williams) who is not here, but whom I have heard express himself on this floor on that subject, would necessitate, if we are going to be governed by law, a revision of the Constitution of the United States. I know it has become quite unpopular nowadays to refer a question to the Constitution. But this league of nations which is proposed assumes, if it assumes anything at all, that the ultimate control in regard to war or peace rests in the league. Under the Constitution of the United States it rests in the Government of the United States, and if you take it away from that Government and submit it to a league, then you set aside your Constitution in effect, whether you do it expressly or not.

The idea that is always assumed, that such a league as is now proposed is in the interest of peace, is in the face of all history. We did not even prevent war in the United States by forming a Federal Union. The most gigantic war that the world had ever seen up to that time occurred between the constituent members of the league, or the Union, as it was called in that case. The Senator, as I said before, can not stop the rivalries and ambitions of men by joining them in a Federal league. They are going to continue whether you have a Federal league or not. The undertaking to interfere with the sovereign right of the United States to determine its policy; to set up a Monroe doctrine, if it sees fit; to levy a tariff against other nations; to make such shipping regulations as it proposed; and to give preferences to its own ships in passing through the Panama Canal, if it wants to, as

against the ships of other nations, will lead to trouble and to warfare instead of to that dream of peace which the Senator from Oklahoma has in mind. As a member of the league, instead of following the advice of Washington and keeping aloof as far as possible from the embroilments of other nations, we would be inextricably involved in the increasing complications of race and a party to every quarrel which growing populations and the struggle for land and trade will inevitably force upon the world.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

At a time like this, when a peace is about to be declared, a peace that is the most glorious of all history, a peace that was made possible by the valor and power of this country, it is proposed that we shall abandon our ancient and traditional peace and shall become entangled in every broil of Europe as these broils may now or as they may hereafter exist. It is the most monstrous doctrine ever proposed in this Republic. The sanctity of no great name can render it holy. The opinion of no man can make it safe.

Let me instance one thing: It is well known that prior to the war England, France, and Germany were busily engaged in extending their foreign territory for the purpose of extending their foreign trade. In a few years' time they absorbed practically all of the continent of Africa. It is also known that they looked with ambitious and greedy eyes toward South America; at least, Germany did, and we have some reasons to suspect that England not many years ago had like ambitions. Who will fail to remember that Grover Cleveland was obliged to almost threaten England with war in the matter of Venezuela? Assume, now, that we shall employ this mighty fleet which we are constructing to absorb the trade of South America—as we should—and that we shall begin to gain the business of that continent; assume that under some controversy which may arise there—a just controversy to begin with or a controversy created for the purpose—Germany, having been rehabilitated, were

¹ By Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri. Congressional Record. p. 12720. November 21, 1918.

undertake to establish herself in some South American country and were to propose to open that country to the trade of European countries on advantageous terms, what would be our chance before a court the majority of whose members represented the countries interested in getting that trade? You say my illustration is impossible: I say that in 10 years from now we may find our closest friend to-day the ally of a German state.

The history of the world shows this. The animosities of nations do not long endure when they have interests in common. A few years ago Prussia conquered Austria; they soon became allies. Many years Russia protected Bulgaria against the Turk, but this did not prevent Bulgaria from becoming the ally of Turkey against Russia. History teems with similar instances. In such a controversy as I have suggested, would it not be to the interest of every European country to destroy the dominance of America in the South American trade? Would it not be to the interest of Norway and of Sweden and of Holland and of Germany and of England and of France and of Spain and of Portugal, of all of them, to turn that trade which the United States had absorbed over to themselves? I might multiply illustrations. It is sufficient to suggest one. In a controversy of that kind, would we be safe? Dare any man propose to submit the Monroe doctrine to a tribunal of European kings or to a tribunal of European nation? I say, if such a man there is, he has forgotten the history of the Republic, the genius of our people, the soul of our institutions.

But, passing from that, I come to the question, What is to be the purpose of this league of nations? We are told that one of its objects is to guarantee the territorial integrity of nations. This in plain language means that we shall agree to prevent any one nation from invading the territory of another nation. Why, Mr. President, if we were to make that sort of compact, it would result that a nation could decline to carry out its agreements and bid defiance to any other nation, simply saying, "You have no power to invade us; you are held back by the international agreement, and if you invade us you will be crushed by the international army. Would a nation be permitted to thus refuse to fulfill its obligations or would the controversy be referred to a court? If so referred, we are at once confronted with all the

difficulties incident to a prejudiced or interested court, a topic already discussed.

Is the league to guarantee the stability of the governments of the different countries that are permitted to become members? If so, no monarchial or tyrannical government can ever be overthrown, because its power will be sustained by the league of nations. No oppressed people can rebel, because they must fight not only the unjust government of their own state, but they must contend against the governments of all of the other countries of the league.

By what code of ethics and morals are we to settle the questions that arise from time to time among the members of this league of nations? Are they to have a tribunal that is to decide these questions; and if not, how are the questions to be decided? If they have a tribunal, it will be composed of the partisans of each nation, and, as I have already shown, under existing conditions its membership will be largely made up of kings or the representatives of kings or revolutionists and bolsheviki or the representatives of revolutionists and bolsheviki. But by what code of morals or of ethics are we to decide the questions that arise?

The nations have different religions, different forms of government, different civilizations, and the roots of these differences in many instances go back more than 2,000 years. Are we to undertake now to create a league of nations and set up an international moral code for the other nations of the world? If so, by what principle are we to govern ourselves? China would be invited into this league of nations. She would have to be. She is a great country. She is the first country in the history of the world that ever adopted the doctrine of pacifism. Japan must come in; and yet we say that Japan is pagan, and we say that China is pagan. Shall the "unspeakable Turk" come in; and if so, shall he bring his religion and serapho? How are we to agree upon a code that will accord with the tenets of the Greek Catholic, the Roman Catholic, the various branches of the Protestant Church, the Jewish, the Mohammedan, and the Confucian religion, or the Shintoism and Buddhism of Japan? By what code of morals are we to regulate and set up our standards?

Mr. President, what is to be the policy of this league of na-

tions? Is England to disband her mighty fleet, which we are just now being told has saved the world and civilization? Is there anybody on this earth great enough fool—I intentionally use that harsh term—to believe that England is going into any league of nations upon terms that will compel her to disband her fleet? Why, if England were to disband her fleet and if she then were attacked by any first-class power she could be starved into subjection within 90 days. Does anyone for a moment believe that England will yield her fleet? If, however, England does not yield her fleet and all other nations agree to build no more ships and to be bound by this league of nations, England will be the master nation of the league and so also of the world. All other nations will be subject to her power should she see fit to exercise it. If it be argued that other nations might continue to arm and build ships, notwithstanding the league, such an argument negatives the chief purpose of the league and renders it a useless thing.

Mr. President, you can not imagine this league of nations and attempt to put it into practical application without you will be startled at once by the impossibility of the task you have assumed. If I had before me a map of Europe, I could point out to you the battle fields of this war; I could point to you where the ancient Hun, the ancient Goth, the ancient Vandal and the ancient Gaul fought on these same battle fields 2,000 years ago. The struggle that has been going on in Europe has, of course, had its recent irritating causes, but its ancient causes can be traced back to times before the birth of Christ, when Teuton met Gaul, and upon the ground now wet with new-drawn blood of their descendants. For 20 centuries the races of Europe have fought for supremacy.

The animosities and hatreds that have been engendered during all the bloody years are to-day as bitter as they were hundreds of years ago. Let me cite you one comparatively recent illustration: Centuries ago Bohemia was overcome by Austria. At that time Bohemia had the greatest university in Europe; over 6,000 students gathered at Prague from all parts of the known world. The court of Bohemia was one of the most brilliant in existence. In one battle Bohemia lost her liberty, and from that time to this the Austrian oppressor has been engaged in endeavoring to exterminate the Bohemian people, not physi-

cally, but to exterminate their love of country, their recollection of the glory of the past, their national spirit. Austria has undertaken to deprive them of their very language; she has imprisoned them; she has hanged them upon scaffolds; she has caused them to be shot by squads of soldiers. Yet the Bohemian continued to hate his oppressor and to love his country so passionately that in the present war Bohemian regiment after Bohemian regiment have refused to obey the orders of their oppressors and at the very first opportunity they raised the flag of revolt. To-day they are seeking to rear again the structure of their ancient State.

Mr. President, that same kind of race hatred and love of country exists to-day in Hungary, where the Magyar has placed his powerful hand upon a conquered race. So through all these European countries—and I do not pause to go into any analysis of their history—we will find these rival races, these rival bloods, these hatreds that are 2,000 years old, these animosities that will spring into flame so long as there are men and women on this earth.

Likewise there exists the ambitions of kings, the ambitions of peoples, the desire of the Teuton to get to the sea and to live in a bigger way, the desire of other nations to hold him back, the determination of the Turk to control the Bosphorus, the fixed purpose of European nations to acquire it, the desire of France to extend her borders toward Germany, the desire of Germany to absorb France, the desire of Greece to reclaim her ancient glories, the desire of Italy to push her borders into Austrian territory, the desire of England that her drumbeat shall not only follow the sun in its course, but that it shall be heard beneath every star that shines between the North Pole and the Southern Cross—these ambitions and these desires are part of the life, the soul, the blood, the history of these peoples.

These controversies will spring into action every 10 years of the world's history. There will be wars in Europe, wars that have an European origin, wars that have an European basis, wars that have back of them European ambitions and hatreds. Into all of those wars, into all of those turmoils, into all of that maelstrom of hatred and ambition, it is proposed to thrust the United States for all time. It is proposed that every time there is a quarrel in Europe the United States must draw her sword;

it is proposed that every time there is a cloud of war anywhere upon the horizon of Europe we shall summon our soldiers. Our boys must be dragged from the factories and offices and farms, that we shall make the draft a permanent institution. That we shall tear these youths from their homes and families and send them across the sea; that we shall pour out their blood in quarrels between nations that are 3,000 miles from our shores, and in controversies that affect us not the slightest jot or tittle.

Mr. President, we have had one of these wars. I do not complain because we entered it. We entered it because Germany violated her rights on the high seas; but shall that be a reason for changing our policy? For nearly a century and a half we have adhered to the policy of Washington. We have pursued the march of empire, of glory, and of peace. It may also be said that in all that long time we have had no European war. The war of 1812 was really the aftermath of the war of 1776, growing out of that and out of our weakened condition. I do not count it. It is impossible that such a war should occur again. The War with Spain—the little 90-day War with Spain—occurred, I honestly believe, through a mistake rather than through a crime; but let us call it a war. They did not count as much sir, as the death roll of a five-minute battle in this war. They did not count as much in money as we are spending in two days' time. In the long flight of years we have stood in our place of isolation; we have stood proudly by ourselves, independent, powerful, great, peaceful, and prosperous.

Because Germany finally violated our rights on the seas and we were obliged to enter a controversy against her, is that any reason why we should by solemn bargain agree to become a party to every European quarrel that may hereafter occur? Is that any reason why our boy should be taken from his home, why the draft should be imposed, why we should plunge ourselves into endless debt?

This war, brought on, as I have stated by the reason of the violation of our rights, will have cost us, I believe, before we are through, more than \$50,000,000,000. It has cost us a toll in life I do not know how great, because the returns are not here yet.

Many of these sorrows are still to come to our people; yet, in the face of that, we have the monstrous doctrine proposed that

America shall bind herself into a league of nations that will compel her to become a part and parcel of every European quarrel; and this is to be the case whether the quarrel is occasioned by the ambitions of kings or by the outbreaks of anarchists and socialists and Bolsheviks, who seek to overturn existing governments whether republics or monarchies.

I protest—I protest in the name of the mothers of the Republic. I protest in the name of the boys of the land—that it is not only our high duty to keep free from European quarrels in the future, but it is our duty just as soon as this war can be honorably ended to call back to this country, as fast as ships will bring them, the last one of our American soldiers. That it is duty to restore them to their homes; to give them back to the creative arts and industries; to give them the chance to build homes and to rear families. It is our duty to open to them the doors of schools and universities. It is our duty to invite them to enjoy the glories of that peace they have so nobly fought to attain. It is our duty to give notice now and here that the Republic will continue to adhere to her ancient policy of isolation and independence.

Why is there not a great enough field for the American statesman? Is any man so ambitious that he can not find in the thing I am about to present a sufficiently alluring picture?

To our south lie the great nations of South America. They are only half developed. They have a people that are naturally our allies and our friends. Their commerce ought to be our commerce; our commerce ought to be their commerce. Our friendship ought to be their friendship; their friendship ought to be our friendship. We are bound together by ties of interest and amity. Surely here one can visualize a field of national influence glorious and splendid, not only for us but for them. The contemplation of such a picture ought to gratify all ambitions, all yearnings for power and greatness.

Mr. President, the life of this Republic may hang upon this decision. We can not engage in these foreign alliances without making mutual bargains. We can not call upon them to protect us unless we agree to protect them. We cannot expect them to come to our relief in a controversy unless we go to the relief of each of them in their controversies. The man who proposes to thrust America into the broils and wars of Europe, binding her

for all time to the intrigues and conspiracies and ambitions of the courts of kings and czars and such governments as may exist, who proposes to reverse the policy of Washington, the opinions of Jefferson, the doctrines of the fathers, advocates that which may unmake this great Republic.

THE CORNERSTONE OF PEACE¹

The American Economist submits that, notwithstanding the lofty aims of Mr. Wilson, the variety of interpretations placed upon the proposal for a League of Nations, and the manifest confusion of thought in the proposal itself, affords abundant ground for serious reflection.

It is said that the league and the clear definitions of its objects "is in a sense the most essential part of the peace settlement itself"; and at the same time that "it cannot be formed now."

It is said that the league must not remain in abeyance until the work of reconstruction begins, for it must form the most essential part of the peace settlement itself.

It is said that the proposed league has nothing to do with the economic system "which," as the London Times says, "each future member of the league may have devised to suit itself"; whereas Mr. Wilson said:

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

It is said that the League of Nations at first must exclude Germany; and yet according to Mr. Wilson the league must be the most essential part of the peace settlement itself, and Germany, of course, is to participate in the peace settlement.

It is said that the league must forever exclude economic weapons except as a means of discipline and control; and yet the English papers declare that England must not surrender her economic weapons. For example, the London Times says:

It is true enough that our own Free Trade system was probably initiated in the first instance in the sanguine hope that the whole world would

¹ American Economist. p. 222. October 18, 1918.

follow the example. It found us, as a matter of fact, at the very crisis of our fortunes, without a single imitator among the great nations of the earth, very largely dependent upon our enemies for supplies, and permeated with hostile agents. That position is now being redeemed under stress of war. We shall not lightly return hereafter to our old helpless tolerance.

It would appear that a League of Nations as the cornerstone of peace, wherein each nation would surrender a large portion if not all of its nationality, and enter into a realm of internationalism founded on free trade, and a world federation founded on brotherhood alone, is a dream that cannot be realized at least at this stage of world development.

Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" is swept aside with the declaration that "only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights."

It seems reasonable to suppose that if Washington meant only "special and limited alliances," he would have said so. But he meant what he said, and warned his country against all entangling alliances, special and general, limited and unlimited. Furthermore, if special and limited alliances entangle some, why will not general and unlimited alliances entangle more? An evil made general dies not become a virtue.

If to the one stern problem of establishing and securing a peace of justice and righteousness are added the countless and contradictory visions and emotions and dreams of theorists; if to the one serious question of securing America's peace and safety—her industrial and economic safety—are added visions of international brotherhood and cosmic beatitudes through a League of Nations, there will be no peace.

Washington was right; and no sophistry, no clever rhetoric can sweep aside his warning. America's dangers are greater to-day than ever. Lifted by a world war to a dazzling place of supremacy and power; her coffers filled with gold; her profits fabulous; her workers intoxicated with high wages; her many industries turned into fountains of war material; her whole government centralized and bureaucratized to the limit; her responsible leaders clothed with almost unlimited authority; America occupies a proud but perilous place.

The great danger is that a so-called "democratic peace" will involve America in socialistic, political and economic complications calculated to undermine her institutions.

And what is a "democratic peace," pray? Why democratic? Is this a democratic war, and therefore there must be democratic peace? Why not plain "peace"?

It is not true that "our soldiers struggle to create a new internationalism which shall be embodied in a world federation with power as well as might behind its decrees." Our soldiers struggle to protect America from wrong, injustice and perhaps political, industrial and economic slavery. The peace that America wants and demands does not involve a League of Nations, or a World Federation. It is not a "democratic peace" but an "American peace" that we want. That is the corner-stone of the structure.

* * * * *

The American Economist predicts that the proposed League of Nations will be a failure, if its promoters insist upon incorporating in it the doctrine of free-trade; for such a reactionary doctrine will not be acceptable to the wise and far-seeing leaders of the respective nations. For that very reason America cannot afford to join such a league.

The policy of protection is manifestly liberal and progressive.

If co-operation is a liberal doctrine, then free-trade is not liberal, for the latter increases competition.

The only kind of co-operation among nations that is practical and workable is that whereby each will protect itself to the fullest degree, and thereby become strong to contribute its utmost to the common good by international commerce based on fair trade and not free-trade; and fair trade must take into consideration labor and other costs of production.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN JEOPARDY¹

Manifestly not one problem but a whole group of most complex problems will unavoidably arise when there is an attempt to construct a League with all the incidents and powers which it must possess. And yet it is just such questions—generally touched by rude hands—that are the seed-beds of war. These difficulties and others which I need not name may be ultimately overcome. A great idea has come into the political world, and there may prove sufficient driving power, foresight, imagination, and tenacity of purpose to bring it to fruition. Obviously all that is proposed cannot be accomplished at once or, it is probable, without many troublesome preliminaries, repeated attempts, and much effort. There is no example of an organisation equally comprehensive being constructed without long preparation. The Holy Roman Empire preceded the German Constitution created by the Peace of Westphalia. It was recast by Napoleon, and again by the Allies in 1815, and it did not take its present form until it had been repeatedly modified. The Swiss Confederation, as it now exists, is the last stage in a development going back to the League of the three Communities in 1291. Analogies drawn from the United States of America are deceptive. There were attempts at federation before the Colonies separated from the Mother Country. Penn and Franklin preceded the authors of the Declaration of Independence, and the loose confederation of 1781 led up to that which exists to-day. The elements of "The Federation of Europe" do not yet exist. The phrase may be a useful or pleasing metaphor; passed off as a reality, it is a delusion. Experience in constitution-making seems to prove that what is small and fragile at first may have unlimited power of growth, while that which is huge at its birth is often a short-lived monstrosity. The more the programme of the League is studied the more apparent is it that the advance must be by slow stages. "Supernationalism" must come gradually.

It is noticeable that of late counter-proposals are coming to

¹ By John Macdonell, Editor of the *Journal of Comparative Legislation and member of the Sub-Commission to South Africa. In Contemporary Review* for August, 1918.

the front. There are suggestions for the establishment of a League of Neutrals; the Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 is to be revived with new strength. It is not improbable that, if the League of Nations were likely to be formidable, German diplomatists would counter it by declaring themselves in favor of such a scheme, which would enable them to bring forward, under the name of "freedom of the seas" proposals intended to cripple the naval-power of England. Dr. Shadwell has thrown out the idea of "the creation of a new balance of power on a world-wide scale by the formation of two Leagues of Nations, which might be called the Land League and the Sea League, because the first would be connected by land and the second by sea. It would not mean real peace, but it might prevent minor wars and preserve the world from war for a long time."

These are only two examples of schemes which may be used to defeat or delay the League of Nations if its friends ask too much. The question presses, Could not something useful, though necessarily imperfect be done with little delay? Could not the Entente Powers continue to act together after peace, and by joint economic pressure carry out the main object of a League of Nations? Exercised by the United States along with the other Allies, it might against some countries be irresistible. The chief possible forms of it are these: (a) Entire stoppage of intercourse; (b) refusal to admit ships of the offending nation to the ports of members of the League; (c) differential dues against the offender; (d) refusal to supply raw materials; (e) refusal to admit emigrants; (f) refusal to allow loans to be brought out or securities to be quoted. I admit that the history of nonintercourse measures is not encouraging. They were tried twice by the United States, and with indifferent success. The first Embargo Act was intended by its author, Jefferson, to be a substitute for war. It was, he said, to save the nation at once from risks and horrors of war, and to set an example to the world by showing that nations may be brought to justice by appeals to their interests as well as by appeals to arms. The measure, no doubt, caused much waste, and roused angry feelings. It was imperfectly carried out. It proved injurious to friends almost as much as to enemies. The second Embargo Act of 1808 was also somewhat of a failure, according to Madison, "because the Government did not sufficiently distrust those

whose successful violence against the law had led to the general discontent which called for its repeal!" "The states themselves," says President Wilson in his History, "suffered more from the Act than the nations whose trade they struck at. America's own trade was ruined. Ships rotted at the wharves—the ships which but yesterday carried the commerce of the world. The quays were deserted. Nothing would sell any more at its old price. The Southern planters suffered even more keenly than the New England merchants. Their tobacco, rice, and cotton could not be sold, and yet their farm hands, who were slaves, could not be discharged and had to be maintained. The wheat and live stock of the Middle States lost half their market. It was mere bankruptcy for the whole country. No vigilance or compulsion could really enforce the Act, it is true. Smuggling took the place of legitimate trade."

This experience is not conclusive. Non-intercourse is only one of several practicable forms of economic coercion. The interdependence of nations is much greater than it was in 1808. At all events, economic pressure is not attended with some of the dangers inseparable from the creation of a large army placed at the disposal of the majority of the members of the League. Still, no doubt such measures would again fail if one half of the people were not in earnest in the desire for peace, and the other half were indifferent to anything but "business as before," which was the state of things when Jefferson applied economic pressure to England and France. With such conditions and such a prevalent temper no League of Nations is likely to succeed.

A great idea having entered the world, let it not vanish in misty sentiment, or fail by trying too much. There is a loss almost as deplorable as that of young lives—the suffering of enthusiasm which does not come more than once in several generations, to cool down or be dissipated, the failure to make use of a large idea of international relations, which has penetrated many minds never before open to it. Much thinking needed for the greater task has yet to be done; something smaller but not without value is possible; and the seed of further achievements may be sown without waiting. The basis of a League sufficient to do good work already exists.

"We have," to quote Lord Parker's wise words, "a number

of nations, great and small, united by the common conception of war as a danger to civilisation, and by determination that on no future occasion will they (out of regard for their private advantage) stand by and see wrong done by the powerful to the weak. My fear has been, and is, that we should lose the practical advantage which we have gained by a fruitless endeavor to secure theoretic perfection. Let us see if we cannot give greater permanence to the existing alliance which might well be done during the war and which, if done, might have a potent influence in settling the terms of peace rather than something which, if possible at all, is only possible after long negotiation and discussion, which cannot conveniently take place as long as the war lasts."

LORD CECIL IN FAVOR OF A WORLD LEAGUE¹

London, Feb. 15.—Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, who announced in the House of Commons recently that he himself had prepared a plan for a league of nations, discussed the whole problem today. While declining to give a detailed outline of his plan, which, with others, is now engaging the consideration of the British Government, he indicated several conclusions to which his study of the problem had led him.

"The first and most important matter to be insured by any adequate league of nations," said Lord Robert, "is that no nation shall go to war until the matter in dispute has been submitted to international consideration. If at first the league of nations gets no further than this it will be worth while, and a beginning would be made from which wider development is possible in due course."

"One thing that promises success for the league of nations idea," said Lord Robert, "is that the world for the first time in history is prepared to give it favorable consideration. Until the outbreak of this war public opinion, internationally speaking, was never favorable. That has been changed, and there will be

¹ From the New York Times, February 16, 1918.

a vehement desire on all sides at the close of this war to consider seriously every proposal that promises to prevent any such struggle occurring again."

FAVORS USING ECONOMIC WEAPON

"Every student of the League of Nations idea," he continued, "finds certain difficulties at the outset. One of these is how the decrees of such a league can be enforced. It is natural to draw an analogy between the growth of international law and order with the growth of law and order within an individual country, and, while I admit that such an analogy must not be carried too far, I find much that is instructive in the development of our English commonwealth from the state of anarchy which existed over a long period after the Wars of the Roses.

"How did a strong English King finally gain ascendancy and control over the warring Barons? He instituted a central body which enforced decrees on the Barons largely by economic means.

"I am convinced that that is the line upon which a league of nations may hope to proceed effectively. My experience in the present war has taught me the great power of an economic weapon. How would a league of nations use it? Well, for example, if any nation went to war with another without submitting its dispute to international consideration, it would forthwith be cut off from commercial intercourse with every member of the league. That would be a tremendous weapon, and one that few, if any, nations would care to defy.

"The first thing to be done is to decide definitely what laws we shall try to enforce through our league of nations, and since we are starting from the beginning we should have these laws as simple as possible. Now, even today, I doubt whether it is yet possible to induce the nations of the world to put themselves completely under control of any international organization. Many nations would still, consciously or unconsciously, reserve the right to defend for themselves what they regard as vital interests to their existence.

"I do not believe that feeling will be found to have completely vanished at the end of this war. I, therefore, am disposed to aim at the rather moderate and cautious step, and will

consider that we have done well if we feel that we are moving more freely and soundly than if we advanced too rapidly. It may be that we shall be unable to go further at first than to lay down the dictum that no nation shall engage in war until the matter under dispute has been submitted to international consideration. Even that would be a great advantage.

AFRAID OF ELABORATE SCHEMES

"I rely rather on international conference than on international tribunals in dealing with the larger international disputes. The most desirable step, in my opinion, is to get nations into the habit of settling their own differences by other means than war and to lay down such regulations as will enforce this habit.

"If prolonged international consideration of the League of Nations idea shows that we can go still further, nobody will be more rejoiced than I, but I am a little afraid when I see some of the elaborate schemes arranged in various quarters. They will be found open to many objections when they come to the international table for examination, and I am afraid that the enemies of this great reform, who will not dare to oppose it directly, will try to destroy it by nibbling at it with objections to details.

"Finally, I would say that although a league of nations to be perfect should embrace all nations of the world, it may have to begin with a more restricted membership, so to insure that only those nations which sincerely favor it shall be partners."

He said he could not believe that agreements for disarmament were practicable at the present time, because it was impossible under present circumstances to put credence in the signatures or written words of certain nations. He went on:

"But disarmament will come of itself in time. A hundred years ago no man in England went out into the street at night without arms. Today not one man in a thousand carries any weapon. The disarmament of nations will come similarly, as soon as they are able to regard themselves safe in the world's highways."

THE BACKGROUND OF AGGRESSION¹

In his book *The League of Nations*, Mr. Brailsford, approaching the problem in something of the spirit of the scientific criminologist, has shown very clearly—more clearly perhaps than has been shown by any other writer—the danger which threatens the whole device of a League of Nations as a solvent of international anarchy. On the side of the English and the Americans a League of Nations is conceived mainly as a means of coercing disturbers of the existing order. And they so conceive it because the existing order of the world, with the great undeveloped spaces in their possession and no historical grievances to redress, is for them, on the whole, a very satisfactory order. But to certain other peoples, and notably the peoples of the Central Empires, the mere crystallization of the existing order may represent nothing more than the confirmation of the privileges of triumphant force which they are entitled to upset by a "righteous rebellion" whenever the opportunity should present itself. Until we have taken more fully into account the weight of this consideration, and all that is implied in it, we shall fail to win the peoples of the Central Empires to real coöperation in lasting peace. So far, almost all the plans for the maintenance of peace, of Anglo-Saxon origin, are marked by the outstanding characteristic of early methods of maintaining peace within the state. The problem is conceived first and last as one of repression. Having drawn a new map, we are to see that respect for it is enforced by preponderant power. Such a conception, of course, implies, not only that the world as now organized internationally, or with such redistribution of territory as the Allies may enforce at the peace, with about the currently accepted principles of national rights, economic and political, is in itself just, but that it will remain so permanently.

The solution is not a matter of map drawing, but of modifying the rights which have heretofore attached to national sovereignty. M. Ribot says Alsace-Lorraine "be-

¹ By Norman Angell. In the *New Republic*. September 8, 1917.
p. 150.

longs" to France; Bethmann-Holweg that it "belongs" to Germany. But if we could imagine the provinces being handed over to France, and France exercising the rights of "proprietorship" hitherto recognized as belonging to national proprietorship, and shutting out Germany from access to the ore fields of Lorraine (thus depriving them of a necessary element of their economic welfare), we have merely created conditions morally certain to render impossible that form of the German spirit which we all admit to be indispensable to the destruction of German militarism and to the permanent peace of the world. On the other side, so long as Germany regards her sovereignty in Alsace as an absolute thing not to be limited by definite obligations to the peoples of those provinces and to the world, France will oppose any real reconciliation with Germany, and make our League of Nations a fiction. No mere manipulation of the map will save us from either horn of the dilemma.

The question Mr. Brailsford has set himself to answer is: "Under what political and economic conditions would the creation of a League of Nations be a hopeful venture?" Whatever the answer, it must include a very great change in our conception of national right and international obligation. The independence and sovereignty of states must no longer, for instance, include the right to block the necessary access of other states to the seas, or, in certain cases, to raw materials and markets. The whole question of sea law and belligerent rights must be approached from a new angle. There must be some means of change, even of frontiers, without war. A League to Enforce Peace that enforced the resolutions of the Paris Conference, sustained the right of one empire to make a preserve of its dependent undeveloped territories, of some small state to block the natural economic highway of a large one, would really be one group of nations maintaining by force special privileges as against another group excluded from them. It would merely be the old conflict of Alliance or Balance of Power in a new form.

Yet we are not ready for the very profound modification of political ideas touching national independence and sovereignty necessary to make a League of Nations workable, and consequently any settlement a very hopeful one. For the

League of Nations must be an integral part of the settlement, if even on its territorial side it is to offer hopes of permanence. The prevailing conception of the League to Enforce Peace, even among supporters, is that of a piece of machinery to be brought into being after the war, not at all a part of the problem of the war itself and related to its conduct and conclusion. Yet, if it is not a reality to the extent of being a living policy with obvious chances of success, when we come to make peace the parties to the settlement will be concerned mainly to secure their own safety by preponderance and "strategic frontiers." And the necessary violation of national rights involved in that will condemn any subsequent League to failure. "The two questions," says Mr. Brailsford most truly, "must be solved as a whole. The settlement must be the preparation for any future Society of Nations. The stability and efficacy of a League of Nations depend not merely on the wise drafting of its constitution, but also on the solution reached in the war settlement of our problems of nationality, colonial expansion, international trade, sea power and alliances."

Any attempt to settle questions of nationality without taking into account the two dominant motives which determine the policy of the great Powers is bound to fail. Those two dominant motives are first security, and secondly vital economic interest. At present the great Powers have no security but their own strength, actual and potential. That compels them, not only, as already indicated, to violate the principle of nationality in order to secure strategic frontiers, but to add by annexation to their own forces human and material, and to weaken those of a possible enemy; while the economic motive pushes to the same violations in order that the possession of a given territory may secure freedom of economic movements to the sea, or access to raw materials or markets.

The danger of these violations is not confined to the Central Powers. The same considerations have stood for generations, and stand to-day, in the way not only of an independent Ireland, but of an Ireland having the same autonomy as a British self-governing colony. Mr. Brailsford notes some of the other Allied cases:

Italy, in order that she may have unchallenged naval control of the Adriatic and certain ports for commercial purposes, is claiming the larger part of Dalmatia, where the Italians are outnumbered more than ten to one. Thus, not only would Slovenes, Croats and Serbs be placed under the government of a tiny minority of aliens, but the retention of this country by an alien clique might shut out from free access to the sea more than fifty millions of Germans, Maygars and Slavs.

Take the cause of an independent Bohemia. One-third of its population would be Maygar or German—a far more important minority than that of Ulster which has so long helped to make the settlement of Ireland impossible; and in the case of Bohemia it would be complicated by the language question, which does not exist in Ireland. And whereas Ireland is at least open to the world by her ports, Bohemia is wedged in territorially between her enemies, whose access to the sea her allies would be blocking.

Rumania in entering the war laid claims to Austrian territory which as a whole would contain as many Maygars and Germans as Rumanians. In the case of one district the Rumanians would be a tiny minority.

The Allies, in order to weaken Bulgaria, proposed to reconquer Macedonia for the Serbs, although the greater part of the country is emphatically and even fanatically Bulgarian by allegiance and choice, and although the Powers previously allotted the country to Bulgaria, and although the second Balkan war was due to Serbia's refusal to give effect to the European decision.

And these are but samples on the Allied side of the fence. If the Allies, who proclaim themselves to be fighting for nationality and the rights of all people to their own government, feel themselves justified on behalf of security in violating their own principles to that extent, what may we not expect from Germans and Austrians who do not emphasize that purpose? If the need for security justifies it, the Germans, who will be the weaker and more unpopular group, will be able to invoke it with very much greater force.

We are still as nations a very long way from the conception that our national independence must be limited by

our international obligations. The old nationalist notion that there is something derogatory and unpatriotic in ceding any part of our national sovereignty or independence has still an almost fanatical strength. And we have no clear idea of just how far that sovereignty and independence must be ceded for the purpose of international organization for security. It is these two things mainly—the force of the old conceptions and the lack of any definiteness of a newer principle—which stand mainly, and will stand at the peace, in the way of settlement.

The disturbing fact in connection therewith is that these changes in conception and principle cannot be made by the public opinion of a great country from one day to another. Coming to the settlement dominated by the old notions of international law, independence, sovereignty, it would tend to compel the rejection of new and strange principles.

The only way to break down the strangeness which at the crucial moment may cause new principles to be misunderstood and misinterpreted is to ensure their thorough discussion beforehand. But upon that discussion there has been placed an almost official ban. By some sort of miracle the democracies are to be fitted to face entirely new conditions and apply new policies, with no preparation whatever, without that discussion which is the chief means of political education. Even certain peace organizations, whose purpose is to prepare the world for the difficult problems of internationalism, have laid down the strange doctrine that these matters should not be studied by the mass at all just now. They may be studied when the damage is done, when, hurried at some juncture into a rapid settlement, mankind may find itself committed to decisions which, as Mr. Lloyd George said the other day, may bind them for generations, but which may well defeat the objects for which the war is being fought.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

It should be clearly understood that any such plan of international coöperation as this league of nations, would involve the giving up by each nation included in the league of the absolute right of its government to deal finally and without appeal except to war, with questions arising out of treaties or relations between itself and some other government. Little serious progress can be made in getting rid of war and in better organizing the world until the free peoples are ready to have their several governments take this long step forward.

It is important that this league of nations should begin by not attempting too much. The line of least resistance, and therefore of greatest possible progress, is to lay stress upon the power and authority of a single international judicial authority, and to accustom the public opinion of the world to seek and to defer to the findings of such authority. All international agreements between members of the league would in effect be acts of international legislation, and in due time some formal international legislative body might be brought into existence. It would be much better, however, to give this body a chance to grow up naturally, rather than to attempt to bring it into existence as part of a logical and systematically worked-out plan.

Such a league of nations as is here outlined will rest upon a moral foundation. Its aim will be to advance the good order, the satisfaction and the happiness of the world. It will not be, and should not be, merely a league to enforce peace. A league of that name might well rest solely upon force and entirely overlook both law and equity. Doubtless Germany and Austria-Hungary now feel that they are joint and several members of a highly meritorious league to enforce peace—peace upon their own terms and as they conceive it. A league of nations that aims to declare and to enforce principles of international law and justice, will of necessity be a league to establish peace, because it will be a league to establish those foundations upon which alone permanent peace can rest.

¹ By Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University. In the London Daily Chronicle, July 27, 1918.

WHY PEACE MUST BE ENFORCED¹

Three main sanctions have been suggested for the international law which a League of Peace will formulate and maintain. I leave out of account diplomatic pressure, because diplomatic pressure has never been accounted sufficient when a real crisis arises. The three are:

- I. Public opinion.
- II. Economic pressure.
- III. Force.

Let us take them up in order.

First, Public opinion. Of course, no sanction can have the effect desired unless it is strong enough to deter those who are tempted to disregard it. Can public opinion do this? Can it of itself compel obedience to international law? While it is an axiom of political science that no law can be enforced contrary to public opinion, the converse is, of course, not true. Public opinion can no more prevent a great nation violating the canons of international law, as has amply been demonstrated in the present war, than can the public opinion within a nation apprehend a criminal or put down a riot. Public opinion must sustain international law and approve its enforcement, but public opinion as a substitute for force is a pure chimera.

Second, Economic pressure. Will non-intercourse or economic pressure be sufficient to enforce the rules of the league? This phase of the question has been little discussed until very recently.

The argument runs that if a nation were absolutely cut off from all intercourse with the rest of the world it would suffer so severely that it would have to give in. If all credit, all loans, all trade were stopped, if even letters and telegrams were prohibited, no nation could endure such a strangling isolation and would come to terms.

Mr. Herbert S. Houston, in his address before the International Peace Conference at the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco last October, expresses this view most succinctly when he says:

¹ By Hamilton Holt. *Independent*. p. 212. February 5, 1917.

The most effective factors in world-wide economic pressure, such as would be required to compel nations to take justiciable issues to a World Court for decision are a group of international forces. Today money is international because in all civilized countries it has gold as the common basis. Credit based on gold is international. Commerce based on money and on credit is international. Then the amazing network of agencies by which money and credit and commerce are employed in the world are also international. Take the stock exchanges, the cables, the wireless, the international postal service and the wonderful modern facilities for communication and intercommunication, all these are international forces. They are common to all nations. In the truest sense they are independent of race, of language, of religion, of culture, of government, and of every other human limitation. That is one of their chief merits in making them the most effective possible power used in the form of economic pressure to put behind a World Court.

Now while economic embargoes would undoubtedly exert a very great pressure in international affairs, and would doubtless, in many instances, be sufficient to bring about a recourse to courts and councils of conciliation, there are several reasons to think it would not always avail. Two of the most important are as follows:

Economic pressure can never be as great as physical pressure, both by the very nature of the case, and because, as President Lowell of Harvard University has recently pointed out, "the resistance of the interests effected will be at least as great against an economic boycott as against war, and they will be constantly striving to break it down, whereas, war once declared silences opposition—a fact which any nation that thought of defying a League of Peace would not fail to note."

The proposal to resort to non-intercourse will have to meet this practical difficulty. When such a measure is to be employed how can the coercing powers equitably apportion the pressure among themselves? In undertaking to employ military force this may not be quite so difficult, but when economic pressure is to be employed, it is conceivable that a single nation may have to bear practically the entire cost of the undertaking. In fact every nation which is party to the league, as has been said by the minority report of the "Committee of the American Chambers of Commerce" would have to be prepared to risk, or sacrifice for the time its entire trade with an offending nation, even tho other members of the league suffered no corresponding loss. Unless the nations were willing to devise some plan by which the nation that suffered the most from the loss of trade would be compensated by the others this objection might be almost insuperable.

Third, Force. If public opinion and economic pressure will

not always and invariably suffice to compel a recourse to the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, we must evidently fall back on force as the ultimate sanction. For, as Woolf says in *The New Statesman*, July 10, 1915, "The maintenance of overwhelming power in the great nations and the continuance of their agreement" are the only guarantee of the future peace of the world.

The nations are now living in a world in which there are laws to prevent war but no force to compel a resort to them. It would be an exact parallel if within the state there were elaborate laws governing the conduct of persons engaged in riots, murder and violence but none to prevent riot, murder and violence and no police to enforce them. This aspect of the case has recently been discussed by Elihu Root, who says:

Many states have grown so great that there is no power capable of imposing punishment upon them except the power of collective civilization outside the state . . . and the only possibility of establishing real restraint by law seems to remain to give effect to the undoubted will of the vast majority of mankind.

In other words, Mr. Root proposes to establish an international criminal law.

If, then, we must have force as the ultimate sanction to bring the nations before the courts and councils, are there not times when economic pressure will do just as well as force and the nations will not have to resort to the bloody arbitrament of war? Or, if force cannot entirely be dispensed with, why might not some members of the league be permitted to use economic force while the other fight? Let us take up the latter question first.

There can be no doubt that if a nation knows that certainly, instantly and concordedly all the other nations will make war against it the minute it begins hostilities, such a nation will not break the peace as long as the force of the league is unquestionably superior to its own force. In other words, the certainty that an overwhelming force will be used means that practically it never will be used. The only conceivable contingency in which the force of the league might not be effective would be in the improbably but not impossibly rare case when the members of the league divide into two nearly equal groups, as the American states did in the Civil War. Such a contingency, tho remote, can, of course, never be absolutely guarded against.

But the real danger of trying to separate economic from military pressure and exerting it independently lies in this fact: If the choice is open as to which course may be pursued, delay and parleying ensue after the danger has arisen, and that in turn would give the offending nation opportunity to befog the issue with intrigue, with the possibility that either nothing at all would be done, and the guilty nation escape punishment, or else the intrigue would continue until war would become inevitable. On the other hand, if the offending nation knew that no parleying and intrigue could prevent instant military intervention it would behave itself from the beginning and neither injustice nor war would be nearly so likely to ensue.

Several of the various American peace organizations, as well as the American Chamber of Commerce, which represent the business life of the United States, have express a belief that there is a stage in the proceedings before hostilities are actually reached where economic pressure might advantageously be applied. There are two stages, it is claimed, in which joint intervention of the league might take place, to put pressure upon a recalcitrant nation. The first stage is that in which war is being threatened by one power against a second when an ultimatum might be presented and the mobilization of troops begun. This would be the stage for economic pressure. But once actual hostilities or invasion had ensued the second stage would be reached and military pressure automatically applied. The League to Enforce Peace has been willing to accept an amendment granting the value of economic pressure before military pressure, provided military pressure follows the instant hostilities begin. But the probability is that there would not be a sufficiently extended time between the ultimatum and actual hostilities in modern warfare to bring economic pressure into action or to permit pressure to exert any deterrent effect on the nation bent on war. In other words, economic pressure is of more theoretical than practical value, since modern wars begin so suddenly.

In taking up the question of whether all members of the league must invariably furnish their quota of force against the recalcitrant nation, there can be no doubt that if it is necessary it must be done. But as a practical proposition, if all nations

exert economic pressure it may be sufficient for certain nations of the league alone to furnish the military force.

When the Hague Court announced its decision in the Venezuela case in 1904 it called upon the United States to see that its decree was carried out. When the allied nations lifted the siege of Peking, only those sent troops who happened to have them in Asia. . . . The United States alone is amply able to protect all foreign interests in Mexico with her own forces. The question of how and in what measure the force of the league shall be used is, after all, a practical one to be decided at the time. The only important thing is to have each nation prepared to use its force to the utmost if necessary.

INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE¹

The purpose of the League is to organize the world's strength into an international police to enforce a procedure with respect to issues likely to lead to war which will prevent all wars but those which nothing can prevent.

The procedure to be enforced is the submission of questions of a legal nature, the decision of which must be guided by rules of law, to an international court for its judgment, and the submission of all other questions to an impartial commission to hear and decide, its decision to take the form of a recommendation of compromise. The judgment of the legal question by the court will be legally and in honor binding on the parties. That is implied in a submission to a court. The recommendation of compromise, however, is not in law or in honor binding unless the parties accept it. The League does not propose to enforce either. Some time if the League comes into successful operation it may be thought well to enforce judgment just as domestic judgments are enforced. The difficulty, however, that even the Supreme Court of the United States has in enforcing its judgments against sovereign states may give pause in taking that step.

¹ By William Howard Taft, President of the League to Enforce Peace. From an article in "The Nation's Business," published by the United States Chamber of Commerce.

The enforcement and recommendations of compromise presents a still more serious problem. Nations may well hesitate to submit questions of policy and vital interests to the unlimited discretion of arbitrators, unguided by settled principles of law, for their final decision, and its enforcement by the world police.

Practically if we enforce the procedure of the League, we shall take a step which will rid us of most wars. If every issue between nations is forced to arbitration and judgment or recommendation of compromise, it will compel deliberation by those who think of war, it will enable the quarreling peoples to understand what it is they are to fight about, and what the attitude of their opponents is. The decision of impartial tribunals can not but have great influence, and will form the public opinion of the world. The period of delay itself will abate heat and induce calmer views. It is the successful practice of arbitration that leads to its adoption. . .

To make arbitration useful, the state of mind of nations in regard to arbitration should be that of the strict and orthodox Puritans, that one must be willing to be damned if he would be saved. Practice in arbitrations produces this state of mind and this confidence in the method, the League enforces this practice, the educational effect of which upon nations in showing the possibility of such peaceful settlement of disputes will be invaluable. The procedure will become as of course and the habit of such settlement will be formed.

But the Pacifist asks why use force at all. Why is not a general agreement by all the world to arbitrate enough? The belligerent nations will not regard mere promises an adequate guaranty. They will insist on adding as a sanction the fear of international police. Every domestic community, however law-abiding its citizens, provides a police force to suppress disturbers of the peace. Many people would never create disturbances, but others would do so, unless they knew that police representing the full power of all for the common good would restrain them.

The potential existence of a police force of such overwhelming nature as the united armies and navies of the world would furnish, and the threat of destructive isolation by a withdrawal of all commerce with all neighbors, would,

except in rare cases, accomplish the purpose of this organization of world force without its use.

A second reason why the agreement to contribute to an international police force is a great improvement over a mere general treaty to arbitrate all differences between all nations is that where no force is behind a treaty as a sanction, no one is especially interested in the performance of the treaty except the two nations who have a difference.

If one of the two nations fails or refuses to arbitrate as agreed, the other nations, though signatories to the treaty, look on and are sorry, but they have no responsibility or motive which leads them to exert pressure upon the recalcitrant nation. In our League, however, every member in order to avoid contributing to the police, is deeply interested to secure peaceful compliance with the procedure. This motive will arouse a world public opinion, having an ever operating and selfishly active influence. The diplomatic pressure that all those not in the quarrel will thus bring to bear on those who are, will be most effective to prevent hostilities. . . .

The Monroe Doctrine does not grow out of rules of international law. It is a policy to be pursued in our own interest and to be maintained by us by force if questioned. No nation can deny our legal right to exclude whom we will from our shores, or to deny to whom we will our citizenship unless we have contracted these rights away. If it is said that such questions might nevertheless be held by the International Court to be of a legal nature, they are so clearly not in that category that a specific provision defining them as non-justiciable issues could, doubtless with the consent of all the powers, be inserted in the Treaty. If therefore we do not accept the recommendation of compromise, on the Monroe Doctrine or our Immigration policy, honor will not require us to acquiesce in it. Thus we shall be no worse off as to such issues than if we had not entered the League. Neither the delay nor the hearing would prejudice us because we are now under treaty obligation with most of the world not to begin hostilities for a year after the issue arises, and to have an investigation by an impartial tribunal meantime.

The League instead of being an abandonment of the Mon-

roe Doctrine will aid in its maintenance because violations of the Monroe Doctrine beginning with threatened hostilities by a European or Asiatic power against one of the American Republics would be halted by the League with an examination of the ground of quarrel by a court or commission.

Then it is said that the League is unconstitutional in that it will turn over to a council of representatives of all the world power to plunge us into war, whereas the Constitution vests Congress alone with power to declare. This is a misconception. We enter into the treaty through the treaty-making power of the President and the Senate. The treaty binds us in a certain event to contribute our share to a world police force and thus help to restrain or suppress the beginning of war in violation of the terms of the League. Our nation must perform this obligation in the way enjoined by the Constitution. That is, Congress must act by proper declaration, furnish the force and authorize the Executive to act. The course is exactly the same in a national promise to pay money to another nation. The treaty-making power makes the agreement, and when the time for performance arrives Congress must make the appropriation. In either case Congress may refuse to do so and thus break the obligation which honorably binds the Government, but the original agreement is not therefore unconstitutional.

If Congress recognizes the binding force of the obligations, Congress must still determine and is the only power which can determine whether the event has occurred which requires the United States to furnish its quota of police. Therefore, the League is neither unconstitutional nor does it put in the hands of a council of foreign nations to plunge us into hostilities unless Congress decides that under the League the time has arrived for us to take action.

OPPOSITION TO FORCE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE LEAGUE¹

All international associations or agreements for the promotion of the world's peace have hitherto been voluntary; that is, there has been no sanction behind the decisions of the international tribunals or behind the international agreements.

If any signatory of the agreements or treaties, or any party to arbitration, declined to be bound by a decision of the tribunal which had been created or by the provisions of an international convention, there was no means of compelling such signatory to abide by them, a fact which has been most dismally demonstrated since this war began.

The chief practical result of international associations for the promotion of peace has taken the form of arrangements for the arbitration of disputed questions. The subjects of these arbitrations have been limited and the submission of the nations to the international tribunals and their decisions has been purely voluntary. Much good has been obtained by voluntary arbitration. Many minor questions which a hundred years ago led to reprisals, and sometimes to war, have been removed from the region of armed hostilities and brought within the range of peaceable settlement. Voluntary arbitrations, which have gone on in steadily increasing number and in the promotion of which the United States has played a large, creditable, and influential part, have now reached, as they were certain to do, their natural limits; that is, they have been made to cover in practice all the questions which can at present be covered by voluntary arbitration. The efforts which have been made to carry voluntary arbitration beyond its proper sphere—like our recent treaties involving a year's delay and attempting to deal with the vital interests of nations—are useless but by no means harmless. They are distinctly mischievous, because in time of stress and peril no nation would regard them, and a treaty which

¹ By Henry Cabot Lodge, Head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. From a speech delivered in the Senate, February 1, 1917.

can not be or will not be scrupulously fulfilled, is infinitely worse than no treaty at all. No greater harm can be done to the cause of peace between the nations than to make treaties which will not be under all conditions scrupulously observed. The disregard of treaties is a most prolific cause of war. Nothing has done more to envenom feeling in the present war or to prolong it than the disregard of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and the further disregard of the Hague conventions, for this has implanted in the minds of men the belief that treaties bring no settlement and are not worth the paper upon which they are written; that the only security of peace is to be found in the destruction of the enemy and in placing an opponent in a physical condition where he is unable to renew war, because there is no assurance of safety in a duly ratified treaty.

If, then, voluntary arbitration and voluntary agreements, by convention or otherwise, without any sanction, have reached their limits, what is the next step? There is only one possible advance, and that is to put a sanction behind the decision of an international tribunal or behind an agreement of the nations; in other words, to create a power to enforce the decree of the international courts or the provisions of the international agreements. There is no other solution.

I have given a great deal of thought to this question and I admit that at first it seemed to me that it might be possible to put force behind the world's peace. The peace and order of towns and cities, of states and nations, are all maintained by force. The force may not be displayed—usually there is no necessity for doing so—but order exists in our towns, in our cities, in our states, and in our Nation, and the decrees of our courts are enforced solely because of the existence of overwhelming force behind them. It is known that behind the decrees of the courts of the United States there is an irresistible force. If the peace of the world is to be maintained as the peace of a city or the internal peace of a nation is maintained, it must be maintained in the same way—by force. To make an agreement among the nations for the maintenance of peace and leave it to each nation to decide whether its force should be used in a given case to prevent war between two or more other nations of the world, does

not advance us at all; we are still under the voluntary system. There is no escape from the conclusion that if we are to go beyond purely voluntary arbitration and purely voluntary agreements, actual international force must be placed behind the decisions or the agreements. There is no halfway house to stop at. The system must be either voluntary or there must be force behind the agreement or the decision. It makes no difference whether that force is expressed by armies and navies, or by economic coercion, as suggested by Sir Frederick Pollock. It is always force, and it is of little consequence whether the recalcitrant nation is brought to obedience by armed men and all the circumstance of war, or by commercial ruin, popular suffering and, perhaps, starvation, inflicted by the major force of mankind under the direction of the League for Peace. It is ever and always force....

I know well the question which can be put to me, and probably will be put to me here and elsewhere: "Are you, then, unwilling to use the power and influence of the United States for the promotion of the permanent peace of the world?" Not at all; there is nothing that I have so much at heart. But I do not, in my eagerness to promote the permanent peace of the world, desire to involve this country in a scheme which may create a situation worse than that which now exists. Sometimes it is better to "bear those ills which we have than fly to others that we know not of." There are measures which will promote peace and which are wholly practicable. The first and most important is the protection of our own peace against foreign attack. That can only be done by national defense, and we have no adequate national defense now. We have no means of repelling the invasion of a great power as it must be repelled, and such weakness, combined with great wealth, constitutes an invitation and a temptation to war. Against that danger we should insure ourselves by adequate national defenses, and by reducing the danger of war being forced upon us we to that extent promote the peace of mankind and we likewise put ourselves in a position where our influence and power in the world for the maintenance of general peace would be enormously increased.

The next thing to which we ought to address ourselves on

the conclusion of this war should be the rehabilitation and re-establishment of international law. International law represents a great mass of customs and usages which have become law and which have been observed, cited, and referred to by the nations. International law has had an ever-increasing power on the conduct of nations toward each other. The fact that it has been violated and disregarded in many instances during the present conflict is no reason for adopting the counsel of despair and saying that it is of no value and must be abandoned. It is of enormous value and should be restored and upbuilt on the conclusion of this war with all the energy and influence which we can bring to bear. We should try also, within the necessary and natural limits, to extend the use of voluntary arbitration, so far as possible, and create, as we can well do, a powerful public opinion behind the system. We can also do much in urging a general reduction of armaments by all nations.

GERMANY AND A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

In view of the position taken later on in this article it is necessary to remind the reader that from the beginning of the great war the writer urged America's entry into it to defeat Prussianism. A single extract from a statement he was privileged to make to *The New York Tribune* a few weeks after the war began, namely, September 19, 1914, will serve to establish this:

The cruel way in which devoted little Belgium is being trampled to death simply because it lay in the path of a war-mad Government makes one's blood boil. The Germans, dominated by a ruthless military class, are moving back the practices of the world. . . . I am not in favor of the United States embroiling itself unnecessarily in European controversies, but a state of affairs exists in Europe which, if the love of decency in international conduct and of fair play and of common justice is in our hearts, must lead us openly to espouse the cause of England and her allies. . . . Germany is not and has not for years been amenable to reason. Only force will avail. She must be beaten to her knees to stem the flow of barbarism, to free the German masses from the grip of the bureaucracy and ruthless military class, and to arrest militarism itself. . . . The cause of militarism will continue to spread over the world until the bureaucracy and military class of Germany are overthrown.

Holding these views and endeavoring, in his feeble way, by pen and speech to advance them to the very end of the

¹ By Theodore Marburg, formerly United States Minister to Belgium. In *New York Times*, November 24, 1918.

struggle, the writer feels the more at liberty to make an earnest plea now for the generous admission of the new Germany to full membership in the League of Nations. A principal reason for this position is that all the leading plans for a league in America and abroad provide for disciplining a recalcitrant nation. A fundamental provision of all of them is that they will make war in common on the nation which attacks a fellow signatory without previous reference of the dispute to inquiry.

To omit this provision is to fail to discourage war. Development of the various international institutions we have now—Court of Arbitration, Commission of Inquiry, and Hague Conference, will, it is true, make for peace. But only general agreement to use force against a nation which attempts to go to war without previous inquiry into the dispute will positively discourage war. And the world is quite disposed to adopt the positive measure in order to secure that great end.

Now, what will happen if a single one of the great powers is left out of a league which is based upon that principle? Is it not plain that the nation we attempt to discipline will at once fall back on the outsider for help, and that world catastrophe will again ensue? In other words, a sine qua non of the present league plans is that the circle of the league must embrace an overwhelming preponderance of military power, force so overpowering that no nation will be so foolish as to refuse the reasonable demand for an inquiry.

Cropping up here and there is a disposition to treat Germany as an outcast, to exclude her from the League until we ascertain whether the change of spirit be real, i. e., to put her on probation. What could be more conducive to a false start? We have made certain, by the terms of the armistice, that she cannot make another such wanton assault on the peace of the world for years to come. We are forcing her, most properly, by money loss and loss of territory, to expiate her crimes. And the German people themselves are making sure that the "Potsdam gang" shall not again ride their necks. Now let us, for our own sake, act as Christians.

A League of Nations is bound to be supposited on good

faith and on the ultimate triumph of good sense and reason among the many. We begin with faith in Great Britain, France and the United States as our cornerstone, because of kinship—kinship either of ideals and political institutions or of historic background. We move forward to faith in Italy and Japan, as great nations which have a strong sense of right. We include without question the progressive secondary powers, such as Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. We can afford to, with these as a basis—in fact, we must—found the League also on faith in our former enemies, burned white by the fire of an awful experience.

Furthermore, it is union, not dismemberment, that makes for peace. Witness the bloody feuds for generations along the Scotch-English border until these two lands united. Witness the centuries of strife between city, states and principalities in Italy until Cavour came to still it all by creating a united Italy. Witness the early internal condition of all the European lands until strong central government appeared. If Germany and Austria are to be genuinely democratized—and what reason have we to doubt it?—why not encourage continued union, under a system of local self-government throughout the area of each of the former empires? To encourage dismemberment of these states with a view to weakening them is not in the interest of future peace.

Germany's practices in the war are unspeakable. Worse still is the great blood-guilt of bringing on the war. Some things are unforgivable. Frankly, her deeds fall in that category. There will be neither forgetting nor forgiving by the generation that witnessed them. They have all the elements of criminality. Intent was there and the attempt was not abandoned through repentance but only when a full accomplishment of the deed became impossible. But the spirit that informs the criminal law as practiced by the modern world is prevention, not revenge. And this is the spirit which has thus far motived the Allies.

In 1870-71 Germany was not invaded. Not a German building was destroyed. Yet she expected of prostrate France five thousand million francs indemnity and tore from her two fair provinces. Acting on that principle the Allies

would have added to their present demand for reparation untold millions as indemnity for the actual money outlay of the war. But, moved by a high wisdom, they have done nothing of the kind. Not a penny of actual indemnity has been demanded. When some inferior soul cheats us we do not boil over in anger. We feel rather a great pity for the darkness in which it moves. If we feel impelled to bring the culprit before the bar of justice it is by reason of no other motive than public interest.

Just punishment makes for prevention, and this punishment the German people are getting. But the armistice is untouched by the soiling fingers of either revenge or greed. It holds before it the single aim of prevention, and the truly great men who are guiding the destinies of triumphant civilization today see that, in order to prevent a return of the awful experience we have just passed through, we must have international organization from which no great state can be left out.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS¹

To the Editor of The New York Times:

The troublesome question of the freedom of the seas will not be solved until the more important question of a League of Nations is attended to by the statesmen of the great powers. The freedom of the seas and what it means can be comprehended only in the light of the rights of neutrals on the high seas. Freedom of the seas means making the seas free for neutral commerce in time of war. This principle, when applied in a concrete way by American statesmen and writers, has resulted in their advocating the exemption from capture at sea of private property, contraband excepted.

But it is very easy to see that a League of Nations when using a sea power in the interests of the community of nations ought not to have any obstacles placed in the way of making sea power effective. When used for enforcing the principles of international government, no question of neutral rights can be

¹ *New York Times*, November 10, 1918.

raised, for there will not be any such status as neutrality which a nation will be allowed to assume. This, of course, does not mean that the sea power that may be used in the future by the League of Nations will be used in any such way as Germany has used her submarines. The old rules should be followed in respect to saving ocean passengers and crews, it is true. But the old rules of blockade, of contraband, of continuous voyage, will be displaced entirely by the new rule that sea power backed by the community of nations can do all that is necessary to check the warlike operations and the commerce of the nation that is breaking the world's peace.

The United States has constantly advocated the freedom of the seas, because its interests have been along the line of keeping out of war. Its interests have seemed to demand a policy of neutrality, and it has resented the acts of any nation which used its naval power in such a manner as to injure neutral commerce. President Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress of Dec. 7, 1903, recommended that that body authorize the Executive to correspond with the great powers with the view of securing general recognition of the freedom of the seas by the concrete method of exempting private property at sea from capture with the exception of contraband of war. No agreement has ever been reached on the proposition.

The experience of this war, however, has shown that it is impossible to remain neutral when a war is carried on in such a large scale. Our interest in the future would seem to be in co-operating with other nations to prevent as far as possible the outbreak of war. If this co-operation cannot be secured we must fall back on our former proposition and again champion with all our might the freedom of the seas as concretely put forward by President Roosevelt and by earlier leaders of the American people. We shall have to begin once more with the Declaration of Paris, the Declaration of London, and with the more recent Code of Neutral Rights, which has been prepared by the American Institute of International Law.

EARL WILLIS CRECRAFT.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS¹

The Allies have accepted all of the American terms with two exceptions. They have extended the demand for reparation to all damages inflicted upon civilians, and in this the President rightfully concurs. They have questioned the clause demanding the freedom of the seas, but this the President cannot withdraw without repudiating the historic policy of the United States from Washington to Wilson inclusive. The interference of England with our navigation was one of the chief causes of the Revolution, as the Declaration of Independence recites. We fought England again in 1812 in defense of the same right, but failed to get it assured in the Treaty of Ghent. Nor during the century since have we been able to make our views prevail in the world at large and today there seems little chance of it. England and France have always opposed the American doctrine of the freedom of the seas and they still do. Prussia, which was the first of the foreign powers to accept it, has been in the Great War the most ruthless violator of it and we cannot trust her present profession of it. President Wilson's polite but plain spoken remonstrances at the beginning of the war against British interference with the freedom of trade and navigation without even the pretense of a blockade had no effect, and since our sympathy was wholly with the cause of the Allies we had no disposition to insist upon our technical rights. But when Germany began her barbaric warfare upon the high seas we promptly entered the conflict and brought Germany to her knees. It was our third war for the freedom of the seas, or our fourth if we count the war against the Barbary States to protect the shipping of the Mediterranean.

The question must be brought before the peace conference for discussion, but it is evident in advance that the opposition will be too great to carry the idea thru in its original form as enunciated by Franklin, Jefferson and Washington. But the President proposes a different solution:

Second—Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

¹ Independent. p. 196. November 16, 1918.

This asserts the freedom of the seas but not as an inalienable and irreducible natural right. It recognizes that it may be necessary to limit this freedom, but declares that the power to do it shall not as at present be in the hands of whatever nation happens to have at any time the most powerful navy but be exercised solely by international action for international aims. The League of Nations shall be mistress of the seas. In this form the doctrine ought to find acceptance even from those countries that have hitherto opposed it.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE PROGRAM OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE¹

There have been some arguments against the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. One of the most frequently advanced of these arguments is that the carrying out of the platform of the League would violate the so-called Monroe Doctrine. These words, the Monroe Doctrine, have been used to designate or to conceal such a variety of ideas and practices that it is necessary to start with some premise as to what the Monroe Doctrine may be.

If the Monroe Doctrine is, as Professor Bingham says, an "obsolete shibboleth," it is clear that the relation of the platform of the League to its content would be one of historical and speculative interest only. If on the other hand it is, as Mr. Pétin says, the substitution by the United States of an "American law for the general law of nations," the relations of the Monroe Doctrine to the platform of the League would be a fundamental question. If the Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the "supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere" or "supremacy in political leadership," there would also be reason for careful deliberation. A careful investigation would, however, show that the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law.

The statement of the Doctrine has varied. Early discussions

¹ By George Grafton Wilson, professor of international law at Harvard University. Read at the first National Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace at Washington on May 26, 1916, under the general topic "Practicability of the League Program." Reprinted from the World Peace Foundation, vol. vi. No. 4, August, 1916.

in the cabinet before the Doctrine was set forth in Monroe's message seem to have been as lively as some later ones upon the same subject. Jefferson, when consulted upon the advisability of a policy which would not "suffer Europe to intermeddle with *cis-Atlantic affairs*," comparing the Declaration of Independence with this doctrine, said: "That [the Declaration] made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us." In the early days of the Monroe Doctrine the aim was to avoid further European interference in American affairs. Later, particularly from the days of President Polk, the Doctrine assumed a more positive form. Bismarck is reported to have called the Doctrine a piece of "international impertinence." In 1901 President Roosevelt in his annual message declared: "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States," and in 1904 that "the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." President Taft intimated in his message in 1909 that "the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have already disappeared and neither the doctrine as it exists nor any other doctrine of American policy should be permitted to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States."

The construction of the Panama Canal gave rise to new problems. The rumor that foreigners were making purchases of land about Magdalena Bay in Mexico led to pronouncements in the United States Senate in 1912, that the United States could not view foreign possession of this or any such harbor "without grave concern" and it was admitted that this is a "statement of policy, allied to the Monroe Doctrine of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it."

As in the early days the United States considered it within its rights to assert a policy defensive in its nature but for the preservation of its well-being, so in later days the same general policy has taken differing forms. President Wilson early in his administration endeavored to assure the Americas of his desire

for the cordial cooperation of the people of the different nations, and a little later he asserted, "we are friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions"; and, in the same message, he declared that the United States "must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." President Roosevelt had in 1901 asserted that the Doctrine referred not merely to European but to "any non-American power." This was recognized abroad, as Sir Edward Grey said in 1911 of the United States: "They had a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which was that no European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent of America."

In December, 1913, Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, announced a late form of policy, saying: "We have now developed subtler ways than taking their lands. There is the taking of their bonds, for instance. Therefore, the important proposition is that no sort of financial control can, without the consent of the United States, be obtained over these weaker nations which would in effect control their government."

These and many other views as to the significance of the Monroe Doctrine show the varying forms in which the United States has stated its opposition to the permanent occupation of territory or acquisition of political control in the American hemisphere by non-American powers. It has seemed necessary to present these differing ideas of the Monroe Doctrine to show that it is not law and to show that, as a manifestation of policy, it is not set forth in any single formula.

As single nations and as groups of nations have policies which vary in different parts of the world, and as the conflict of policies rather than the violation of established law is the frequent cause of international differences, it is evident that, if the League to Enforce Peace cannot provide any aid in case of conflict of policies, its function will be comparatively restricted. The conflict of policy would rarely take a form which would make justiciable methods practicable as a means to settlement.

This being the case, reference of such matters would be to the council of conciliation provided for in the second article of

the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The first article provides for justiciable questions and the second states:

"All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation."

A dispute in regard to the Monroe Doctrine or involving its principles, whatever they may be, would surely be included in the agreement made by the United States to refer disputes "of every nature whatsoever" to an international commission for investigation and report. This principle has had indorsement by leaders in preceding administrations as well as in the action upon these treaties by the present administration, and is therefore not to be regarded as embodying partisan policies. The United States is already bound to act as regards the Monroe Doctrine in disputes which may arise with most states in a fashion in exact accord with the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The aim of the League is secured when the question which negotiation has been unable to settle is submitted "for hearing, consideration and recommendation," and it makes little difference whether the body to which it is submitted is called an "international commission" or a "council of conciliation."

If, then, the United States and thirty or more nations are already bound to the principle of the second article of the League's platform so far as the Monroe Doctrine and other matters are subjects of dispute, there would seem to be no reason for raising the question of the practicability of that part of the program at the present time. Its practicability has already been formally declared, and, as embodied in treaty provisions, is a part of the law of the land.

Any further discussion as to the practicability of the application of the League's program to differences arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine would involve the question as to whether treaties already made will be observed when put to the test. Put concretely the question may be, will the United States, which has made treaties with certain states agreeing to submit to an international commission disputes "of every nature whatsoever," find it practicable to submit a dispute arising in regard to the Monroe Doctrine to such a commission, or will the United States disregard the treaty, and did the United States so intend in making

the treaty. It is to be hoped, and it must be believed, that these treaties were made in good faith and that the parties to the treaties intend to observe their provisions. It has even been announced that the United States proposes to observe in principle toward other nations not parties to such treaties the conduct prescribed in these treaties. These treaties are called treaties for the "Advancement of Peace" and declare as their object "to contribute to the development of the spirit of universal peace" or "to serve the cause of general peace." Accordingly, the enforcement of these treaties is regarded by these states as at least desirable for the sake of peace.

Under the general practice and law of nations the violation of a treaty may be a just cause of war. If this be so, then it is particularly essential that treaties for "the development of the spirit of universal peace" be kept. It would seem to be a simple proposition that the greater the risk of violation of a treaty the less ready a state will be to violate the treaty. This principle generally prevails, though at times states disregard all risks. If there is behind a treaty the compelling force of the fact of a signed agreement and the physical resources of the other signatory only, the fact of the agreement seems often, even in modern times, to have had little weight, and the sole deterrent seems to have been the physical power which might be felt if the agreement was not observed. This has given rise to the maxim often quoted that "a treaty is as strong as the force behind it." There is undoubtedly some truth in the maxim. The program of the League to Enforce Peace proposes to adopt what is beneficial in the maxim and to put behind treaties a degree of force which weak state might by themselves be unable to command. If, under the provision by which the United States and other states have agreed to refer to an international commission all differences, there is a reservation as regards matters affecting the Monroe Doctrine, this reservation is not expressed or implied.

In brief, the United States would be obliged, so far as members of the League were concerned, to do exactly what it is now obliged by treaty agreement to do with most of the states of the world; and, as these treaty states would probably be the members of the League, the conditions would be changed in no respect, except that behind the treaty obligation would be the sanc-

tion of the justified use of economic and military force in addition to other sanctions.

Further, it may be said if, when in dispute, the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the United States is not a policy upon which the United States is willing to await hearing, consideration and recommendation, then the United States has not acted in good faith in signing these recent treaties; and it may also be said, if the American policy as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine will not stand the test of investigation and consideration, that it is time for the United States to be determining why it should longer give to the Doctrine its support.

As the plan of the League for submission of controversies such as might arise over the Monroe Doctrine has, on the initiative of the United States, already been embodied in treaties with a greater part of the states of the world, such a plan cannot be regarded as impracticable without condemnation of the judgment of those who are in control of the affairs of the world, and this judgment the League to Enforce Peace, having the well-being of the world in view, does not criticize and condemn, but supports and commends.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

The declaration of United States policy associated with the name of President Monroe, but really due to John Quincy Adams, and in some measure also to the suggestions of George Canning (then British Foreign Secretary), was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or limitation which America proposed to place on her own action. She would not interfere in the wars and alliances of the Old World and she expected that in return the states of the Old World would not interfere with the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. If they tried to introduce their political system into the New World they must expect her opposition. This declaration was aimed at the so-called Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, which, having pledged itself to maintain autocratic government in the European continent, was contemplating interference in South America against the insurgent colonies of Spain. Another part

¹ By Viscount Bryce. Nation. 105:659. December 13, 1917.

of Monroe's declaration which referred to territorial aggression by European powers was apparently meant as a warning to Russia, which had advanced large territorial claims in the far Northwest.

The danger that any European power would try to found a new dominion in the Western Hemisphere has latterly seemed too remote to be worth regarding, but what we have recently learned of the far-reaching plans and hopes of the German Government makes it pretty clear that if they had come victorious out of this war, with a navy able to command the Atlantic, they would have endeavored to set up a dependent German state, or perhaps a province of the German Empire, in southern Brazil. This is a region of superb natural resources containing a very large population sprung from Germany, and still speaking German, though there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they desired to exchange their present freedom for the rule of the Prussian officer and the Prussian bureaucracy.

The United States, which would then have had to come to the rescue of Brazil, has fortunately already thrown herself into the conflict for justice, liberty, and the rights of the smaller peoples. Monroe's policy, which was also Washington's, of holding aloof from European complications was long maintained, and wisely maintained, by America, but the current of events has been too strong to make it possible to stand apart any longer. The whole world has now become one, and must remain one for the purposes of politics. No great nation can stand out.

Thus the Monroe Doctrine in its old form may seem to have disappeared; for the counterpart to the exclusion of the European Powers from interfering with the freedom of American states was the abstention of America from interference in European affairs. Yet what has really happened may turn out to be not a supersession of the Doctrine, but rather an extension of what was soundest in its principle. The action of the German Government in proclaiming a general submarine warfare was a threat to which no self-respecting nation could have submitted. It was addressed to the western nations as well as those of Europe. It showed that there were dangers which involved all maritime powers alike and which western nations must join the European allies in combating. The unbridled am-

bition and the aggressive spirit of the German Government are compelling all the nations which love peace and law and freedom to come together to secure for themselves that which America, in proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine against the Holy Alliance, desired to secure for the western continent.

There is need to-day for a League of Nations which will endeavor to extend its protection to all the world and not to one continent only. In any such combination to secure justice and tranquillity based upon right, the presence of the United States would be invaluable and would indeed be necessary if the combination were to secure those blessings for the world.

LORD LANSDOWNE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

The primary condition, if there is to be any chance of providing an effective sanction to prevent the recurrence of aggressive warfare, is a measure of relative disarmament among the nations party to the League. I have noticed that this condition has been overlooked in much of the criticism levelled at the principle of a League of Nations. It is not realised that such a League should be a substitute for the doctrine of "Balance of Power," the favourite phrase of diplomats, and no doubt of importance so long as the doctrine of force prevails in the settlement of international disputes. The result in Europe was aptly summarised by Mr. Asquith. "Such a state of international relationship without any solid foundation, ethical or political, was bound, by its very stability to stimulate naval and military activity. No one felt secure." An effective sanction implies the possibility of an ultimate resort to force, and the armament of each member of the League should not be so constituted as to menace the power of the whole co-partnership, or to necessitate the maintenance, or use, of an unnecessary large co-partnership force. Moreover, if countries accept the burden of maintaining armaments at their present level, it would be contrary to human experience to hope, that they would be anxious to abstain from the use of the costly machinery. There is a

¹ By Lord Parmoor. *Contemporary Review.* p. 10. January, 1918.

further reason which tells in favour of an agreement for a relative all-around measure of disarmament at the present time. Whatever else may be the effect of the present war, it will certainly result in a period of financial exhaustion. The re-establishment of normal conditions will require the use of all available capital for industrial purposes. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has thought it necessary to write a letter to the Press on the security of the National Debt, a letter which would probably not have escaped the Censorship if written by a private individual. It is hardly necessary to write a letter to emphasise so patent a truism as that either the repudiation of the National Debt, or the compulsory reduction in the rate of interest, would mean a disastrous interference with those principles of security and honesty absolutely essential to the maintenance of industrial progress. There is, however, an alternative at hand, which should give greater assurance, than a letter of an individual who happens to be a member of the Government for the time being. An agreement for the relative reduction of armaments would lessen the enormous sums now being spent on the costly plant which modern warfare requires, and tend to redirect science into the more beneficent lines of a research tending to promote, not human destruction, but fresh discovery in alleviation of human suffering and in mitigation of human poverty.

The Papal Note, to which reference is made in the letter, uses the phrase "the establishment of arbitration." Probably this phrase is not used in any technical sense. There are some questions for which arbitration is applicable, and during the last century no fewer than 471 cases of international disputes were settled by arbitration methods. It is, however, of importance to realise that, if a League of Nations is to be a permanent success, a sufficiently strong international tribunal cannot be constituted on the arbitration principle. The weakness of arbitration is that the so-called Arbitration Court is not really an impartial body, but consists of advocates on either side, with selected umpire or umpires. The result is that the decision generally depends not on the judgment of the tribunal, but on that of the individual or individuals, who act as umpire or umpires. Consequently the authority is of a limited character, and the decisions do not carry sufficient weight to build up a body of accepted precedent. A League of Nations requires a permanent

international Court, judicial in character, and with that atmosphere of trained impartiality which is the distinguishing feature of a well-constituted tribunal. This tribunal should be composed of the highest available judicial ability, such as would be likely to ensure a loyal acceptance of its decisions. A Court so constituted would be competent to decide all judiciable questions, such as the interpretation of treaties, and questions capable of judicial treatment. In comparatively modern times, Courts of great authority have been constituted with the best possible results, not international in character, but exercising jurisdiction over independently constituted subject tribunals. Striking illustrations may be found in the Supreme Court of the United States of America, and in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It would be a fitting testimony to the law-abiding instincts of the two Anglo-Saxon communities, if, starting from the experience which they have already gained, they would co-operate in suggesting the framework on which an international tribunal of sufficient weight and authority might be constructed. There are questions other than justiciable which should be referred to a council of conciliation; but space does not enable me to follow further this branch of the subject.

It would be useless to attempt to form a League of Nations, unless the orders made by the International Court are enforceable by adequate sanction. A Court, whose orders could not be enforced, would lose its authority and sink into insignificance. The difficulty of providing a sanction has been recognized from the time of Grotius, who lived through a period of almost continuous devastating warfare, and realised that strong human passions could not be governed without an appeal to force as the ultimate resort. It probably would not be necessary to resort often to such a sanction; but this would largely depend on the prestige and authority of the tribunal, and the extent to which it could demand a loyal acceptance of its decisions. Two methods of sanction have been suggested—the sanction of industrial boycott, and the sanction of armed force. There is no reason why these two forms should not be applied with cumulative effect; but I agree with what was said by Mr. Asquith in an interview in which he referred to an international authority: "That the rule of its authority must be supported in case of need by the strength of all, that is, in the last resort, by armed force."

This implies, that, in the event of disobedience to the orders of the International Court, it might become necessary to use all the force of the League against the peccant nationality. The justification is that, in the face of such a combination, the outbreak of war is improbable, and that, if it does break out, the conditions would be unfavourable to the aggressor, and that, in any event, the waste and ruin would be less terrible than in a world conflagration. The question of sanction was considered in the propositions formulated at the Conference of the League of Nations to enforce peace held in the United States on May 26, 1916. It is said that this meeting was the largest and most distinguished gathering of a voluntary character that ever assembled in the city of Washington. Mr. Taft, the late President of the United States was elected president of the League, and we find in the first chapter that "right thinking men in every land resolved within a week of the beginning of that tragedy (the present war) that it should never be repeated if they could help it. Given this attitude of mind it was inevitable that some sort of creative action should follow, not to stop nor even to limit nor control the war then raging, for all recognised the futility of any such attempt; but to set in motion the machinery that would provide something to take the place of slaughter in settling some, if not all, future international disputes." The principles formulated contained a proposed sanction which was subsequently elaborated in the following form: "The signatory Power shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory." I have been doubtful as to the use of an economic boycott; but the proposal that it should be used as a penalty against any member of the League, which refuses to submit the dispute to an international judicial tribunal, or council of conciliation, before issuing an ultimatum, or threatening war, appears to be a valuable form of sanction which may be adequate without actual resort to military force. Certainly the time has come when an effort should be made to formulate the organisation of a League of Nations on an effective basis. To

the formidable array of authority which Lord Lansdowne quoted in favour of the principle of a League of Nations two further illustrations may be added. In Switzerland a congress of the "Societe Suisse de la Paix" was held which declared that a durable peace ought to "establish respect for treaties, the liberty of nations to dispose freely of themselves, the necessity of compulsory arbitration, the limitation of armaments, the abolition of secret diplomacy, and an agreement between nations to constitute a Society of Nations." Resolutions were further passed calling upon the Swiss Government to summon a conference to examine the conditions under which Switzerland might become a member of the League and to take a suitable opportunity to summon an International Congress to determine the fundamental conditions of the League. In France there has been a difference of opinion, but M. Thomas, formerly French Minister of Munitions, has said, "that after the establishment of the right of France to Alsace-Lorraine, the most important war aim is the establishment of a Society of Nations." I think enough has been said to show the importance of Lord Lansdowne's insistence on a League of Nations as a security against the recurrence of aggressive warfare, and to negative the exaggerated criticism which appears to have been really aimed against any expression of independent opinion. When the Representation of the People Bill has been passed into law, and the House of Commons is renovated by contact with the electorate, there is hope of a freer atmosphere and a less intolerant spirit.

A PEACE LEAGUE BASED ON POPULATION¹

The first essential of a successful league is that it should be constituted in such a manner as would not only lead to the doing of real justice in all disputes, but would also convince each separate nation that that nation was having a fair chance in the activities of the league. Unless real justice is done and unless the nations are satisfied as to the general fairness of the league, the league cannot last very long. It is bound to fall to pieces.

¹ By Arnold Bennett, New York Times Current History. p. 355. August, 1918.

Now let us consider a little what the league at work will actually consist of. It will consist, not of heavenly beings, seraphim, cherubim, saints, and high philosophers removed from the weakness of common beings; it will consist of persons very like you and me, subject to our failings, our weaknesses, and our prejudices. Half of the members of the league, when they assemble in the morning, will be wondering whether or not they can digest their breakfast properly. More than half of them will be open to flattery or to threats, and a great deal more than half of them will have axes to grind.

The existence of the league will not change human nature, and there will be precisely as much human nature within the meetings of the league as there will be outside those meetings. The meetings will be remarkably like other meetings of committees and councils.

It follows, therefore, that important and influential negotiations will go on informally between sundry groups of the league and quite apart from the formal meetings, and that a large proportion of the members will attend the meetings with their minds already made up on points on which their minds are theoretically supposed to be quite open. In other words, the real, effective proceedings of the league will not, after all, be quite so public as we in our innocence may have imagined. There will be an appreciable amount of what we call lobbying; that is, members and groups of members will foregather in private and A will say to B, "Will you vote for my project?" and B will reply to A, "Yes, I will vote for your project, if you will vote for mine," and so on in increasing degrees of complication.

Well, how will the nations of the world agree to constitute the personnel of the league? The principle adopted at the old Hague Conferences was beautifully simple. Forty-four states were represented, and the principle was one nation, one vote. The smaller nations insisted upon this principle as the price of their adhesion. Their argument was that, as each nation was sovereign and independent, all nations were equal and must be equally represented. It was a charming principle and might conceivably work well on the planet Mars, but it could never work well on earth, because

it was so absurdly contrary to all earthly notions of common sense.

Eight great powers of the world—Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Japan, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary—comprise about three-quarters of the total population of the world, and under the one-nation-one-vote scheme they had less than one-fifth of the voting power. Luxemburg and Denmark, with a combined population less than half the population of London, could swamp the vote of the Entire British Empire with its area of 13,000,000 square miles and its population of over 400,000,000 souls. The thing would obviously be ridiculous in any plan for a truly practical and workable league.

The only simple alternative seems to be representation on the basis of population. Democracy is the politics of the future, and this would be a democratic alternative. It would, however, mean that, if Luxemburg had one representative, Britain would have some 1,700 representatives, which is almost as ridiculous as the one-nation-one-vote scheme. The personnel of the league must be kept down to a reasonable size, hence either the smallest states could not be represented at all, or several of them would have to combine together to send a single representative.

But the smaller nations are not of urgent importance. The league is to be chiefly concerned with the prevention of war. The smaller nations would never make war, only the great powers could make war, and it is the representation of the great powers that matters in the constitution of the league. Hence let us glance at a list of the great powers, adding Spain to them, if you like, as Spain did make war not such a long time ago, and see if there is anything curious about it.

There is just this that is curious about it, namely, that two groups dominate it, an Anglo-Saxon group and a Teutonic group. In mentioning a Teutonic group at all I am, of course, assuming that the war is over and the German militarists smashed. Outside these two groups we observe Russia, with a population so gigantic that it could look after itself in the league, and Spain, which would itself be the head of an important group comprising Spanish South America,

and Japan, which is Oriental and incalculable. France and Italy are left out in the cold. They would probably never combine together, and, even if they did, their combined forces would not equal that of Germany alone.

The idea of a league of nations has had some success in France, but only very modified success. Do you wonder why? France, like Italy, may or may not have consciously realized the reason for her coldness toward the idea of a league, but the reason is this: On a population basis of representation France would be simply nowhere in the league; she would be a trifle amid tremendous groups.

There is no suggestion for anything so silly as the old balance of power in what I am saying, but there emphatically is the suggestion of the inevitable drawing together of nations allied alike by race or language, or by both. Undoubtedly lobbying would occur within the great groups, and bargaining would go on, as to which no hint would ever appear in the official proceedings of the league. France, like Italy, naturally fears this, and on a population basis of representation could do almost nothing to counter any movements which she might imagine to be against her interests.

France counts far more than her population in the progress of the world. She is the centre of civilization, the historic nursery of ideas, the admired heroine of the earth, and a league of nations without her whole-souled co-operation is unthinkable; hence her fears must be dissipated, they must have no ground to stand on and no air to breathe.

How can her fears be dissipateed? They can only be dissipated by giving her appreciably larger representation in the league than she is strictly entitled to on a basis of population; the same in less degree with Italy.

I am fully aware that my proposal is a very delicate one, and will arouse many objections; nevertheless I regard the proposal as the *sine qua non* of a successful league of nations. Let this proposal be made, and the idea of the league of nations will instantly jump forward. The proposal involves difficulties, but these difficulties must be met. It involves sacrifices, but greater sacrifices than these will have to be made if a league of nations is to be and is to work.

WILL DEMOCRACY MAKE THE WORLD SAFE?¹

During the past century the great democracies have been making war, threatening war, and preparing for war, much of the time against each other. Their history shows clearly enough that if their neighbors had also been democratic this change alone would not have prevented wars. Nor is the outlook for the future encouraging. Democratic nations are still willing to fight to defend their national interests and policies; they demand their due share of over-sea trade, concessions and colonies—if they are a commercial or expansionist people—no less insistently because they are democratic. But the interests and policies of one nation conflict with those of another; what one democracy regards as a due share of over-sea trade, concessions, and colonies is an undue share to its rival. Each democracy becomes an excited partisan of its own view, ready to back it by force of arms; and the natural result is, as it always has been, wars and rumors of war. There are enough conflicts in national policies today to lead to a dozen future conflicts, even if all the world should be democratic. There is Japan's insistence upon controlling China; our own Monroe Doctrine, when interpreted in a domineering or selfish spirit; England's Persian Gulf Policy; the anti-oriental policy of the United States and the British self-governing colonies; and the expansionist policy of all of the Balkan states. Unless present conditions are changed, the democratic nations of the world, with their conflicting interests, could not maintain world peace, for the next century, even if they wished to maintain it. History, present conditions, and the logic of the situation show that democracy alone will never make the world safe.

In fact, democracy alone,—at least our familiar nationalistic democracy, for we need not consider the new socialistic Bolshevism—however much we value it and however fiercely we intend to fight for it, must be admitted to have exerted, up to the present time, a relatively small influence in hastening international peace. Whatever advance has been made in limiting the

¹ By George H. Blakeslee. In the Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, at the annual meeting held in Worcester, Mass., October 7, 1917.

area of war has thus far in history been accomplished almost solely by another means,—by uniting existing, independent political units into some larger group, thus bringing peace within continually widening areas. The independent primitive families became tribes; the tribes, city states; and the city states, the Roman Empire. After the fall of Rome, the practically independent feudal castles gradually became feudal duchies; the duchies, kingdoms; and finally the kingdoms, the nations and the empires of today. Each stage has brought peace to the previously warring units after they have once been united in the larger organization.

This process has been working out in a striking way in the recent past. Not a long time ago, as we count time in history, Scotland and England were bitter enemies: Scotland, Celtic, and Presbyterian; England, Anglo-Saxon, and Episcopal. For centuries their unending border warfare lasted on,—until finally without conquest these old enemies were united, and co-operated as parts of the larger British nation. The States of Germany continually fought one another until they formed a union, which they later cemented by mutual consent into the present German Empire. However fiercely the Imperial Government may now attack other nations, there is peace between the self-governing states which compose this new federated unit. A similar development took place in Italy. Bitterly and constantly the little Italian city states contended against each other; but they all finally united, in large part by voluntary action, to form the modern kingdom of Italy, and thus brought peace and security to Venice, Florence, Genoa, Milan, and all their warring neighbors within the bounds of the Italian peninsula.

The necessity of some kind of union among independent states, even democratic states, if they are to establish permanent peace, is shown with especial clearness by our own early history. Soon after the coercive hand of the Revolutionary War was relaxed, and our thirteen commonwealths became virtually independent of each other, it took them only a short half dozen years —though they were non-militaristic and intensely democratic—to develop the same kind of disputes and the same spirit of mutual suspicion which we know too well in Europe. New York State ordered its troops to the Vermont border to enforce its boundary claims, while partisans burned houses and murdered

farmers in this contested territory. Connecticut showed a genuine war spirit against Pennsylvania because of the inhuman treatment which the Pennsylvania military authorities inflicted upon the Connecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley. Tariff squabbles of much bitterness arose between New Jersey and Connecticut, on the one hand, and New York on the other. Our democracies were rapidly going the way of the military autocracies of the old world; within these few years five of them went dangerously on the far road which led to inter-state war. But they realized their danger, called an inter-state convention and, after a long discussion, adopted the present federal constitution, which the convention had drawn up. It was not their democracy but their federation which saved them.

If the world's democracies are to keep the peace, they too must follow this historic process and form some greater political organization; without relinquishing their sovereignty they must league themselves together to achieve certain common purposes. Such a union of sovereign or partly sovereign states, that is, a federation, is an American conception. Forty years ago John Fiske pointed out that the idea of federation was America's greatest single contribution to civilization, and declared that it was "one of the most important in the history of mankind." Then he added, prophetically, "the principle of federation . . . broadly stated contains within itself the seeds of permanent peace between nations." It is by federation that our own self-governing, partly sovereign, democratic states—differing in size, population, laws, customs, interests, and each with its local pride—succeed in maintaining peace and harmony throughout our continental-wide areas. It is by federation that the British Commonwealths, which are virtually independent, making even their own tariffs, their own immigration laws, and their own tests of citizenship, find security and the means of settling in common, their common problems.

The nations of the world must adopt this same principle. It is not enough that they become democratic; they must also federate into a great league of peace to protect each other from aggression and to provide means for settling international disputes, and agencies for composing clashes of policy and of interest. The necessity of international organization has frequently been pointed out by the President, and at no time more

earnestly than in his notable war message, when he held up as one of the aims of the United States the creation "of such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and security to all nations and make the world itself free."

But if the final and essential factor in securing permanent peace is a concert or league of nations, why is it considered necessary to have all of the peoples in the league self-governing or democratic? Chiefly for the reason that a thoroughly militarized autocracy by its very nature can not loyally enter into a league of democracies which aims to substitute law, reason, and conciliation for military force, and to reduce national armaments to their lowest limits necessary for the fulfillment of the guarantees of the league. It is militarism more than autocracy which prevents cordial co-operation. An autocracy which is not militaristic would not greatly endanger the world's peace; autocratic China, during most of the past century threatened no country. It is the controlling military caste and the controlling military principle in a great state, whatever its form of government, which stand in the way of membership in a peaceful democratic league. For militarism, necessarily, stands for force and might—the law of the jungle—in foreign relations, and, within its own state, for the supremacy of the military over the civilian element. A state essentially militarized thus represents principles which are directly opposed to those upon which a concert or league of free nations would be built.

This military attitude is well shown by the action of the German Government during the past few decades. It has consistently opposed the various suggestions which have been made looking towards international limitation of armament. Before the Hague Congress of 1907, its leaders stated that it would not even send delegates to the Hague, if the subject of the reduction of armament was to be so much as mentioned. It is Germany which has been the greatest obstacle to the Hague idea, as opposed to the "blood and iron" idea. This fact was recognized in the two conferences of 1899 and 1907; and has been further illustrated by Germany's attitude towards the calling of a third Conference. Dr. Henry Van Dyke has recently shown that all of his efforts as United States Minister at the Hague to forward the assembling of a third Conference were blocked by Germany. This opposition is only to be expected; a

government under military control wishes to rely upon military force—or the fear of it—to back up its policy in dealing with other nations.

But the mass of the people in every great European State, whether its government is under military control or not, desire peace as a permanent basis of international relations, and do not believe in war as a good in itself or as a policy of calculated aggression. They are, however, ready to fight, if necessary, to defend themselves as well as their national rights, interests, and policies. The majority even of the German people have desired to keep the peace: this is clear from such evidence as the secret report on public opinion in Germany prepared by the French Embassy in Berlin in 1913, and published in the French Government Yellow Book in 1914; by the testimony of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister to Berlin for a number of years before the war; and by the observations of Georges Bourdon, the correspondent of the Paris Figaro, who made a study of German sentiment in 1913. But the majority of the German people did not control their government. Even had they controlled it to the extent to which the people of Great Britain, France, and Italy control theirs, there would have been likelihood of war had no international machinery been devised for discussing and settling the clashes of policy between Germany and other Powers, and thus allaying international suspicion and fear, and obviating the resulting rival military preparedness.

What then must be done to make the world safe? *First*, the German people should obtain control of their Imperial government. This change would naturally do away with the insistence, by Germany, of maintaining military force as the sole arbiter in international affairs. *Secondly*, the treaty of peace at the close of the present war should be just; so eminently just to all peoples that the German democracy will be willing to accept it as a somewhat permanent international settlement, and join with the other democracies in safe-guarding it. In such a settlement, "punitive damages, the dismemberment of Empires, and exclusive economic leagues," as President Wilson has well pointed out, must have no place. *Thirdly*, a league or concert should be formed of the self-governing peoples, the democracies of the world, in order to maintain international security, justice, and peace.

History proves, however, that democracies—at least nationalistic democracies—unless leagued together, and thus restrained by the ties which bind them to their fellow members, will in the future as in the past, be carried away, at times, by the militaristic and imperialistic minorities, which exist in some degree in every state—even in our own—and will become aggressive and unscrupulous; unless they devise methods, with force behind them, for adjusting their conflicting claims, interests, and policies, they will occasionally, as has happened so often before,—even when they desire to maintain peace—drift helplessly into war, each fighting in defense of what it regards as its just rights.

The fact that democracies bring peace only when they are leagued or federated is of the greatest practical importance to the United States, and should determine our future international policy. The necessity of having the nations of the world become democracies has been emphasized by the President; but the necessity of grouping these democracies into a concert or league to maintain peace, is not so generally appreciated. Yet the President—backed by such men as Ex-President Taft—has for the past two years repeatedly insisted that to obtain secure peace the democracies must form a league of nations, “a concert of free peoples,” “a partnership of democratic nations.”

It is only by supporting the President in his effort to lead our own and the other free peoples—including a freed and self-governing Germany—into a definite concert of states, that we may, in the truest sense, win the war; that we may secure a reasonable promise of obtaining a permanent international peace and of becoming a non-militaristic world. If we should not succeed in forming such a league, no matter how badly our armies may defeat the German troops, no matter how thoroughly we may democratize the German state, we shall fail to achieve fully our great ultimate purpose in the war. For democracy alone will never make the world safe.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS¹

President Wilson's New York address is remarkable for its emphasis of a league of nations as the "indispensable instrumentality" by which a just and permanent peace can be guaranteed. The ground plan of such a league should be discussed and agreed upon by the people of every nation. The following considerations appear pertinent and valuable:

1. The best model for a league of nations is the American Union. Under our Constitution a group of "free and independent states," thirteen at first, now forty-eight, have kept the peace with one another a hundred and thirty years with the exception of the Civil War. That war was not attributed to any defect in our federal system. No political arrangement that human intelligence can devise will be an absolute guarantee against war.

2. There is free trade throughout our nation. No state can establish commercial barriers or secure selfish economic advantages. Only Congress can regulate commerce between the states and with foreign countries.

3. Our Constitution gives the general government no authority to coerce a state, but delinquent individuals within the states may be coerced. Said Oliver Ellsworth, one of the men that framed the Constitution: "The Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states. If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent state, it would involve the good and the bad, the innocent and the guilty, in the same calamity." The distinction between using force against individuals, which is a proper police function, and using force against collectivities, which is war, was clearly perceived by our fathers. They acted on the principle expressed in Burke's famous dictum: "I do not know how to draw up an indictment against a whole people." This distinction is supremely important in the solution of the problem of world peace.

4. Our Constitution provides a Supreme Court to pass upon disputes between the states, but it makes no provision of force

¹ By Henry W. Pinkham. Public. p. 1338. October 26, 1918.

to compel a state to accept the Court's decision, but depends solely on public opinion as a sanction.

5. Thus our Union is a league of peace and not a "league to enforce peace." Our federal army and navy have never been thought of as instruments for possible use in preventing New York from making war on Pennsylvania, or for intervention in case Massachusetts should attempt to annex Rhode Island. An armed conflict between states or groups of states in our Union is well nigh unthinkable and is not a concern of practical statesmanship. It is only because we have relations with foreign nations that an armament is deemed necessary by any one. But in a world federation there will be no foreign nations in the present sense, that is, no unlimited sovereignties, with the right to make war. Hence there need be no armies and navies, since there is but little reason to fear an invasion from Mars. Disarmament, universal and complete, is the natural accompaniment of the organization of a world league.

CAN MAN ABOLISH WAR?¹

Unless the league of nations is prepared to hold down by force, for an indefinite period, Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, the peace of the world would always be at the mercy of these dissatisfied countries. I can perfectly understand the point of view of an English militarist who argues that there is not room in the world for two great empires, and that Germany must have that idea knocked out of her head once for all. This is a sane and logical point of view. There is no doubt that if the philosophy of Nietzsche is true, and if morals in politics are an affectation, we should exert all our power, now that we have got the world on our side, to dismember the German Empire, to enfeeble her people, and to bar her progress at every point of the compass. But this is a point of view which presupposes the eternity of the sword. It cannot possibly present itself to those who hate war as Kant hated it, and Goethe, and Fichte, and Hegel. It cannot for a moment be entertained by any man who believes in the religious progress of humanity. It is a no-

¹ By Harold Begbie. North American Review. p. 891. June, 1918.

tion, whatever else may be its implications, which makes a scrap of paper of the Gospel of Christ.

But how can we expect Germany and Austria and Turkey and Bulgaria to enter our league of nations if their entrance is to be made in the rags of beggary with the mark of slaves upon their brows? We can force them in such a condition to enter, but with what hope of their co-operation in the great work of world civilization? Surely we must confess that a league of nations so composed would break asunder within measurable time. The conspiracies of the malcontents might fail; their mutinies might be beaten by the police force of the other nations; their revolts might be feeble and short-lived; but such revolts would do something more than disturb the armed peace of the world—they would introduce dangerous controversies into the league.

It seems evident, I think, that if this league of nations is to be formed, and if from this league which, clearly, is only a beginning, the nations are, in the words of the late Lord Salisbury, to be "welded in some international constitution," which he foresaw to be the one eventual security against war, it is, above all other things, necessary that good will should inspire the whole body of nations forming that league.

International federation, which we are now considering, is manifestly the greatest political ideal which presents itself to good men in every country under the sun. If there could be in the world an international court of justice to which every dispute between the federated nations would automatically be referred, and if behind this international court of justice there could be a force of the federated nations to see that its judgments were honored, then surely we might hope with Lord Salisbury for "a long spell of unfettered and prosperous trade and continued peace."

But as soon as we begin to particularize, the obstacles to such an international constitution appear almost insurmountable. For example, let us suppose that France claimed from us the restitution of the Channel Islands and the court decided that we should surrender them. In this case, despite all the difficulties, we might bow with a good grace to the judgment of the court. But suppose that India appealed to the Court for self-government, and was followed by Egypt, and then that Spain came into

court against us, claiming Gibraltar and Malta, would it be easy for us to submit? No one dreams of setting up an international constitution which would merely preserve the status quo; it is obvious that this international constitution must be as adaptable and progressive as a national constitution; that it must be, indeed, the supreme judge of every decade of world politics. Are we, then, quite certain that we could with safety commit our national destinies into the hands of such a constitution? Might not the peace of the world be too high a price to pay for loss of control over our own British destiny?

The Englishmen, of all nationalities, is the freest, and has the notion of freedom in his very blood. The French historian, M. Seignobus, has paid us this complement: "The English people developed the political mechanism of modern Europe, constitutional monarchy, parliamentary government, and safeguards for personal liberty. The other nations have only imitated them." And Professor Ramsay Muir, in Nationalism and Internationalism, shows that England, where equal law was established by the Norman and Angevin kings, was "the first European nation to achieve full consciousness of her nationhood." England, then, is of all countries the least unlikely to resent the decisions of law. She has none of the irritable pride of the parvenu; she is old in her hatred of militarism; she is patient, peace-loving, law-abiding. But who can think of this England allowing an international court of justice to decide for her whether India should be left to a bloody contest between Mussulmans and Hindus, and whether her stupendous work in Egypt should be exposed to the destruction of desert tribes? And if England would not easily submit to such jurisdiction, how can we expect submission from those more arrogant nations in whose blood is the pride of the sword and in whose history is no long tradition of the law?

If we are honest with ourselves, must we not acknowledge that there is some indestructible force in nationalism which insists upon making its own way across the centuries, and which cannot trust itself to the interference of others? Is it not a truth of every educated Englishman's existence that, like Milton, "content with these British islands as my world," he feels the destiny of his country to be something immeasurable greater and infinitely more precious than anything else in politics of

the world? And is it to be expected of other nations that they should submit to a foreign decision matters which they feel to be vital to their destinies—as great and as precious to them as the destiny of his country to be something immeasurably greater such as disputes touching the interpretation of international law, we can imagine any nation submitting to a tribunal of the peoples but not matters which concern their destiny.

And yet it is through this very pressure of nationalism that the world is most likely to reach the ideal goal of international federation. Instead of finding, as so many pacifists have argued, that nationalism is a bar to internationalism, we shall find, I think, that by no other road is internationalism to be reached. But we shall imperil this great hope if we insist upon proceeding with President Wilson's suggestion for a league of nations with any idea in our minds that a mechanical solution can be found for national rivalries. Good will is essential.

Let us beware of pouring the new wine of international fraternity into the old skins of national hatreds. These dreadful hatreds, history teaches us, will pass. But no form of international machinery, even when this present tempest of hatred has passed, can guarantee to the nations of the earth a true and lasting peace until the spirit which animates the relations of states is definitely the spirit of Good Will.

MAN CANNOT LIVE TO HIMSELF ALONE, NOR CAN A NATION¹

There was a time when neighboring countries were as remote from each other, in so far as intercourse and communication are concerned, as though separated by an ocean or a continent. That day has passed.

✓ No longer can any man live to himself alone, nor any nation. The world has become a unit. Crop failure in South America is felt in Europe. A panic in London or New York creates financial depression throughout the world. Industrial difficulties in any one country have their influence in all countries.

¹ From "Brotherhood of Men and Nations," by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. An address delivered before the Civic and Commercial Club of Denver, Colorado, June 13, 1918.

Just as the peace and prosperity of any nation depend upon the happiness and the welfare of all the people in that nation, so the peace and prosperity of the world are dependent upon the happiness and welfare of all the nations of the world. And no force will be so powerful in conserving universal peace and good will after the war is over as the spirit of Brotherhood among men and nations.

When this world struggle is ended, grave questions are sure to arise in the internal life of the several countries involved in it.

Some one has said that the present war is only a curtain raiser compared to the conflicts which are likely to follow when the period of reconstruction is reached.

The progress of events in Russia during the past months gives some indication of the violent differences of opinion which may assert themselves and of the bitter internal dissensions which too often attend the re-birth of a nation.

The patriotism of men of all classes is certain to be severely tested in the readjustments which must follow the war.

During the period of reconstruction the one force to be looked to for the prevention of possible internal wars in the various nations—wars which if they came would be far bloodier and more heartrending than this present war, because between brothers—is the spirit of Brotherhood.

If that spirit shall prevail—influencing as it must and will those who are conservative in their views, to consider the vital questions of the day from all sides, and likewise influencing those who are radical to realize that time is a great force in changing most things, that patience must be called into play and that the progress which is slow is surer than that which is precipitate, then and then only can we expect this critical period to be lived through, and the momentous questions which it will bring satisfactorily adjusted, without further bloodshed and suffering.





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